Snead v. State

• Citation: 251 Ala. 624,38 So.2d 576
• Decision Date: 26 November 1948
• Docket Number: 2 Div. 260.
• Parties: SNEAD v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

38 So.2d 576

251 Ala. 624

SNEAD v. STATE.

2 Div. 260.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 26, 1948

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1949.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bibb County; L. S. Moore, Judge.

J Fred Wood and George White, both of Centreville, for appellant.

A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Francis M. Kohn Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LAWSON Justice.

Appellant, Buster Snead, alias Buster Sneed, was indicted for the first degree murder of Ellen Mason by a grand jury of Bibb County. Snead was unable to employ counsel, so the trial court appointed two practicing attorneys of the Bibb County Bar to represent him. § 318, Title 15, Code 1940, as amended. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and was found guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death by electrocution. The appeal here is under the automatic appeal statute. Act 249, Acts 1943, p. 217, approved June 24, 1943, Code 1940, Title 15, §§ 382(1)-382(13).

The evidence for the State shows that during the early hours of the morning of January 14, 1947, this appellant broke into the bedroom of Ellen Mason, where she was sleeping in a bed with her daughter, Mazell Blackmon. It is undisputed in the evidence that appellant cut Ellen Mason several times with an axe while she was still in bed. After the blows were struck, Ellen Mason fell off the bed onto the floor. A deputy sheriff of the county, after being notified of what had occurred, went to the home of Ellen Mason. When he arrived there he saw a Negro woman lying on the floor of the bedroom between the bed and the wall. The floor was bloody. The woman was dead. There were cuts on the head and body. On direct examination this witness testified that he had seen Ellen Mason on one or two previous occasions, but on cross-examination he stated that while he had seen the dead woman on previous occasions, he could not say that he had known her to be Ellen Mason.

C. S. Sharper, a mortician, testified for the State. Sharper had not known Ellen Mason personally. On the morning of January 14, 1947, he went to the home of Ellen Mason and removed therefrom the body of a Negro woman, which he prepared for burial. Sharper described the wounds which he found on the body. There was a cut on the forehead which was about five inches wide and which penetrated to the brain. Another cut severed the jugular vein. A portion of one of the fingers had been cut off. The trial court correctly permitted this witness to testify as to the appearance and location of the cuts. Phillips v. State, 248 Ala. 510, 28 So.2d 542, and cases there cited. Sharper was permitted to testify, over the objection of defendant, that in his opinion the wounds which he observed on the head and neck of the dead woman were sufficient to result in death. We are of the opinion that in view of the predicate laid for his testimony and the statement of his experience in observing and examining wounds and the effects thereof on human bodies, the trial court did not err in permitting Sharper to give an opinion as to the fatality of the wounds upon the body which he prepared for burial. As pointed out in the case of Phillips v. State, supra, the question as to whether a witness is shown to possess the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert as to whether wounds were sufficient to cause death is a preliminary question addressed largely to the discretion of the trial court. We cannot say that there was an abuse of the court's discretion in this connection.

Appellant contends that there was not sufficient proof of the corpus delicti to justify the admission in evidence of the confession alleged to have been made by the appellant in that the State did not by direct evidence show that the dead body which was found in the bedroom of Ellen Mason was actually that of Ellen Mason. Proof of death of the person named in the indictment as the result of force unlawfully applied is sufficient as a predicate for the introduction of a confession voluntarily made. Phillips v. State, supra, and cases there cited.

Circumstantial evidence may afford satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti and if facts are presented from which the jury may reasonably infer that the crime has been committed, the question must be submitted to the jury, and other evidence tending to implicate the accused is thereby rendered admissible. Johnson v. State, 247 Ala. 271, 24 So.2d 17; McDowell v. State, 238 Ala. 101, 189 So. 183; Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 So. 460; Phillips v. State, supra; DeSilvey v. State, 245 Ala. 163, 16 So.2d 183.

We think it clear that, aside from the confession of appellant, the evidence in this case, with the legitimate inferences which it was the province of the jury to draw therefrom, if believed by them beyond a reasonable doubt, shows the death of the person alleged to have been killed, Ellen Mason, and that said death was caused by the criminal agency as alleged in the indictment--the corpus delicti. Jordan v. State, 225 Ala. 350, 142 So. 665; McDowell v. State, supra.

In Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94, 14 So. 868, it was said: 'Positive, direct evidence of the corpus delicti is not indispensable to the admissions of confessions. Whenever facts and circumstances are proven from which a jury might legally infer that the offense has been committed, the confessions are admissible. The proven facts and circumstances, and the confessions of the defendant, may then be weighed and considered together; and if, upon the whole evidence, the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to the corpus delicti and the identity of the defendant as the guilty perpetrator, it becomes their duty to convict.' To like effect is the case of Hill v. State, supra.

We hold, therefore, that there is no merit in appellant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce in evidence the alleged confession of the defendant on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti.

The predicate as laid by the State was in all respects sufficient to show prima facie that the confession was voluntarily made. There is nothing in the record to show that under the circumstances prevailing at the time the confession was made, when considered with the age, character, and situation of the appellant, that he was deprived of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer. Phillips v. State, supra. It appears that the appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to the officers shortly after the crime was committed, at which time he admitted his guilt. The defendant did not testify. He offered no witnesses in his behalf. Hence, there was no testimony tending to refute the evidence of the witnesses for the State as to the voluntary character of the confession.

The trial court did not err in permitting Mazell Blackmon, the...