Sneed v. Davis
Decision Date | 07 December 1938 |
Citation | 135 Fla. 271,184 So. 865 |
Parties | SNEED et al v. DAVIS. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by Coma E. Davis, as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of William F. Sneed, against Mary E. Sneed, joined by her husband, William F. Sneed, and others to cancel an alleged transfer of stock and to subject the entire certificates of stock to the payment of a claim of a judgment creditor. From an order holding the answer insufficient to state a defense defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded. Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; W. J Barker, Judge.
D. O Rogers and Carver & Langston, all of Lakeland, for appellants.
Huffaker & Edwards, of Bartow, for appellee.
In an amended bill of complaint it is alleged in effect:
'6. That the 49 1/2 shares of stock stand on record on the stock book of the Mine & Mill Supply Company as follows:
4 1/2 shares in the name of William F. Sneed, Sr.
15 shares in the name of William F. Sneed, Jr.
30 shares in the name of Mary E. Sneed.'
The purpose of the suit was to cancel the alleged transfer of stock and to subject the entire certificates of stock to the payment of the claim of Franklin Liquidating Company, as assignee of the Bank, a judgment creditor.
Answer was filed, containing, along with other allegations, the following:
'Further answering the asid paragraph of the saib Bill of Complaint, these defendants say that on July 16, 1929, at which time the stock in question was transferred, William F. Sneed, Sr., was the head of a family residing in the State of Florida within the meaning of the provisions of Section 1, Article 9 [10] of the Constitution of the State of Florida; that at such time the defendant William F. Sneed, Sr., resided in the City of Lakeland, Florida, together with his family, consisting of his wife and others; that at such time there was exempt to him, among other things, One Thousand Dollars' worth of personal property; that on July 16, 1929, at the time the transfers in question were made, the defendant William F. Sneed, Sr., owned no property of value other than the stock in question and that the same at such time, together with such other personal property as William F. Sneed, Sr., owned was in value worth less than One Thousand Dollars and that the right, title and interest of William F. Sneed, Sr., in and to such property was exempt from forced sale under process of any Court and that by reason thereof neither the said Bank nor its successors in interest were entitled to look to such stock as assets out of which to satisfy any claim it might have as against William F. Sneed, Sr.
'Further answering the Amended Bill of Complaint, these defendants say that they are without knowledge as to whether the plaintiff is advised that the 49 1/2 shares of stock of Mine & Mill Supply Company stand of record on the stock book of the corporation as follows: 4 1/2 shares in the name of William F. Sneed, Sr., 15 shares of the stock in said William F. Sneed, Jr., and 30 shares in the name of Mary E. Sneed; but do say, as a matter of fact they do so stand of record on the stock book of said corporation.
'Further answering, these defendants specifically deny that the plaintiff has a clear right or any right to have the 4 1/2 shares of stock issued to the said William F. Sneed, Sr., transferred and assigned to him as an agent for the benefit of the creditors of said estate but say that, as a matter of fact, the said stock stands of record on the books of such corporation in the name of William F. Sneed, Sr., the such stock has so stood in the name of William F. Sneed, Sr. for such a long period of time and the plaintiff's rights, if any, against such 4 1/2 shares of stock was subject to an execution at law.
'Further answering, these defendants say that William F. Sneed, Sr., has filed a petition in the Federal Court, in and for the Southern District of Florida, Tampa Division, to be adjudicated a bankrupt; that he, as such bankrupt, is entitled to legal exemption and that he in his petition for bankruptcy and in other proceedings thereunder, is claiming the 4 1/2 shares of stock in question as being a parcel of his homestead exemptions and that the matter of the rights of the creditors of William F. Sneed, Sr., in so far as such 4 1/2 shares of stock is concerned, is being handled by and is under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court proper.'
Plaintiff filed motion for decree on bill and answer.
The answer was held insufficient to state a defense and from the order so holding, appeal is taken.
We have quoted only a portion of the answer because in the paragraphs quoted we find a complete defense to the amended bill of complaint.
Section 1 of Article 10 of our constitution is familiar to every student and there is no need to quote it here. Under its terms personal property is as effectively exempt from forced sale as is real estate.
The motion for decree on bill and answer admits the allegations of the answer which are well pleaded. Therefore it admits:
'1. That William F. Sneed, Sr., at the time of the transfer was the head of a family residing in the State of Florida, within the meaning of Section 1, Article 10 of the Florida Constitution.
'2. That there was exempt to William F. Sneed, Sr., at such time within the meaning of such Section and Article $1000.00 worth of personal property.
We are dealing with the rights of the parties as of the date of the first re-issue of the stock involved, July 16, 1929, and not considering what their respective rights might have been at some later day, had not this re-issue been accomplished at that time. The general applicable rule is stated in 27 C.J. 438, as follows:
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...as fraudulent transfers." (Id. , p. 8.) The Bankruptcy Court also stated that the Florida Supreme Court decision in Sneed v. Davis , 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (Fla. 1938), had held that a debtor "cannot commit fraud on his creditors by disposing of exempt property that the creditor had no l......
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Jensen v. Elsie (In re Montemoino)
...a creditor to satisfy the individual debt of only one spouse.”). Moreover, as the Florida Supreme Court explained in Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865, 868 (1938), property that is beyond the reach of a creditor cannot give rise to a fraudulent transfer action by that creditor becau......
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In re Goldberg
...source of the proceeds was exempt property, the proceeds were out of the reach of creditors as a matter of law. In Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865, 868 (Fla.1938), the Florida Supreme Court according to the weight of authority a debtor in disposing of property can commit a fraud o......
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In re Stewart
...on fraudulent transfer grounds because such property could not have been attached by creditors before any transfer. See Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 184 So. 865 (1938). The Florida fraudulent transfer act specifically excludes from treatment as a recoverable "asset" property held as a tena......
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Rasmussen court allows both spouses $125,000 exemptions and protects appreciation within 1,215 days of bankruptcy.
...source of the proceeds was exempt property, the proceeds [are] out of the reach of creditors as a matter of law." See also Sneed v. Davis, 135 Fla. 271, 277-78 (1938) (stating "Creditors have no right to complain of dealings in property which the law does not allow them to apply to their cl......