Sneed v. State, No. 13-05-163-CR (TX 2/23/2006), 13-05-163-CR

• Decision Date: 23 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 13-05-163-CR,13-05-163-CR
• Parties: RONALD SNEED, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

RONALD SNEED, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

No. 13-05-163-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi.

Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed February 23, 2006.

Do Not Publish. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 130th District Court of Matagorda County, Texas.

Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ and CASTILLO.

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

Memorandum Opinion by Justice CASTILLO.

A jury convicted appellant Ronald Sneed of burglary of a habitation.² The trial court assessed punishment at forty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division. By three issues, Sneed asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove property was stolen and identity. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

At approximately 6:45 in the morning of February 26, 2004, the complainant heard her garage door open and "knew that two [men] had gone in there." Walking outside her residence, she ordered them to exit her garage. One man complied, paused momentarily, and fled through hedges on the property to the alley along the residence. The complainant assumed that the second man fled through a utility room by a gate left open outside that room. When police arrived, the complainant directed them to the alley. A few minutes later, an officer returned with a man who the complainant testified "we identified him as being the guy." Her leaf blower was returned to her at that time. The complainant testified that the leaf blower, among other things, had been inside her garage.³ She later discovered that a weed-eater was also missing.

A police officer dispatched to the scene observed Sneed in the alley behind the complainant's residence with a leaf blower under his arm. Sneed fled. After a short pursuit on foot, the officer apprehended Sneed as Sneed "was dropping the leaf blower." The officer testified, without objection, that Sneed told him "he was out for a jog and going to a pawn shop." The pawn shops were not open at that time in the morning, according to the officer. The leaf blower belonged to the complainant.

On the same day, an employee of a nearby day care center identified Sneed to law enforcement as the man she saw standing on the complainant's driveway and then running through the hedges to the alley. In court, she identified Sneed again.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his first issue, Sneed asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish the essential theft element of property. He asserts that the evidence does not establish that a leaf blower was stolen. By his second and third issues, he asserts the evidence is factually insufficient to prove his identity, and that the leaf blower was stolen.

A. Legal Sufficiency Standard of Review

A legal sufficiency challenge requires us to review the relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and then to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). This standard is designed to give "full play to the [jury's] responsibility fairly" to "draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We consider all the evidence that sustains the conviction, whether properly or improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam)). Similarly, we consider all the evidence that sustains the conviction, whether submitted by the prosecution or the defense, in determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In this review, we are not to reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence; rather, we act only to ensure that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

B. Factual Sufficiency Standard of Review

A factual sufficiency review begins with the presumption that the evidence supporting the jury's verdict is legally sufficient under Jackson. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In a factual sufficiency review, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether evidence supporting the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if evidence contrary to the verdict is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met.⁴ Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We review all the evidence. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We must consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). However, we approach a factual sufficiency review with appropriate deference to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder.⁵ Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Every fact need not point directly and independently to the accused's guilt. Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A conclusion of guilt can rest on the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Id.

C. Hypothetically Correct Jury Charge

We measure the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd); Cano v. State, 3 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref'd). We then determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7.

Thus, the hypothetically correct jury charge authorized the jury to find Sneed guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation if he (1) intentionally and knowingly (2) entered the complainant's habitation (3) with the intent to commit theft. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 2003), § 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Williams v. State, 505 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). "Owner" means a person who "has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The crucial element of theft is the deprivation of property from the rightful owner, without the owner's consent, regardless of whether the defendant at that moment has taken possession of the property. Stewart v. State, 44 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

When there is independent evidence of a burglary, the unexplained personal possession of recently stolen property may support an inference that the possessor is guilty of the offense in which the property was stolen. Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Once the permissible inference arises, sufficiency of the evidence must still be examined according to applicable evidentiary standards of appellate review, because the inference is not conclusive. Hardesty, 656 S.W.2d at 77. Flight is also a circumstance indicating guilt. Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 839 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ("We have repeatedly held that flight is evidence of a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn."); Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should look at "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) and Thompson v. State, 697 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction. Id. (citing Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) and Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). The evidence is sufficient if the conclusion of guilt is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. See id.

D. Discussion

Sneed asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the property component of theft, namely, the leaf blower. The jury heard the complainant identify the leaf blower as her property. In the complainant's statement, which was admitted in evidence, she stated that the leaf blower "had been right at the front of the garage." Sneed had the leaf blower in his possession while in the alley, after fleeing from the scene, and when apprehended.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, evidence of proximity in time and in place while Sneed was in possession of the leaf blower identified as the complainant's militates in favor of a conclusion that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of property beyond a reasonable doubt. Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817. We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient. We overrule Sneed's first issue.

There is no contrary evidence in the record to demonstrate that the leaf blower was other than in its usual place in the complainant's garage and subsequent to Sneed's forbidden entry into the garage, on Sneed's person. Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the evidence...