Smocks v. Preston Heights Apartments

Decision Date24 October 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 4:22-CV-787
PartiesTROY ANTHONY SMOCKS, Plaintiff, v. PRESTON HEIGHTS APARTMENTS, PRESTON HEIGHTS APARTMENTS, LLC, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Case Back to the State Court (Dkt. #13) and First Amended Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Federal Jurisdiction (Dkt. #14). Having considered the motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the motions should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the events that occurred on January 6 2021, at our nation's capital and the arrests that have since taken place. Plaintiff Troy Anthony Smocks (Smocks) was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) in connection with those events. Smocks lived in an apartment complex in Collin County that was owned by Defendants Preston Heights Apartments and Preston Heights Apartments, LLC (collectively Preston Heights). Preston Heights assisted the JTTF in its investigation into Smocks and Smocks subsequently filed suit.

On January 13, 2021, JTTF agents communicated with Preston Heights regarding the federal investigation into Smocks although they did not have a warrant (Dkt. #2 at p. 7). Preston Heights ultimately provided Smocks' identifying information-including Smocks' social security number phone number, leasing information, and address-and let the JTTF agents set up surveillance on Smocks (Dkt. #2 at pp. 7-8). On January 15, 2021, Preston Heights allowed a team of JTTF agents to access the apartment complex through the security gate to arrest Smocks (Dkt. #2 at pp. 8-9). The agents made the arrest at around 6:35am and had Smocks stand in the street outside where he was wearing nothing but his underwear (Dkt. #2 at pp. 8-9). Smocks' arrest caused a commotion, with large vehicles and flash bang grenades, which Smocks states was only done to wake his neighbors “to further humiliate and embarrass [him] (Dkt. #2 at p. 9). After Smocks was arrested, Preston Heights evicted Smocks for “criminal reason” that Smocks states is “predicated upon the unlawful conduct of the [JTTF] (Dkt. #2 at p. 9).

Smocks has filed suit against Preston Heights because it was acting as an agent for the JTTF during these events, and it “aided, abetted, and or assisted in the unlawful actions taken by the federal government resulting in tortious damages to [Smocks] (Dkt. #2 at p. 9). Smocks has alleged that: (1) he has an invasion of privacy action against Preston Heights for giving out his identifying information to the agents; (2) he is entitled to monetary damages because of his forced eviction; and (3) that Preston Heights intentionally inflicted emotional harm on Smocks based on the public humiliation caused by Preston Heights when they allowed the agents on Smocks' residence. Smocks states that these claims derive from “negligence and wrongful acts of the Apartments and the Owner” because Preston Heights “fail[ed] to reasonably verify the lawfulness, legal status, and authority of [the JTTF] (Dkt. #2 at pp. 6, 9).

On August 4, 2022, Smocks filed the original complaint against Preston Heights in the 471st Judicial Court of Collin County, Texas (Dkt. #2). On September 2, 2022, Preston Heights generally denied the complaint (Dkt. #3), and on September 12, 2022, Preston Heights removed the case (Dkt. #1). On September 14, 2022, Smocks filed what was essentially two different motions in one: (1) a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) a motion to remand based on lack of jurisdiction, but it was considered a deficient filing (Dkt. #5). On September 19, 2022, Preston Heights responded to the deficient motion (Dkt. #7). On September 22, 2022, Smocks filed the two pending motions as separate filings (Dkt. #13; Dkt #14).[1] Although Preston Heights did not respond to these motions individually, the Court will treat Preston Heights' initial response from September 19, 2022, as the responses to the pending motions.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “Only state court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). “In an action that has been removed to federal court, a district court is required to remand the case to state court if, at any time before final judgment, it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Humphrey v. Tex. Gas Serv., No. 1:14-CV-485, 2014 WL 12687831, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2014) (citations omitted). The Court “must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction,” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001), and [a]ny ambiguities are construed against removal and in favor of remand to state court.” Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)). “When considering a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.” Humphrey, 2014 WL 12687831, at *2 (quoting Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723).

One statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, authorizes “federal question” jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Generally, to determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists, courts apply the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011). There is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) when the lawsuit is against an officer of the United States or any person acting under that officer. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989). In those situations, a defendant may remove the case to federal court so long as a federal question is raised in the removal petition. Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136 (“the raising of a federal question in the officer's removal petition . . . constitutes the federal law under which the action against the federal officer arises for Art. III purposes”). For proper removal under § 1442(a), a defendant must show: (1) it has asserted a colorable federal defense; (2) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute; (3) that has acted pursuant to a federal officer's directions; and (4) the charged conduct is connected or associated with an act pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 291.

Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Further, parties may raise objections to subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).

ANALYSIS

In both pending motions, Smocks' asserts the same argument-the Court lacks jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Specifically Smocks argues that Preston Heights has not raised a colorable federal defense as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1442 (Dkt. #14 at p. 3). Therefore, Preston Heights cannot rely on the federal officer statute to assert jurisdiction on federal question grounds. Preston Heights responds that it raised two defenses in its notice of removal, 18 U.S.C. §§ 875, 3052, that are colorable federal defenses that should be available to Preston Heights because Smocks' entire claim relies on the question of whether there was a valid federal investigation and lawful arrest (Dkt. #7 at p. 3). Since the only difference in the two motions is the remedy sought-remand back to state court or dismiss the lawsuit-the Court will consolidate the motions and address whether the Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1442.

As a preliminary matter, Smocks does not contest that Preston Heights satisfies three of the four requirements under the test established in Latiolais. 951 F.3d at 296. Smocks makes two arguments as to why Preston Heights has not satisfied its burden of showing that a colorable federal defense has been established (Dkt. #14 at pp. 3-5). Smocks first states that Preston Heights' motivation to assist the JTTF was due to “political viewpoints share[d] with the agent(s) (Dkt. #14 at p. 4). Smocks then argues that the JTTF agents acted without a warrant when it first contacted Preston Heights (Dkt. #14 at pp. 4-5). The Court will address each argument in turn.

Smocks begins his first argument by stating that the federal officer statute does not apply because a few questions need to be answered before a colorable federal defense can be established.

Smocks asks: “What is a colorable defense? What does it mean to act under color of federal office?” (Dkt. #14 at p. 3). Courts have answered both questions. In Latiolais, the Fifth Circuit found that a federal defense is colorable unless it is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining...

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