Smithrud v. City of St. Paul

• Decision Date: 18 September 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10-4452 (JNE/JSM)
• Parties: LeRoy Smithrud, Plaintiff, v. City of St. Paul; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

LeRoy Smithrud, Plaintiff,

v.City of St. Paul; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants.

Civil No. 10-4452 (JNE/JSM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Dated: September 18, 2012

ORDER

Plaintiff LeRoy Smithrud brought this action against Defendant City of St. Paul and John and Jane Does 1-10 ("City"), alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4604(a) and (f), the Americans with Disabilities Act, federal civil rights, and state law.¹ On July 11, 2011, this Court dismissed Smithrud's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions that the Court consider whether Smithrud's Verified Complaint ("Complaint") states a claim under federal law. After supplemental briefing on that issue, the Court concludes that it does not.

I. BACKGROUND

Smithrud owned three rental properties in St. Paul, located at 1369 Case, 847 Agate, and 1863 Montana. Smithrud alleges that the City falsely posted the 847 Agate and 1863 Properties as "vacant," and then later declared these properties nuisances. On August 20, 2008, the CityCouncil ordered the demolition of the 847 Agate property. On September 10, 2008, the City Council ordered the demolition of the 1863 Montana property.²

Smithrud brought an action against the City in state court in 2008, under many of the same causes of action as asserted in the current lawsuit. The Ramsey County District Court dismissed Smithrud's lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the only mechanism to review a municipality's quasi-judicial decision is by a petition to the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smithrud's claims. Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, No. A08-2003, 2009 WL 2927389 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009).

On November 3, 2010, Smithrud, proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint in this action alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4604(a), (f), the Americans with Disabilities Act, federal civil rights, and state law.³ He filed a nearly identical complaint against the City of Minneapolis in a related case. Smithrud v. City of Minneapolis, Civ. No. 10-cv-4451(JNE/JSM). The City of Minneapolis moved for dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Honorable Janie S. Mayeron, United States Magistrate Judge, recommended dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed Smithrud's Verified Complaint against the City of Minneapolis. On April 7, 2011, the Court ordered Smithrud to show cause why the Court should not also dismiss his claims against the City of St. Paul for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. After the parties submitted their briefs, the Court dismissed Smithrud's Complaint on July 11, 2011 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Smithrud, still proceeding pro se, appealed the dismissals to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eighth Circuit agreed that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smithrud's state law claims, but held that the dismissal of the federal claims was improper. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for this Court to determine whether the Complaint states a claim under federal law. This Court then ordered the parties to submit briefs on that issue.⁴ In addition to addressing whether the Complaint states a claim, the City also asserted that Smithrud's FHA claims were time-barred. Smithrud was permitted to file a response brief on the subject of the FHA's statute of limitations, and the City was permitted to file a reply. All the briefs have now been submitted.

II. DISCUSSION

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 2011). Although a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Smithrud filed his Complaint when he was proceeding pro se, even though he is now represented by counsel. Although a pro se complaint should be liberally construed, it must still contain specific facts to support its conclusions. Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981).

The court "generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings," but "[i]t may . . . consider some public records, materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999)). The Court may also consider exhibits attached to the pleadings. Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010). In this case, Smithrud submitted nearly three hundred pages of exhibits along with his Complaint—the Court will consider only those exhibits bearing on this motion. The Court, however, will not consider the over two hundred pages of documents Smithrud submitted along with his various (solicited and unsolicited) memoranda and requests.⁵ To do otherwise would convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if 'matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.'" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d))).

A. Fair Housing Act Claims

"The [FHA] prohibits property owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b)). The Court need not address whether Smithrud's Complaint states a claim under the FHA because any such claim would be time-barred by the FHA's two-year statute of limitations.

The FHA provides that "[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action . . . not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). "The computation of such 2-year period shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing practice." Id. § 3613(a)(1)(B). An administrative proceeding is commenced by the aggrieved persons' filing of a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Id. §§ 3610, 3602. Section 3610 provides that "[s]uch complaints shall be in writing and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Secretary requires" and that after a complaint is filed, the Secretary "shall service notice upon the aggrieved person acknowledging such filing and advising the aggrieved person of the time limits and choice of forums provided under this subchapter." Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(ii) & (a)(1)(B)(i).

The alleged discriminatory housing practices terminated on September 10, 2008, when the City Council ordered the demolition of the 1863 Montana property (the City Council orderedthe demolition of the 847 Agate property on August 20, 2008).⁶ Smithrud's Complaint was dated October 29, 2010, and filed on November 3, 2010. More than two years elapsed between the City's allegedly discriminatory housing practice and the commencement of this action.

Smithrud asserts that the limitations period should be tolled under the FHA's statutory tolling provision. He claims that he presented evidence that he filed a complaint with HUD, which he believes tolled the statute of limitations until the conclusion of his state court proceedings, including the appeals process. Smithrud directs the Court to "Exhibit 2," but no "exhibit 2" was submitted along with this motion. See Memorandum in Response to City of St. Paul's Memorandum Requesting Dismissal of Plaintiff's Lawsuit Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), at 2 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Response Memorandum," Docket No. 73). Nor does the HUD complaint properly appear anywhere else in the record.⁷ Even if the Court were to consider the exhibit, the statutory tolling provision still would not apply. The exhibit appears to be a letter addressed to the HUD field office in Minneapolis. But there is no indication that the letter was ever actually sent by Smithrud or received by HUD. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(i) (providing that after a complaint is filed with the Secretary of HUD, the Secretary must serve notice upon the complainant acknowledging the filing). This letter, standing alone, provides no support forthe assertion that there was ever an administrative proceeding pending. Smithrud's self-initiated state court lawsuit was not an "administrative proceeding" and did not trigger the FHA's statutory tolling provision.

Smithrud also makes reference to the "continuing violations"...