Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 90-4634.
• Citation: 780 F. Supp. 283
• Parties: Patricia A. SMOLSKY v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

780 F. Supp. 283

Patricia A. SMOLSKY v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION.

Civ. A. No. 90-4634.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Decided December 11, 1991.

Filed December 12, 1991.

Jean M. Handley, G. Sander Davis, William L. Myers, Jr., G. Sander Davis and Associates, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Barry Simon, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Eric Hoffman, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HUTTON, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff's response and defendant's reply. For the following reasons defendant's motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The complaint in this case was filed on July 16, 1990 and contains two counts. One count alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (hereinafter "FELA") and the other alleges sexual discrimination/hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter Title VII). The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts. The Court will not restate the facts of this case at length as the parties have already done so in their briefs. As will become apparent, most of the facts and characterizations are strongly disputed, especially regarding the incidents of harassment. A general outline will be helpful for understanding the posture of the parties. The facts which are not disputed by the parties are summarized by the Court as follows.

The plaintiff, Patricia A. Smolsky (hereinafter "Smolsky"), was an employee at defendant, Consolidated Rail Corporation (hereinafter "Conrail"), during all times relevant to this matter. Smolsky is still an employee at Conrail. She was employed during all relevant times as a clerical worker and remains so employed. For two days a week for the period March 13, 1989 to June 14, 1989, Smolsky was supervised by Dominic Scatasti (hereinafter "Scatasti"). During this time period, Smolsky alleges she was subject to sexual and non-sexual abuse by Scatasti. The defendant disputes these allegations. The defendant does admit one incident of non-sexual harassment. Scatasti removed the plaintiff's coat and purse from her office to his so that she would have to retrieve them from his office before leaving. The reason for the incident is disputed. During this period both sides agree that Smolsky complained to Jim Knapp about this treatment approximately three times. Jim Knapp was a supervisor of equal responsibility as Scatasti. She also complained about Scatasti's harassment of her to Vince Frascino, another supervisor. She also complained to her union representative who relayed the complaint to Jim Knapp. One of defendant's employees, Jeannette Hatton, who was knowledgeable of defendant's internal review procedures, thought that Smolsky took appropriate action to register her complaints. Eventually, Scatasti was reassigned to another position. The reason for this reassignment is also disputed. During the time Scatasti supervised her and allegedly harassed her, she alleges that she suffered breakdowns at home and fits of crying. Upon hearing a rumor that he might return, she marked off sick for three months. After she marked off sick, she complained of aggravated neck problems and other emotional injuries. She then chose to pursue her rights under defendant's formal complaint procedures. Scatasti received a letter of reprimand from the defendant. Not satisfied, Smolsky filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This action followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard

The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). When considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court shall grant such motion "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.1988). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court should resolve all reasonable doubts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Arnold Pontiac — GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 700 F.Supp. 838, 840 (W.D.Pa. 1988).

The inquiry into whether a "genuine issue" of material fact exists has been defined by the Supreme Court as whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. If the court determines that a material issue of fact remains for the jury to decide, the court cannot grant summary judgment.

B. FELA Claim

1. Title VII Does Not Preempt The FELA

The defendant first raises the argument that Title VII preempts the FELA in this action and that the plaintiff only has rights under Title VII. Basically, the defendant argues that since the plaintiff is claiming sexual discrimination and harassment, she should not be able to also claim that the defendant negligently inflicted emotional distress upon her as a result of this discrimination. The defendant finds support for this argument in Griggs v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 900 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.1990). However, a careful reading of Griggs demonstrates that it does not apply to this case. The Sixth Circuit in Griggs held that the plaintiff's discrimination claims were not cognizable under the FELA. Id. at 75. The plaintiff in Griggs only alleged racial and sexual harassment as a basis for a discrimination claim which she pursued under the FELA, essentially a tort of discrimination. Id. The court focused on the fact that the alleged tort underlying the FELA claim was not a tort recognized at common law, such as negligent infliction of emotional distress, but something different, a tort of discrimination. Id. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to create new substantive torts under the FELA, but only to have common law torts covered by the FELA. Id. Discrimination was not a common law tort and, therefore, it was not cognizable under the FELA. Id. The rationale of Griggs was not that Title VII preempted the FELA, but that the FELA cannot be used to create new substantive rights because it is only a remedial statute.

The Supreme Court in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987), had an opportunity to review the interplay between the Railway Labor Act (hereinafter "RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151, and the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51. The question in Buell was whether a plaintiff who pursued a grievance under the RLA is subsequently deprived of his right to bring an action under the FELA. Id. at 559, 107 S.Ct. at 1411. The claim brought under the FELA arose out of the same facts as the RLA grievance. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that the FELA is defined in broad language and the courts have construed it even broader. Id. at 561, 107 S.Ct. at 1413. The courts have adopted a liberal application of the statute to advance the goals of Congress. Id. at 562, 107 S.Ct. at 1414. These goals are to provide a federal remedy for railroad workers injured by the negligence of their employer or fellow employees. Id. at 561, 107 S.Ct. at 1413. With these goals in mind the Supreme Court held: "The fact that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the RLA does not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring a FELA action for damages." Id. at 564, 107 S.Ct. at 1415. The Supreme Court found that the difference in the remedy available under the RLA and the FELA was critical to determining that the RLA should not deprive the employee of her right to also pursue an action for damages. Id. at 565, 107 S.Ct. at 1415. The Supreme Court further found "there is no basis for assuming that allowing FELA actions for emotional injury will wreak havoc with the RLA." Id. at 566, 107 S.Ct. at 1466. This Court considers Buell not Griggs to be the starting reference for analysis of whether Title VII should preempt the FELA.

Title VII provides employees with certain rights in order to remedy discrimination in the workplace. The statutory scheme for resolving these claims involves administrative review and possible administrative enforcement of the employee's rights. Although addressing different problems, Congress has enacted both the RLA and Title VII to deal with employer-employee relations and both statutes provide very comprehensive systems to resolve disputes. Buell, 480 U.S. at 562, 107 S.Ct. at 1414 (RLA provides elaborate administrative framework for resolving major and minor disputes); Griggs, 900 F.2d at 75-76 (Title VII created a detailed and specific enforcement scheme to vindicate statutory rights. Federal and State agencies established to provide opportunity for out of court settlement procedures). If the RLA cannot preempt the FELA, there is no reason which this Court has found which would require that Title VII be able to do so. The remedies available under Title VII such as backpay and reinstatement do not adequately advance the goals of Congress in the FELA of allowing the plaintiff to recover for the negligent acts of the defendant. The difference in remedies was a concern of the Buell Court and a basis for their decision to find that the RLA did not preempt the FELA. Simply because a worker has suffered an injury which she may be able to pursue under another narrower federal stat...