Sneil, LLC v. Tybe Learning Ctr., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC 92390.,SC 92390.
• Parties: SNEIL, LLC, Appellant, v. TYBE LEARNING CENTER, INC., and Regions Bank, as Successor to Union Planters Bank, N.A., Respondents, and Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, et al., Defendants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

370 S.W.3d 562

SNEIL, LLC, Appellant,

v.TYBE LEARNING CENTER, INC., and Regions Bank, as Successor to Union Planters Bank, N.A., Respondents,andMetropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, et al., Defendants.

No. SC 92390.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

July 3, 2012.

Phillip K. Gebhardt, Gebhardt Real Estate and Legal Services LLC, Desoto, Stanley D. Schnaare, The Schnaare Law Firm PC, argued, Hillsboro, for Sneil.

Rufus J. Tate Jr., The Tate Law Firm LLC, St. Louis, Anthony D. Gray, Johnson Gray LLC, St. Louis, for Tybe Learning Center.

Deborah J. Volmart, Hanna & Volmert LLC, Belleville, Ill., for Regions Bank.

ZEL M. FISCHER, Judge.

Sneil, LLC, sought to quiet title to 3645 Marietta Drive, Florissant, Missouri, and to eject Tybe Learning Center, Inc. and Regions Bank from that property. The circuit court found in favor of the Tybe and Regions. Sneil appealed. After opinion, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court, which has jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.¹

FACTS

On August 28, 2006, Sneil was the successful bidder for the real property located at 3645 Marietta Drive in St. Louis County at a first offering tax sale held by the St. Louis County collector of revenue. At the date of the sale, Tybe was the owner of the property and Regions, as successor to Union Planters Bank NA, had a recorded deed of trust on the property.

On August 27, 2007, Sneil's attorney sent a notice letter dated August 9, 2007, to Tybe and to Union Planters by certified mail, return receipt requested, that they both received the following day. The notice letter stated in part that:

On Monday, August 28, 2006, the Collector of Revenue of St. Louis County, Missouri, offered the tax lien certificate on the [property] for sale in a delinquent tax sale. This offering was the first or second offering of such property by the Collector of Revenue. At such sale, our firm's client, Sneil, LLC, purchased the tax lien certificate on the [property] for the sum of $41,700.00. A copy of the Tax Sale Certificate of Purchase evidencing this purchase is enclosed herein for your perusal and incorporated herein, as if set fully set forth.

Pursuant to Section 140.405 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo), this letter is to give you notice of the intention of our firm's client Sneil, LLC to acquire a collector's deed to the ... property. A copy of Section 140.405, RSMo, is enclosed herein for your perusal.

If you wish to redeem your interest in the ... property, you should contact the Collection Division of the St. Louis County Department of Revenue at 41 South Central Avenue (Street Level), Clayton, Missouri 63105, Telephone (314) 615–4207, Fax (314) 615–5428.

The notice did not include the duration of the redemption period.

On December 6, 2007, the collector delivered a deed to the property to Sneil, who recorded it December 18, 2007. On February 27, 2008, Sneil filed a petition seeking to quiet title to the property and to eject Tybe from the property.² The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on February 14, 2011. Sneil requested that the circuit court make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The circuit court found that the collector offered the property for sale as a “first offering” under the Jones–Munger Act (chapter 140, RSMo) and that both Tybe and Regions had an interest in the property in that Tybe owned the property at that time and Regions held a recorded deed of trust on the property. It further found that Sneil was the high bidder on the property at the collector's tax sale.

The circuit court also found that Sneil sent a notice to Tybe and to Union Planters on August 27, 2007, and that they received this notice via certified mail on August 28, 2007. In addition, it found that Sneil made no attempt to contact Tybe or Regions at any time prior to August 27, 2007. It further found that Sneil's notice did not inform Tybe or Regions of how long they had to exercise the right to redemption before they would be barred forever from doing so. The circuit court further found that the notice failed to provide either a specific redemption period expiration date or a number of days indicating the length of time that Tybe and Regions had to redeem the property. The notice simply stated that Tybe and Regions should contact the collection division of the St. Louis County department of revenue about redemption.

