Smithrud v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 18 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10-4451 (JNE/JSM) |
| Parties | LeRoy Smithrud, Plaintiff, v. City of Minneapolis; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Plaintiff LeRoy Smithrud brought this action against Defendant City of Minneapolis and John and Jane Does 1-10 ("City"), alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3617, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983.1 On July 11, 2011, this Court adopted a Report and Recommendation issued by the Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge, and dismissed Smithrud's Verified Complaint ("Complaint") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smithrud's state law claims, but held that the Court should not have dismissed the federal claims. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for this Court to determine whether the Complaint states a claim under federal law. After supplemental briefing on that issue, the Court concludes that it does not.
Smithrud owned an apartment building at 2400 Dupont Avenue North in Minneapolis. On June 6, 2007, the City's Director of Inspections ordered that the building be demolishedbecause it was a nuisance. Smithrud requested a hearing, and the review panel recommended that the demolition order be upheld. After a committee hearing, the matter was presented to the full city council on August 22, 2008, at which time the city council voted to demolish the building. The decision was approved by the mayor on August 26, 2008.
On October 28, 2008, Smithrud brought an action against the City in the Hennepin County District Court. On October 31, 2008, the state district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding that "[a] city's decision to order demolition of a building is quasi-judicial . . . and therefore a party may obtain review of the decision only by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals." Smithrud v. City of Minneapolis, No. A08-2157 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009). Smithrud at attempted to appeal the City's decision by writ of certiorari in November 2008, but the appeal was dismissed as untimely.2
On November 3, 2010, Smithrud, proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint in this action alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3617, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983. The City moved for dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge, recommended dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed Smithrud's Verified Complaint against the City of Minneapolis.
Smithrud, still proceeding pro se, appealed the dismissal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit agreed that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smithrud's state law claims, but held that the dismissal of the federal claims was improper. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for this Court to determine whether the Complaint states a claim under federal law. This Court then ordered the parties to submit briefs on that issue.3 In addition to addressing whether the Complaint states a claim, the City also asserted that Smithrud's FHA claims were time-barred. Smithrud was permitted to file a response brief on the subject of the FHA's statute of limitations, and the City was permitted to file a reply. All the briefs have now been submitted.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 2011). Although a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content thatallows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Smithrud filed his Complaint when he was proceeding pro se, even though he is now represented by counsel. Although a pro se complaint should be liberally construed, it must still contain specific facts to support its conclusions. Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981).
The court "generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings," but "[i]t may . . . consider some public records, materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings," Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999)), as well as exhibits attached to the pleadings, Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010). Smithrud attached numerous exhibits to his Complaint—the Court will consider those that are relevant to this motion. The Court, however, will not consider the hundreds of pages of documents Smithrud subsequently and impermissibly filed with the Court—to do otherwise would convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment.4 See Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if 'matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.'" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)).
"The [FHA] prohibits property owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b)). The Court need not address whether Smithrud's Complaint states a claim under the FHA because any such claim would be time-barred by the FHA's two-year statute of limitations.
The FHA provides that "[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action . . . not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). "The computation of such 2-year period shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing practice." Id. § 3613(a)(1)(B). The alleged discriminatory housing practices terminated on August 26, 2008, when the decision to demolish Smithrud's property became final. Smithrud's Complaint was dated October 29, 2010, and filed on November 3, 2010. More than two years elapsed between the City's allegedly discriminatory housing practice and the commencement of this action.
Smithrud asserts that the limitations period should be tolled under the FHA's statutory tolling provision. He claims that he presented evidence that he filed a complaint with the U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), which he believes tolled the statute of limitations until the conclusion of his state court proceedings, including the appeals process. In Smithrud's "Memorandum in Response to Defendant City's Post-Remand Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss" (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Response Memorandum," Docket No. 73), he directs the Court to "Exhibit M," but no such exhibit was submitted along with thismemorandum.5 Further, due to the haphazard and chaotic manner in which Smithrud's counsel littered the docket with extraneous and unsolicited filings, locating this purported HUD complaint presented a nearly insurmountable challenge. After unearthing the exhibit, however, the Court still concludes that the FHA's statutory tolling provision does not apply. The exhibit appears to be a letter addressed to the HUD field office in Minneapolis. But there is no indication that the letter was ever actually sent by Smithrud or received by HUD. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(i) (). There is no indication that the Secretary ever acknowledged the purported filing. There is no suggestion that HUD ever knew about, initiated, or participated in any proceeding related to Smithrud's claims. This letter, standing alone, provides no support for the assertion that there was ever an administrative proceeding pending. Smithrud's self-initiated state court lawsuit was not an "administrative proceeding" and did not trigger the FHA's statutory tolling provision.
Smithrud also makes reference to the "continuing violations" doctrine. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982) (...
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