Snelling v. Haynes
| Decision Date | 09 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:10CV00925 AGF |
| Parties | LONNIE D. SNELLING,, Plaintiff, v. J.D. HAYNES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the court on the motions of Defendants Matthew Chase, Jack Fishman, The Fishman Law Firm, P.C., and Michael F. Stelzer to dismiss the First Amended Petition brought by Plaintiff Lonnie D. Snelling for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Docs. 27, 33, 35, 49.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss, and deny Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this case on May 10, 2010. (Doc. 1.) On July 9, 2010, Defendants Jack Fishman and The Fishman Law Firm, P.C. moved to dismiss that complaint. (Doc. 10.) On July 12, 2010, Defendant Matthew Chase moved to dismiss that complaint. (Doc. 13.) On July 15, 2010, Defendant Michael F. Stelzer filed his answer and contemporaneously moved to dismiss the original Complaint. (Docs. 15, 16.)
On July 26, 2010, Plaintiff moved to file his First Amended Complaint, which the Court granted on August 6, 2010. (Docs. 18, 22.) Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint asserts six claims against Defendants: (1) abuse of process, (2) conspiracy to interfere with judgment lien, (3) deprivation of Plaintiff's property rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 by private persons acting under color of state law, (4) a second abuse of process claim, (5) infringement upon Plaintiff's First Amendment rights and 28 U.S.C. § 1654 right to file grievances in court personally, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 37.)
On August 6, 2010, Defendants Chase, Fishman, and The Fishman Law Firm, P.C. moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Docs. 27, 33.) On August 9, 2010, Defendent Stelzer answered the First Amended Complaint and moved to dismiss it on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Docs. 35, 38.) Defendant J.D. Haynes was granted until January 11, 2011 to file a response to the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 48.)1 Although not reaching the merits of the pending motions for sanctions (Docs. 50, 54, and 68), the Court notes that Defendant Matthew Chase has alleged that Plaintiff wrongfully submitted two forged motions, purportedly made by J.D. Haynes, forextensions of time to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 50.) Plaintiff disputes these allegations and has filed counter-motions for sanctions. (Docs. 54, 68.)
On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on the basis that (1) Defendant J.D. Haynes has not filed a responsive pleading, (2) "all other defendants only filed motions to dismiss, " (3) Plaintiff's use of the word "constitutes" caused certain paragraphs of the First Amended Complaint to be conclusory, and (4) none of the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint have changed from the original and First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 49.) Defendants oppose this motion. (Doc. 51.)
On July 3, 2003, Plaintiff had a valid judgment against Defendants J.D. Haynes and his wife. On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff had an Execution/Garnishment Application ("Order") and Order issued by the Circuit Court Clerk of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri. The Order was delivered to the Sheriff of St. Louis City for execution upon Defendant Haynes and his wife, and the Sheriff's deputy served the Order upon them. The Sheriff also placed the Order in the St. Louis Daily Record, to be run on May 2, 2005, giving notice to all interested parties that the Haynes' property at 2035 East Gano Avenue would be sold by auction on June 1, 2005 to satisfy the judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that prior to, and at various times during, May 2005, Defendants Jack Fishman, Matthew Chase, and J.D. Haynes "met, joined together, and planned a strategy how to hinder, delay and eventually extinguish the sheriff's sale of Haynes' realproperty, scheduled for June 1, 2005." On May 23, 2005, Fishman allegedly implemented the strategy by presenting ex parte, an oral application for stay of execution to the scheduled sheriff's sale. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Michael E. Stelzer ("Judge Stelzer"), exercised his power as an associate circuit court judge, delegated to him by the State of Missouri, under color of state law, to accommodate Defendant Fishman, and granted Fishman's application, staying the execution of the judicial lien. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of Judge Stelzer's "impartiality toward plaintiff as a self-represented litigant, and that he would not question their ex parte appearance, since plaintiff was the opposition and grant their oral application."
After learning of the ex parte appearance by Fishman, and the order entered by Judge Stelzer staying the execution of the judicial lien, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the Order, challenging Judge Stelzer's jurisdiction to act in the manner in which he did. On June 3, 2005, Judge Stelzer took Plaintiff's motion under submission, and on June 7, 2005 set aside the order on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
On behalf of Defendant Haynes, Defendant Chase subsequently filed a motion to vacate and set aside the default judgment entered against Defendant Haynes on July 3, 2003 in the earlier state action leading to the judgment against Haynes, and to dismiss Plaintiff's petition. On June 8, 2005, the Honorable Steven F. Ohmer, Circuit Court Judge for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, restored the stay of execution. On June 15, 2005, Judge Ohmer quashed his June 8, 2005 order, ordered that the original execution be returned in full force, such that the sheriff could proceed with the sale of the Property, and denied the motion to vacate and set aside the default judgment as untimely filed.
A motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the Complaint. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto. Servs., Inc., 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005)); Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (The Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party."). A motion to dismiss must be granted if the Complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., 591 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (). While a Complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will notdo." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
Under this standard, the task of a court is "to review the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation." Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (). "This is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
A. Count III of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted for Deprivation of Plaintiff's Property Rights Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges the grant of the ex parte stay of execution deprived him of his "constitutional[sic] protected due process rights of notice and to be heard prior to taking property interests" as guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Defendants argue that Count III fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted for deprivation of Plaintiff's property rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiff has not alleged a protected property interest, and even assuming he had alleged a protected property interest, he was not denied due process because the First Amended Complaint alleges that he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Procedural due process requirements apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the 14th Amendment's protection of property and liberty. Board of Regent v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Only a property interest that is "'a legitimate claim to entitlement'... as opposed to a mere subjective expectancy, " is a protected property interest. Batra v. Board of Regents, 79 F.3d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Whether a protected property interest exists is a...
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