Smith v. Wisniewski

• Decision Date: 29 December 2022
• Docket Number: COA22-457
• Citation: 2022 NCCOA 930
• Parties: RYAN SMITH, pro se, Plaintiff, v. SUSAN WISNIEWSKI, pro se, and DAVID WISNIEWSKI, pro se, Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

1

2022-NCCOA-930

RYAN SMITH, pro se, Plaintiff, v. SUSAN WISNIEWSKI, pro se, and DAVID WISNIEWSKI, pro se, Defendants.

No. COA22-457

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

December 29, 2022

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 November 2022.

Appeal by plaintiff from order/judgment entered 29 October 2021 by Judge V. A. Davidian, III, in Wake County No. 19 CVD 15443 District Court.

Plaintiff-appellant Ryan Hayden Smith, pro se.

Defendants-appellees Susan and David Wisniewski, pro se.

ZACHARY, JUDGE

¶ 1 This case arises out of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff Ryan Smith and Defendants Susan and David Wisniewski. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order/judgment denying his claims denying Defendants' counterclaim, and imposing sanctions against him pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful review, we affirm in part reverse in part, and remand.

I. Background

¶ 2 Defendants hired Plaintiff to provide legal services to them following a car accident. On 30 May 2019, Defendants signed an engagement contract ("the Contract") prepared by Plaintiff. Pertinent to the present appeal, the Contract contains the following language regarding invoicing:

The Firm will periodically send You invoices that include detailed descriptions of Fees, Costs and Expenses, and/or Disbursements. All invoices are subject to Your verification. Unless otherwise agreed by the Firm in writing, You shall be responsible for full payment of all invoices within seven (7) days of their issue date.

¶ 3 The relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff quickly devolved into disputes "over invoices, the quality and amount of work being performed, and advice being given and received." As the trial court detailed in its findings of fact:

7. [The Contract] clearly says, "All invoices are subject to your verification." Plaintiff drafted his own contract. It is also of note, that . . . Defendants believed [that] Plaintiff was going to "help" them and . . . Defendants wanted to proceed in the car accident case pro se, but the executed contract is a full litigation contract. This also brings into question the "meeting of the minds" and contract formation. While all parties admitted that [the Contract] was signed, it did not state what . . . Defendants' [sic] wanted, but was the standard "full" contract provided by . . . Plaintiff.

8. In fact, . . . Defendants did file a pro se complaint in the car accident case, but under the guidance of . . . Plaintiff. He erroneously or negligently told them to include the insurer (MetLife) in their complaint.

According to . . . Defendants, Plaintiff told them, "they might get away with it because they were pro se." On the other hand, it was his lack of knowledge of how to handle any car accident/personal injury case where an insurance agency is involved because after the contract was signed, he "worked out a deal" with the other side to amend the complaint and add some claims. He either knew it was wrong for it to be in the complaint and sent a pro se litigant on their way with bad and harmful advice or he was not adequately prepared to handle this case per the Rules of Professional Conduct....

9. . . . Defendants clearly and unambiguously disagreed with the invoices in question and questioned the excessive "working of the file" and the redundant work billed by . . . Plaintiff.... Defendants had done much of the busy work themselves in an effort to lower costs, yet . . .

Plaintiff billed for "working the file" which was excessive. This was brought to the attention of . . . Plaintiff.

10. Both parties produced a cornucopia of text messages and emails between them concerning this case, the invoices, and their attorney-client representation.... 11.... Defendants did not provide "verification" to . . .

Plaintiff that they were agreeable with the billing and invoices presented to them. In fact, they conveyed the exact opposite. They were upset and unhappy with the representation and the excess/redundant billing.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 4 By November 2019, the billing impasse reached a point where Defendants' "past due account" with Plaintiff allegedly amounted to nearly $6,000.00. On 12 November 2019, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint ("the collection complaint") against Defendants and their minor child^[1] in Wake County District Court, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

¶ 5 In January 2020, Defendants filed their combined answer and counterclaim for constructive fraud, which they subsequently amended twice. In response to each answer and counterclaim, Plaintiff filed a "counterclaim answer" and ultimately asserted 12 various affirmative defenses. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied on 10 November 2020. Plaintiff proceeded pro se; Defendants hired an attorney for the limited purpose of preparing and filing their second amended answer and counterclaim, but otherwise proceeded pro se.

¶ 6 This matter came on for a bench trial on 10 November and 8 December 2020. At the close of evidence on 8 December, the trial court invited the parties to submit written closing statements for the court's consideration. Both parties opted to submit closing statements to the trial court.^[2]

¶ 7 On 4 February 2021, the trial court called the matter for hearing via videoconference to deliver its oral ruling. The trial court informed the parties that it would deny their respective claims by a written order to follow.^[3] The trial court also informed Plaintiff that it intended to sanction him $2,000.00 pursuant to Rule 11 for "the complaint or the signed documents, or the action is done without factual sufficiency, legal sufficiency, or for an improper purpose, the [c]ourt is cobbling together all of those[.]" Recognizing that Plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the Rule 11 sanctions, and not wanting to "put [Plaintiff] on the spot now," the trial court permitted Plaintiff to submit a written response "to provide case law or something in an argument written, to change [the court's] mind" if Plaintiff wished.

¶ 8 After submitting a request for oral argument on the issue of the Rule 11 sanctions-which the trial court denied-as well as several requests for an extension of time, Plaintiff submitted his written response opposing sanctions. On 29 October 2021, the trial court filed its order/judgment denying Plaintiff's claims, denying Defendants' counterclaim, and sanctioning Plaintiff $2,000.00 pursuant to Rule 11. Plaintiff timely filed notice of appeal.^[4]

II. Discussion

¶ 9 On appeal, Plaintiff first challenges the trial court's denial of his claims. Plaintiff also raises several arguments with regard to the trial court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions: that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by denying him a meaningful opportunity to be heard; that the trial court's order was not based on competent evidence; and that the trial court abused its discretion in assessing sanctions of $2,000.00. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the trial court's bias against him entitles him to a new trial before a different judge.

A. Denial of Plaintiff's Claims

¶ 10 First, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's denial of his claims, alleging that "the evidence introduced at trial does not support the order's findings of fact, and its findings of fact do not support the order's uncited conclusions of law." We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 11 "The standard of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment." Farlow v. Brookbank, 230 N.C.App. 179, 183, 749 S.E.2d 493, 496 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Since the trial judge acts as the factfinder, the trial court resolves any conflicts in the evidence; any findings made by the trial judge are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence." Gribble v. Bostian, 279 N.C.App. 17, 2021-NCCOA-423, ¶ 9, disc. review denied, 375 N.C. 685, 865 S.E.2d 870 (2021). "This is true even though the evidence may also sustain findings to the contrary." Graham v. Martin, 149 N.C.App. 831, 834, 561 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002). Further, "[u]nchallenged findings of fact are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." Treadaway v. Payne, 279 N.C.App. 664, 2021-NCCOA-535, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

¶ 12 "Conclusions of law drawn by the trial judge from the findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal." Gribble, ¶ 9 (citation omitted). When conducting de novo review, "this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." Stikeleather Realty &Invs. Co. v. Broadway, 242 N.C.App. 507, 515, 775 S.E.2d 373, 378 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2. The "Verification" Provision

¶ 13 Plaintiff argues that the trial court "materially misinterpret[ed]" the "verification" language in the Contract "by considering only one sentence." In its findings of fact, the trial court observed that "the breach of contract [claim] boils down to the verification of the invoices by . . . Defendants" and that under the terms of the Contract, "Defendants were required to verify the invoices PRIOR to being liable for paying them. Without this verification by...