The circuit court found that Sneil filed an affidavit in support of its application for a collector's deed on September 6, 2007, received the deed on December 6, 2007, and recorded it on December 18, 2007. It also found that none of the defendants in the case redeemed their interests in the property prior to the issuance of the collector's deed. The circuit court additionally found that Tybe offered to pay Sneil in accordance with § 140.600.³

The circuit court concluded that the notice sent by Sneil to Tybe and Regions did not inform them of how long they had to exercise the right of redemption and that the notice failed to comply with the requirements of § 140.405. It determined that Sneil lost any interest in the property due to the insufficiencies of the notice provided to Tybe and Regions. The circuit court denied the relief requested by Sneil in count I of its petition and denied the relief requested in count II as moot. It ordered Tybe to contact the collector to get the cost of redemption and to pay Sneil in accordance with § 140.600 within 30 days. The circuit court expressly determined that there was no just cause for delay in entering judgment.

Sneil now appeals from this judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for any court-tried case is that “[t]his Court will affirm the judgment of the circuit court unless it misapplied or erroneously declared the law, or the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, or the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” JAS Apartments, Inc. v. Naji, 354 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)); see also Rule 84.13(d). “If the issue to be decided is one of fact,” as is presented in this case, “this Court determines whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence and whether the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. “Appellate courts should exercise the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is ‘against the weight of the evidence’ with caution and with a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.” Id. (quoting Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 31). “If the trier of fact does not believe the evidence of the party bearing the burden, it properly can find for the other party.” White v. Dir. of Rev., 321 S.W.3d 298, 305 (Mo. banc 2010). “Generally, the party not having the burden of proof on an issue need not offer any evidence concerning it.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact has the right to disbelieve evidence, even when it is not contradicted.” Id. at 307 (internal quotation omitted).

“When the facts of the case are contested, this Court defers to the trial court's assessment of the evidence.” Id. “While a party can contest evidence by putting forth evidence to the contrary, a party can also contest evidence by cross-examination or by pointing out internal inconsistencies in the evidence.” Id. at 308.

In a court-tried case, “it is the parties' duty to specifically request findings of fact and conclusions of law, identifying the issues they wish the court to decide.” ⁴Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843, 849 (Mo. banc 1996). “Merely submitting proposed findings to aid the court does not trigger the court's duty to make findings of fact and law.” Id. In this case, Sneil made a detailed request for findings of fact from the circuit court.

ANALYSIS

Sneil contends that the circuit court erred by misapplying § 140.405 in denying it relief under count I on the basis that notice sent to Tybe and Regions was defective because Tybe and Regions' right to redeem the property was not limited to one year, but rather could last up to two years under § 140.410. Sneil also contends that the circuit court misapplied the law in denying it relief under count I of its petition on the basis that the notice letters did not inform Tybe and Regions of how long they had to exercise the right of redemption and “purportedly failed to comply” with the requirements of § 140.405. Sneil argues that § 140.405 “was drafted to integrate the Hobson Redemption Period[,]” and that “there is no universally applicable redemption period for all delinquent taxpayers or other interested parties.” Sneil also argues that tax sale purchasers cannot give advance notice when they might be authorized to acquire a collector's deed because they cannot know in advance when all of the lawful requirements to get such a deed will be met. ⁵ Sneil further claims that neither § 140.405 nor “constitutional principles of due process” require that a tax sale purchaser provide advance notice of the time limits applicable for redemption or any other details related to the right of redemption. Sneil additionally posits that any “purported defects” in the notice were not grounds to invalidate the collector's deed and that the notice letters, sent on August 27, 2007, “gave notice of the right to redeem, which is all that § 140.405 requires.”

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 140

Chapter 140 provides that the county collector conduct an annual sale each August of real property on which tax payments have been delinquent. It also provides for three successive tax offerings. If, at the first offering, no one bids a sum equal to the delinquent taxes on a property, with interest, penalties, and costs, the county collector holds a second offering the following August. Section 140.250.1, RSMo 2000. If there are no adequate bids submitted at the second offering, a third offering is made the following August, and at the third offering, the property is sold to the highest bidder. ⁶

A tax sale...