Sneed v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 31 January 1854
• Docket Number: No. 70.,70.
• Citation: 14 Ga. 542
• Parties: Leroy Sneed, plaintiff in error. vs. Thomas Hughes, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

14 Ga. 542

Leroy Sneed, plaintiff in error. vs. Thomas Hughes, defendant in error.

No. 70.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JANUARY TERM, 1854.

Assumpsit in Baker Superior Court. Tried before Judge Perkins, October Term, 1853.

This action was against Leroy Sneed, as the endorser upon a promissory note, made by Dudley Sneed, Jr., and payable to E. P. Sneed or bearer. The endorser pleaded non est factum; and on the trial of this issue, it appeared that Leroy Sneed transferred the note to James R. George; and that George transferred it, with the endorsement upon it, to Hughes, the plaintiff in the action.

After some evidence introduced by both parties, the plain-tiff below tendered the depositions of James R. George, to whom the note was transferred by Leroy Sneed, to prove the genuineness of the endorsement.

Counsel for Sneed objected, on the ground that George was interested. The Court overruled the objection, and this decision is assigned as error.

D. A. Vason, for plaintiff in error.

R. F. Lyon, for defendant in error.

By the Court.—Starnes, J., delivering the opinion.

It has been sometimes held, that a person who transfers apromissory note for a valuable consideration, though by delivery only, warrants by implication, that the instrument is genuine, and not forged or fictitious. And this implied warranty is said to extend also to any endorsement which may precede the transfer. (Ch. on Bills, 245.)

As we are enabled to do so, we prefer to put this case on stronger grounds. The correctness of the above position may be doubted; but it will not be doubted that if the party assigning, knows that the note transferred as genuine is forged or fictitious, or any endorsement thereon is so, the Law will hold him responsible as upon a warranty. In such a case, the concealment of the defect is a fraud upon the assignee, and he who transfers is held liable to repay the money he received. (Story on Prom. N. 118. Fern vs. Harrison, 3 T. R. 759.— Winter vs. Bulloch, 6 Ga. 233.)

Let us apply this principle to the case before us. It is abundantly evident from the record, that James George, who transferred the note in this case to the defendant in error, must have known that the endorsement of Leroy Sneed upon the note in question was not genuine, if this were so. The record shows that he had received it from Sneed in person. If the endorsement was forged, it must have been done after George received it; for he received the note from Sneed personally; and of course if the name of Sneed was on it when he delivered it to George, it was there with his (Sneed's) sanction, and was genuine. If a forgery then, it could only have been made so after it came to George's possession; and he, of course, must have known it. If knowing it and concealing it, he assigned it for a valuable consideration to Hughes, he became liable to refund what was paid for it, upon Hughes' failing to recover against Sneed. When called, therefore, to prove it genuine, he was called to support a direct interest. (1 Greenl. Ev. §393, 395, 397. Ray et al. vs. The Justices of the ...