Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-4634.
| Decision Date | 03 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-4634. |
| Citation | 785 F. Supp. 71 |
| Parties | Patricia A. SMOLSKY v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Jean M. Handley, G. Sander Davis, William L. Myers, Jr., G. Sander Davis and Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Barry Simon, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Eric Hoffman, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
Presently before the Court is the defendant's motion for reconsideration of the Court's memorandum and order of December 11, 1991, the plaintiff's response, and the defendant's reply. For the following reasons the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
The factual and procedural background of this matter has been set forth in this Court's prior memorandum of December 11, 1991. 780 F.Supp. 283. The defendant argues that the Court applied an inappropriate standard for summary judgment and erred regarding the applicable law. The Court finds no error in the December 11, 1991 memorandum and addresses the defendant's concerns in order.
The defendant is correct in asserting that the party opposing summary judgment must come forward with admissible evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, ___, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3186, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). The Court notes that the parties submitted extensive deposition transcripts and numerous affidavits. The plaintiff has made specific averments in her deposition and subsequent affidavits regarding the elements in her case. The defendant has come forward with evidence to the contrary. Credibility is, therefore, the contested factor in this case. Credibility is not the province of the Court on summary judgment.
The defendant raises five examples as demonstrating how the Court erred in applying the summary judgment standard. On the contrary, the defendant's arguments on each point are essentially that the Court erred in regarding the amount of evidence the plaintiff should have submitted to avoid summary judgment. Rule 56(e) and the Supreme Court decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) require that the plaintiff make a "showing sufficient" to establish the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff has done so in this case. The Court will now briefly address the defendant's five specific contentions.
The Court did not base its decision on foreseeability primarily on the strength of an affidavit supplied by the defendant regarding past emotional problems of the plaintiff, nor on the evidence regarding the purpose behind assigning Dominic Scatasti to his position.1 These first two contentions by the defendant address whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding foreseeability. The Court made clear in the opinion upon what portions of the record the Court relies in finding a genuine issue of material fact on foreseeability. For the purpose of convenience that portion of the Court's decision is restated here:
Contrary to the defendant's argument there is substantial evidence of foreseeability of the injuries of the plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct. The defendant admits it knew of the plaintiff's past emotional problems. (Defendant's Brief pg. 5 n. 3) (Severe anxiety depression caused plaintiff to miss two years of work). The individual who allegedly harassed the plaintiff indicated in his deposition that, when he was assigned to his position, Conrail assigned him because of his intimidating management style. Not only did they know of his propensities but promoted them in order to bring certain offices in line. In addition, the plaintiff did complain several times to managers of equal responsibility of Scatasti but to no avail. The alleged harassment continued unabated until Scatasti was reassigned to another office.... Based on that summary of the plaintiff's position which has plausible support in the record, the Court cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to foreseeability.
Clearly the Court did not rely solely upon those one or two facts. The Court relied on the deposition transcripts and affidavits submitted by both parties. As to the FELA claim, the defendant in the motion for summary judgment challenged the sufficiency of the record on foreseeability. Pages 16 through 19 of the memorandum, a portion of which is restated above, provide a clear and concise analysis of the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. Because the Court has addressed this issue extensively in the original memorandum, this contention is without merit.2
With regard to the third argument of the defendant regarding the chronology of events, the defendant is correct that the Court misstates the chronology. However, upon reconsideration of the foreseeability issues in relation to the proper chronology, the Court finds its error to be irrelevant. The Court's treatment of foreseeability relies not upon the chronology, but upon events occurring before the mistake in the chronology. The actions which the Court reversed in its chronology concern injury and not foreseeability. The Court's analysis above on foreseeability clearly demonstrates the presence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding foreseeability.
The fourth factual contention of the defendant concerns questions of a legal nature. The defendant argues...
To continue reading
Request your trial