Snell v. Snell

• Decision Date: 16 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. S–15–0276.,S–15–0276.
• Citation: 2016 WY 49,374 P.3d 1236
• Parties: Clyde V. SNELL, Trustee of the Imogene Snell Revocable Trust dated November 16, 1993, Appellant (Defendant), v. William R. SNELL, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

374 P.3d 1236

2016 WY 49

Clyde V. SNELL, Trustee of the Imogene Snell Revocable Trust dated November 16, 1993, Appellant (Defendant)

v.William R. SNELL, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–15–0276.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 16, 2016.

Representing Appellant: Drake D. Hill of Hill Law Firm, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Tonia Hanson of Hanson Law Office, LLC, Buffalo, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Hill.

Representing Appellee: H. W. Rasmussen, Attorneys at Law of Wyoming, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶ 1] William R. Snell (William) and Clyde Allen Snell (Allen) are remainder beneficiaries of the family trust created pursuant to the terms of the Imogene Snell Revocable Trust. William filed an action for a trust accounting from his father, Clyde V. Snell (Clyde), who is the sole trustee and current beneficiary of the trust.¹ The district court applied Arkansas law in accordance with the trust's choice of law provision and granted summary judgment in favor of William, ordering Clyde to produce certain trust documents to him. Clyde appealed.

[¶ 2] We conclude the district court's summary judgment order was not a final appealable order. However, we exercise our discretion to convert Clyde's notice of appeal to a petition for writ of review and grant the writ to address the legal question of whether William is entitled to a trust accounting. On that issue, we affirm the district court's determination that, under Arkansas law, William is entitled to an accounting and remand to the district court for immediate release of the records in the court's possession and further proceedings consistent with this decision.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] The dispositive issues in this case are:

1. Was the district court's order appealable?

2. If the order was not appealable, should this Court use its discretion to convert the notice of appeal to a petition for writ of review and grant the writ?

3. Did the district court properly interpret Arkansas law in concluding that a trustee is required to account to a remainder beneficiary even though the trust does not expressly require it?

FACTS

[¶ 4] Imogene and Clyde Snell were married and had two sons, William and Allen. In 1993, Imogene executed a revocable trust, which named her and Clyde as the initial co-trustees and slated William as successor co-trustee if either was unable to serve. The trust contained a choice of law provision directing that it be construed and governed by the laws of Arkansas, where Imogene was domiciled. The stated purposes of the trust were to avoid federal estate taxes and provide for Clyde after Imogene's death.

[¶ 5] Imogene died in 2003, and the trust, therefore, became irrevocable. Under its terms, her estate was split between a bequest to Clyde and a family trust. The family trust states that Clyde may get distributions of income and principal under certain limited circumstances. William and Allen are remainder beneficiaries of the family trust.

[¶ 6] After Imogene's death, Clyde and an Arkansas bank were co-trustees. The bank was soon replaced by William's and Allen's uncle, Glen Evans, who served as co-trustee with Clyde. In 2006, Clyde moved to Buffalo, Wyoming, where Allen lived. Mr. Evans died in 2009, leaving Clyde as the only remaining trustee, and no successor co-trustee has been appointed.

[¶ 7] In 2013, Clyde proposed that the family trust be terminated and the assets be divided between the two sons. When William received the trust termination documents, he noticed that the value of an asset of the trust, an Edward D. Jones investment account, had recently fallen by over $200,000. He asked for an explanation but did not receive one.

[¶ 8] William filed an action in the district court seeking an order directing Clyde “to provide sufficient material facts for [William] to protect his interests as a beneficiary of the Imogene Snell Family Trust [and] an [o]rder continuing the Court's supervision of the administration of the trust.” Clyde contested the request for an accounting, and William moved for summary judgment.

