Monroe v. Foreman

• Decision Date: 25 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-122.,87-122.
• Citation: 540 A.2d 736
• Parties: Dana O. MONROE, Appellant, v. Anthony Paul FOREMAN, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

540 A.2d 736

Dana O. MONROE, Appellant, v. Anthony Paul FOREMAN, Appellee.

No. 87-122.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 21, 1987.

Decided March 25, 1988.

Henry R. Berger, with whom J. Phillip Kessel, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Karen R. Sistrunk, with whom Ronald C. Jessamy, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, BELSON and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.

NEWMAN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from an Order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Anthony Paul Foreman, in a negligence action brought by Dana O. Monroe, as a result of a motor vehicle accident. In determining whether summary judgment was properly entered against Monroe, the principal issue we are called upon to decide is one of first impression in this court — whether a resident of the District of Columbia, who failed to maintain insurance required by the Compulsory/No Fault Motor Vehicle Act, D.C.Code §§ 35-2101 through 2113 (1985 Supp.), may maintain a negligence action against a resident insured motorist to recover for injuries and damages suffered in an automobile accident in the District of Columbia, including losses which would have been recoverable under an insurance policy for the payment of personal injury protection benefits.¹ We affirm.

I.

At all times relevant herein, the parties were residents of the District of Columbia, and the respective owners of the motor vehicles they were operating at the time of the accident. In his complaint, Monroe alleged that he was ineligible for personal injury protection [hereinafter "PIP"] benefits because he was an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident; he concludes that he was not subject to the civil restriction of the Compulsory/No Fault Motor Vehicle Act, D.C.Code §§ 35-2101 through 2113 (1985 Supp.) [hereinafter the "No-Fault Act"]. Foreman sought summary judgment contending that the action was statutorily barred. Specifically, Foreman asserted that under the No-Fault Act, the negligence action could not be maintained because: (1) Monroe did not incur medical expenses in excess of the $5,000.00 medical threshold; (2) Monroe did not claim nor offer any proof of any permanent injury or impairment; and (3) Monroe's status as an uninsured motorist precluded his recovery of PIP benefits and barred him from maintaining the negligence action.² In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Monroe argued that there was a genuine factual dispute and that Foreman was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

II.

In 1982, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the No-Fault Act, D.C. Code §§ 35-2101 through 35-2113 (1985 Supp.).³ The No-Fault Act mandated that residents and nonresidents, owning or operating motor vehicles in the District of Columbia, maintain, among other things, insurance paying PIP benefits. D.C.Code § 35-2103(a) & (b)(1) (1985 Supp).⁴ The No-Fault Act also restricted the common law right to institute a tort action. D.C. Code § 35-2105(a) (1985 Supp.). Monroe admits that he has neither incurred medical expenses in excess of $5,000.00 nor sustained any permanent injury or impairment.⁵ Accordingly, the issue before us is one of law.

D.C.Code § 35-2105 (a) (1985 Supp.) provides:

(a) Restriction. — [N]o person may maintain a civil action based on liability against any other person, with respect to an injury as to which personal injury protection benefits are payable under this chapter. (Emphasis added.)

D.C.Code § 35-2106 (d) & (e) (1985 Supp.), which pertain to eligibility and ineligibility for PIP benefits, read, in relevant part, as follows:

(d) Eligibility for benefits. — Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) of this section, personal injury protection benefits are payable by the applicable insurer or assigned claims plan for any victim if the accident involved occurs in the District. . . .

(e) Ineligibility for benefits. — (1) No personal injury protection benefits shall be paid with respect to any victim if that victim:

(A) Is, as of the date of the accident, the owner of a motor vehicle involved in the accident resulting in that victim's injury; and

(B) Failed, as of the date of the accident, to provide and maintain insurance for payment of the benefits required by this chapter for personal injury protection.

