Smith v. Young

• Decision Date: 14 October 1893
• Citation: 89 Iowa 338,56 N.W. 506
• Parties: SMITH v. YOUNG ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

89 Iowa 338

56 N.W. 506

SMITH

v.YOUNG ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 14, 1893.

Appeal from district court, Dubuque county; J. L. Husted, Judge.

Action to quiet title to lot 2, in the subdivision of outlot 711, in the city of Dubuque. Joseph Young died intestate, siesed of said lot, in 1844, leaving surviving him his widow, Sally Ann Young, and five children. There was never an administration upon his estate, nor was dower ever assigned. At the time of his decease the dower of the widow was a life estate of one-third. On the 5th day of May, 1846, the widow conveyed her interest in the lot to one Conet, and on the same day Conet conveyed his interest to one Ball. On the 19th day of June, 1846, Ball conveyed it to the widow again. The words of the deed from Ball are: “I do grant, bargain, and sell, and forever quitclaim.” From the death of her husband, in 1844, to the conveyance by her to Ball, the widow occupied the lot in question, and after the conveyance to her by Ball she occupied it continuously till near her death, in February, 1889, except for the years 1852 and 1853, during which years she, having married one Howell, lived with him in St. Paul. Howell died in December, 1853, when she returned to Dubuque, and resided on the lot. During nearly all of the time after the death of Joseph Young, his children, one or more of them, occupied the lot with the widow, either by occupying the house with her or another house on the lot. William Young, one of the defendants, built a house on the lot in 1867, and has lived there since. By her marriage to Howell she had one daughter, who is plaintiff in this suit. On the 10th day of November, 1888, Mrs. Howell conveyed the lot to the plaintiff, by warranty deed, and she brings this suit against the heirs of Joseph Young to quiet the title to the lot in her. The district court made the following findings: “Sally Ann Young had a life estate in 1/3 of the premises in dispute, and that alone. The deed from Mrs. Young to Conet conveyed her life estate only. The deed from Conet to Ball conveyed no other or greater interest, and the deed from Ball to Mrs. Young reinvested her with her original life estate. The deed from Mrs. Young to plaintiff conveyed Mrs. Young's life estate, and no more, and this estate terminated with the death of Mrs. Young. Mrs. Young's possession was neither exclusive nor adverse, in such sense as to furnish her a title based thereon.” From a judgment dismissing her petition, the plaintiff appealed.Monroe M. Cady, for appellant.

P. S. Webster, for appellees.

GRANGER, J.

The legal proposition involved in this case is not difficult. Appellant claims title to the lot only because of adverse possession by her mother or grantor. Had her mother never conveyed to Conet, but continued to occupy the lot, there would have been neither color of title nor claim of right on which to base title by adverse possession. Her interest of a life estate would have given no color to title in her behalf. It would have defined her right as being one of occupancy and use, without title or ownership, and there could be no claim of right except as pertained to the life estate. She knew that she had nothing except her life estate to convey to Conet, nor did her deed purport to convey more. She knew Conet had nothing more...