Snelling v. State
| Citation | 49 Fla. 34,37 So. 917 |
| Parties | SNELLING v. STATE. |
| Decision Date | 24 January 1905 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Error to Circuit Court, Jackson County; Lucius J. Reeves, Judge.
Loren Snelling was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Immaterial and irrelevant questions on cross-examination are properly excluded upon objection duly made, and answers to questions on cross-examination, when immaterial, are properly stricken on motion.
2. An official court reporter for the circuit court, under the statutes of this state, may testify in rebuttal as a evidence given at a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate, when the testimony is given independently of any record, or from memory as refreshed by a transcript of notes taken by the witness at the preliminary hearing.
3. It is not error to refuse instructions containing propositions already substantially given in charges, though couched in different language.
4. Where the court has given a proper charge on the subject of reasonable doubt, it is not error to refuse a requested charge that 'to justify a jury in finding a verdict of unlawful homicide, in any of its degrees, against the defendant, each individual juror must be convinced from the evidence, for himself, that the defendant is so guilty.'
5. In a prosecution for murder, it is not error to add to a charge on the subject of self-defense requested by the defendant the following: 'Provided he had used all reasonable means within his power, consistent with his own safety, to avert the danger and avoid the necessity of taking P.'s life.'
6. In a prosecution for murder of one Pridgeon, where the question of self-defense was raised by the testimony, the court refused to give the following charge as requested by the defendant 'If you should believe from the evidence that the defendant was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty and was not the aggressor therein, and that he was assaulted by the deceased, or by the deceased and another, who were armed with deadly weapons, and that such assault was made under such circumstances that it reasonably appeared to the defendant, as an ordinarily cautious and prudent man, that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, or of the deceased and another, as aforesaid then you are instructed that, under such circumstances, it would not be incumbent upon the defendant to flee in order to avoid the difficulty or avert the necessity of taking the life of his assailant; but, on the other hand, under such circumstances, he might lawfully stand his ground, and, if assaulted by the deceased, or the deceased and another, under the circumstances aforesaid, then, in such event, he would be justified in his acts, and you would find him not guilty.' But the court did give the charge with the following added thereto: 'Provided he had used all other reasonable means in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avert the danger, and to avoid the necessity of taking P.'s life.' The charge as modified and given was not inconsistent or misleading, and was not error.
COUNSEL Edwin R. Blow (W. H. Price, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
W. H Ellis, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of Wylie Pridgeon, and convicted of manslaughter, in the circuit court for Jackson county, and brings this writ of error from the judgment.
The first witness for the state at the trial testified that he, the deceased, Manual Ham, and a woman called 'Janie' were in the 'shanty that Loren Snelling was staying in at the time,' when Loren Snelling entered the shanty, asked why they were there, and ordered them out; that all came out, and soon thereafter the homicide occurred. On cross-examination this witness was asked the question (referring to the deceased), 'Do you know whether or not he had been warned by Mr. Campbell not to come there?' The bill of exceptions then recites: Error is assigned on this ruling. On cross-examination this witness testified: 'When Snelling came, me and Wylie [the deceased] were looking at Janie and Manuel Ham gambling with cards.' Then followed the question: 'Were they gambling?' Answer: 'Yes, sir.' The state attorney moved to strike this answer as being immaterial. The defendant asked that it be not stricken out, on the ground that it showed the motive of the defendant for ordering them from the house; that he had a right to order them from his house if they were gambling. The court sustained the motion, and an exception was noted. This is assigned as error.
The court permitted the defendant to prove that deceased was a trespasser while in the house occupied by the defendant.
There was no attempt to show that the defendant had forbidden the deceased to go on Campbell's premises, or that defendant represented Campbell in respect to any warning he may have given deceased. Consequently the question first above quoted was immaterial and irrelevant, and was properly excluded.
The answer to the second question above quoted was properly excluded as immaterial, since it did not appear that the deceased was gambling in the house.
A witness for the defendant was by the defense asked the question: 'Do you know whether or not Wylie Pridgeon [the deceased] had been forbidden to go on these premises?' An objection by the state to this question was sustained, and an exception noted. The question was not limited to the inquiry whether the defendant had lawfully forbidden the deceased to go on the premises, and it was properly excluded. The same witness was asked by the defense, 'Do you know what his [deceased's] business was?' and 'What was his business?' The difficulty between the defendant and the deceased did not arise from discussing any business matter. These questions were clearly immaterial, as the business of...
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...v. State, 43 Fla. 556, 30 So. 656; Fuentes v. State, 64 Fla. 64, 59 So. 395; Stafford v. State, 50 Fla. 134, 39 So. 106; Snelling v. State, 49 Fla. 34, 37 So. 917; Morrison v. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 97; v. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 482; Alvarez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 So. 40; Olds v. ......
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...he may do so without apparently exposing himself to death or great bodily harm (Stafford v. State, 50 Fla. 134, 39 So. 106; Snelling v. State, 49 Fla. 34, 37 So. 917; Peadon v. State, 46 Fla. 124, text 135, 35 So. 204), and that whatever qualification this principle may in application have ......
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