Monroe contends that the plain reading of these statutory provisions means that he is not subject to the civil restriction because he is ineligible for PIP benefits. Monroe further argues that in the absence of an express declaration abrogating his common law right to institute the negligence action, his right to do so still exists. In contrast, Foreman contends that these statutory provisions must be read in pari materia with the entire No-Fault Act. Foreman asserts that such a reading reveals a legislative intent to preclude Monroe, an uninsured motorist, from recovering PIP benefits and maintaining a negligence action.

In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we must conduct an independent review. Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1175 (D.C. 1986); Holland v. Hannan, 456 A.2d 807, 814 (D.C. 1983). Therefore, like the trial court, we must decide whether there is "no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c); Williams v. Gerstenfeld, supra, 514 A.2d at 1176; Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, (1980); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1083-84 (D.C. 1976).

When we are called upon to interpret a statute, as we are here, our primary task is to be consistent with the legislative intent. See Nova University v. Educational Inst. Licensure Comm'n, 483 A.2d 1172, 1179-80 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 1759, 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985); Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 65 (D.C. 1980) (en banc); District of Columbia National Bank v. District of Columbia, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 198, 348 F.2d 808, 810 (1965). We must "look at the language of the statute itself to see if it is plain and can rationally bear only one meaning, . . . for generally the intent of the legislature can be found in the language used in the statute." Barbour v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 122, 125 (D.C. 1985); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03, 18 S.Ct. 3, 4, 42 L.Ed. 394 (1897); Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., supra, 424 A.2d at 65; Peoples Drug Store, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc). Our review is not limited to reading isolated provisions of the No-Fault Act because such a review may not reveal the true legislative intent. See Howard v. Riggs National Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. 1981); see also Carey v. Crane Serv. Co., 457 A.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. 1983). "It is an accepted principle of law that a statute is to be construed in the context of the entire legislative scheme." Floyd E. Davis Mortgage Corp. v. District of Columbia, 455 A.2d 910, 911 (D.C. 1983) (citation omitted).

At common law, Monroe could maintain this negligence action. Therefore, to adopt the construction of the No-Fault Act urged upon us by Foreman would, indeed, constitute an abrogation of this common law right. There is, however, a presumption against such an abrogation. See Scharfeld v. Richardson, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 379, 133 F.2d 340, 341 (1942). We have stated that "no statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express." Dell v. Department of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 102, 107 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565, 25 L.Ed. 892 (1880)). Because this is a rebuttable presumption, "[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be given to the measure." Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640, 50 S.Ct. 440, 442, 74 L.Ed. 1082 (1930); cf. Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C.) (common law right to institute tort action has been statutorily restricted in workers compensation cases), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 141, 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979). Consequently, our task remains the same — to ascertain and adhere to the legislative intent.

It is undisputed that Monroe was the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the February 1, 1986 accident and that he did not have insurance for the payment of PIP benefits at the time of the accident. Therefore, Monroe cannot receive any payment of PIP benefits. D.C.Code § 35-2106(e) (1985 Supp.). The plain and ordinary meaning of D.C.Code § 35-2106(e) (1985 Supp.) supports this conclusion. Nonetheless, to conclude that Monroe cannot be paid PIP benefits does not end our inquiry. We must still determine the meaning of D.C Code § 35-2106(d) (1985 Supp.). Adhering to the proposition that "generally the intent of the legislature can be found in the language used in the statute," we view the definition of the term "eligibility" found in D.C.Code § 35-2106(d) (1985 Supp.) crucial to the proper resolution of this appeal. Barbour v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., supra, 499 A.2d at 125 (citation omitted).

We must initially look to the statute itself to determine the meaning of the term "eligibility". See id. This term is not statutorily defined. See D.C.Code § 35-2102 (1985 Supp.). As a result, we must then attempt to define the term "eligibility" in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. See Stuart v. American Security Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. 1985); United States v. Bailey, 495 A.2d 756, 760 (D.C. 1985); Barbour v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., supra, 499 A.2d...