Smith v. WMATA, No. 91-CV-529.

• Docket Nº: No. 91-CV-529.
• Citation: 631 A.2d 387
• Case Date: September 16, 1993
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

631 A.2d 387

Carroll SMITH, Appellant,
v.
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Appellees.

No. 91-CV-529.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued May 28, 1992.

Decided September 16, 1993.

631 A.2d 388

Vanessa M. Carpenter, with whom Jay M. Berkowitz, Adelphi, MD, was on the brief, for appellant.

Cynthia R. Mabry, Asst. Gen. Counsel, with whom Robert L. Polk, Gen. Counsel, Arnold I. Melnick, Deputy Gen. Counsel, and Gerard J. Stief, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellee WMATA.

Jonathan S. Resnick, Washington, DC, for appellee Restrepo.

Before FARRELL and WAGNER, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Senior Judge.

631 A.2d 389

GALLAGHER, Senior Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (hereinafter "WMATA") and Alfonso Rojas Restrepo in a negligence action brought by appellant Carroll Smith as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In determining whether summary judgment was properly entered against Smith, the principal issue we are called upon to decide is whether, under the 1982 Compulsory/No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act ("No-Fault Act") (D.C.Code §§ 35-2101 to -2113 (1988 Repl.)), Smith has adequately demonstrated that she meets an exception to the Act's restrictions against tort actions for noneconomic losses. We affirm.

On April 4, 1986, Smith was a passenger aboard a WMATA metro bus when the bus was involved in an accident with a taxicab owned and operated by Restrepo. Smith was injured in the accident and requested, pursuant to the No-Fault Act (D.C.Code § 35-2104 (1988 Repl.)), personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from WMATA for economic losses.¹ Accordingly, WMATA, a self-insurer,² paid Smith PIP benefits for medical expenses and loss of work.

On March 18, 1989, Smith brought suit to recover certain noneconomic losses³ which she contends she is entitled to recover from WMATA under the No-Fault Act. On January 9, 1991, the trial court granted appellees' oral motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. In their motion for summary judgment, filed on January 29, 1991, appellees asserted that "WMATA is self-insured against liability for injury to persons,"⁴ that "at all times material to this action" the No-Fault Act is applicable, that Smith did not incur medical expenses in excess of the medical threshold of Five Thousand dollars,⁵ and there was no genuine issue as to material fact pertaining to Smith's claim.⁶ Consequently, appellees claimed that they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law since Smith elected to receive PIP benefits from WMATA, and thus was prevented from maintaining a tort action for noneconomic losses because she failed to make her prima facie case, pursuant to the No-Fault Act, D.C.Code § 35-2105(b) (1988 Repl.), which requires that the injury directly resulted in:

substantial and medically demonstrable permanent impairment which has significantly affected her ability ... to perform... her professional activities or usual and customary daily activities; or a medically demonstrable impairment that prevents her from performing all or substantially all of the material acts and duties which constitute ... her usual and customary daily activities for more than 180 continuous days.

Smith, in her opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment, claimed that it was a question for the jury to determine whether she had provided sufficient evidence that she met the exception. Smith supported her opposition to the motion

631 A.2d 390

for summary judgment with her answers to interrogatories and an unsigned and unsworn report of her physical examination performed on January 16, 1991. The trial court held a hearing on these issues on April 11, 1991 and, "upon consideration of the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and Opposition and Argument thereon," issued an order granting appellees' motion. It is from this order that Smith appeals.⁷

I.

Both a motion to strike and motion for summary judgment test the legal sufficiency of a cause of action, the former when the pleadings are open, the latter when pleadings are closed. See Camp v. Chase, 39 Conn.Supp. 264, 476 A.2d 1087 (1983). In other words, where the pleadings are closed, the motion for summary judgment, supported by verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, may be used to test whether the party opposing the motion met the threshold question of law at issue. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56. Where the party opposing the motion fails to meet the burden of demonstrating that she has stated a cause of action, then there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Nader, supra, 408 A.2d at 42.

In reviewing the grant of the summary judgment, this court must conduct an independent review of the record, Scrimgeour v. Magazine, 429 A.2d 187, 188 (D.C.1981), and must view the facts in "the light most favorable to the non-moving party," Sayan v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington, D.C., 544 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1988). After the moving party, here appellees, makes its initial requisite showing, the non-moving party, here Smith, "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and must demonstrate that a jury or judge is necessary to resolve the disputed fact. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e); Nader, supra, 408 A.2d at 42. The requisite "showing of a `genuine issue for trial' is predicated upon the existence of a legal theory which remains viable under the asserted version of the facts...." Id. at 48 (quoting McGuire v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 399 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir.1968)). Once movant has made the requisite showing in support of its motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party, in order to make the evidentiary showing that will permit her to advance to trial, must show that she has a plausible ground to maintain the particular cause of action; i.e., she must produce enough evidence to make out a prima facie case in support of her claim. Id. at 48-49.

II.

The No-Fault Act "established a compulsory insurance system for personal injury in which victims of automobile accidents would be compensated irrespective of fault." Dimond v. District of Columbia, 253 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 114, 792 F.2d 179, 182 (1986). Under this Act, no-fault personal injury protection benefits paid by his own insurer compensated a victim for economic detriment incurred as a result of an accident.⁸ Id. at 114-15, 792 F.2d at 182-83. On the other hand, noneconomic losses⁹

631 A.2d 391

could be recovered only by bringing a tort action against the driver "at fault" in an accident, but the No-Fault Act restricted a victims' ability to bring such actions. See Monroe, supra note 5, 540 A.2d at 742. It is a threshold question of law for the court to decide whether appellant has met the strict statutory requirements as set forth in the No-Fault Act sufficient to overcome the Act's restrictions against tort actions for noneconomic losses. Id.

WMATA, in support of its summary judgment motion, has met its requisite initial showing that it is self-insured, that the No-Fault Act applies here, and that appellant has not incurred medical expenses in excess of the medical threshold of Five Thousand Dollars; therefore, the burden of proof shifts to Smith. Thus, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Smith must produce enough evidence through verified pleadings, interrogatories, affidavits, and depositions to demonstrate that she can maintain a cause of action for noneconomic losses under the limitations set forth by the No-Fault Act (D.C.Code § 35-2105(b) (1988 Repl.)). She must show that she suffered a "substantial and medically demonstrable permanent impairment" and/or a "medically demonstrable impairment" that prevented her from "performing all or substantially all of the material acts and duties" of her "usual and customary daily activities for more than 180 continuous days." Id.

In our review of the record, however, we...