[¶ 9] The district court initially issued an order titled “Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment.” However, the district court's ruling was more than a simple denial of William's motion. It ruled in William's favor that he is “entitled to an accounting in order to ensure the purpose of the Trust is being achieved.” But, it found that there was an issue of material fact as to “whether or not the request for an accounting is reasonable.” By this ruling the district court apparently meant that there would have to be a factual determination of what records and information would constitute a “reasonable” accounting, rather than a determination of whether an accounting was reasonable at all. After issuing the summary judgment order, the district court held a hearing on “what would be a reasonable request for trust records.” At that hearing, the court ordered Clyde to produce for in camera review a list of all trust assets and “information related to activity associated with the Edward D. Jones account from June of 2012 to present.” Clyde provided the information to the district court under seal.

[¶ 10] The district court examined the documents in camera and issued an order on October 20, 2015, ruling “the information tendered is discoverable as it does not constitute an unreasonable accounting.” On November 16, 2015, the district court entered an “Order Nunc Pro Tunc Clarifying October 20, 2015 Order,” stating that it intended to grant summary judgment in favor of William and the order was final under W.R.C.P. 54(a), “as resolving all issues in the case.” Clyde appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. Jurisdiction

[¶ 11] William asked us to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order granting him access to the information provided by Clyde did not finally decide the case.² The question of whether an order is final and appealable is one of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo. Northwest Bldg. Co., LLC v. Northwest Distributing Co., Inc., 2012 WY 113, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d 239, 245 (Wyo.2012). See also Poignee v. State, 2016 WY 42, ¶ 8, 369 P.3d 516 (Wyo.2016) (jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review).

[¶ 12] Under Wyoming's rules of appellate procedure, this Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final, appealable orders. Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo.2006). See also McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶¶ 19–20, 34 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Wyo.2001). W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) defines an appealable order in pertinent part as: “(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment[.]” We have identified three requirements for an order to be appealable under Rule 1.05(a). It must affect a substantial right, determine the merits of the controversy and leave no issues for future consideration. See, e.g., CAA v. ZWA (In re KRA), 2004 WY 18, ¶ 10, 85 P.3d 432, 436 (Wyo.2004) ; Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo.2000).

[¶ 13] William asserts the district court's order requiring production of the information reviewed in camera did not finally decide the case because the information may not be sufficient to allow him to protect his interests. In fact, in his motion for summary judgment, William sought an order directing Clyde:

to account for all contributions, income and distributions of the trust from July 7, 2003 to the present, including but not limited to the closing statement from the sale of real property held by the trust, annual tax returns for the trust, Edward D. Jones account number ... and to the extent transfers were made to a checking or savings account of the Defendant ... ultimate distribution from such accounts to third parties, and such other and additional information as will provide Plaintiff with sufficient information to be informed of distributions from the trust and in the alternative that the Plaintiff be provided such information from the demise of the co-trustee Glen Evans, on August 10, 2009....

William also points out that his request for judicial supervision of the trust has not been addressed by the district court.

[¶ 14] We agree that the district court's order releasing the information to William is not final and appealable. Although the information provided by Clyde shows the trust values and withdrawals and transfers from the investment account in 2012 and 2013, it remains to be determined whether it is sufficient to protect William's interests. It is likely the investment statements will lead to additional questions such as the purposes of the withdrawals and/or transfers and where the funds went, and he will request additional information to answer those questions. If the parties are unable to agree, the district court will need to decide whether such future requests are appropriate. In addition, William's request for continued judicial supervision of the trust remains unresolved. Thus, the district court's claim in its November 16, 2015 Order Nunc Pro Tunc that it had resolved “all issues in the case” is obviously incorrect. Given there are outstanding issues, the district court's order requiring production of the information tendered by Clyde is interlocutory in nature and not directly appealable.

[¶ 15] However, we may review interlocutory orders by granting a discretionary writ of review under W.R.A.P. 13. Rule 13.02 states in relevant part:

A writ of review may be granted by the reviewing court to review an interlocutory order of a trial court in a civil or criminal action, ... which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial bases for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance resolution of the litigation.

We have, in the past, exercised our discretion to issue a writ of review even though the appellant...