Snethen v. Nix, 83-2064

• Citation: 736 F.2d 1241
• Decision Date: 24 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2064,83-2064
• Parties: Daniel SNETHEN, Appellant, v. Crispus NIX, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 1241

736 F.2d 1241

Daniel SNETHEN, Appellant, v. Crispus NIX, Appellee.

No. 83-2064.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 17, 1984.

Decided June 20, 1984.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1984.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

James P. Cleary, Gary L. Shriver, Student Attorney-Legal Intern, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and HEANEY and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Snethen appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Snethen asserts the admission at trial of statements he made during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, and other statements he made to police officers while in custody, violated the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. Because we find Snethen's petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand with directions to dismiss Snethen's petition. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-522, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204-1205, 71 S.Ct.2d 379 (1982).

Snethen was indicted for murder in Polk County, Iowa on October 23, 1974. Thereafter, he requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether he was sane at the time of the alleged homicide and whether he was competent to stand trial. Pursuant to a court order, Snethen was admitted to a psychiatric facility and examined by Dr. Paul Loeffelholz, who expressed the opinion that Snethen was competent to stand trial. A jury nonetheless found Snethen incompetent and he was recommitted until such time as he was found competent. Prior to a second competency hearing, Dr. Loeffelholz again examined Snethen and again gave the opinion that he was competent. On Snethen's motion, the court ordered an independent evaluation by Dr. John Garfield, a clinical psychologist. After the second competency hearing, a jury found Snethen competent to stand trial.

Snethen asserted an insanity defense at trial. The defense called Dr. Garfield as a witness. He testified that Snethen suffered from paranoid delusional beliefs or a psychotic paranoid state. The state called Dr. Loeffelholz as a rebuttal witness. He disputed Dr. Garfield's opinion and testified as to his conversations with Snethen and statements Snethen made during his competency evaluations. The defense objected to Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony, but on grounds irrelevant to his applications for post-conviction relief. The jury subsequently found Snethen guilty of first degree murder.

In his direct appeal, Snethen challenged the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony on the ground that it violated the physician-patient privilege. The Iowa Supreme Court did not reach the merits of this contention because no objection on this ground was made at trial and consequently the error was not preserved. State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 316 (Iowa 1976). Snethen then filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief in the state courts. Counsel was appointed both for the proceedings before the trial court and on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. In his post-conviction petition, Snethen claimed he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial because his trial counsel failed to object to the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony on the grounds that it violated the physician-patient privilege. The trial court denied Snethen's application for post-conviction relief.

On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Iowa 1981). The court held that the physician-patient privilege was inapplicable, and therefore defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on that ground. The court noted that Snethen had raised for the first time on appeal the allegation that his trial attorney was ineffective in not objecting to Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony on the ground that it violated his fourteenth amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to counsel. Because Snethen had not raised these claims in his post-conviction proceedings before the trial court, the appeals court refused to consider them on their merits. The court noted, however, that "assuming arguendo" the due process question had been raised in Snethen's petition, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object on that ground because there was no supporting case law for such an objection at the time of trial, and because Snethen was not prejudiced given the other evidence of his involvement in the murder. Id. at 16. In a footnote, the court also noted that there may have been a fifth amendment problem with admitting Loeffelholz's testimony, but that this issue was not before the court.

On November 25, 1981, Snethen filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. In his federal petition, Snethen claimed that the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony (1) violated his physician-patient privilege; (2) violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (3) violated his fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial; and (4) violated his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel and his attorney-client privilege.

The state raised the exhaustion issue in its answer to Snethen's petition. It argued that Snethen had not exhausted his state remedies because his state post-conviction petition did not challenge the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony on the merits of the constitutional grounds asserted in the federal petition, but rather as a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. In an order dated August 31, 1982, the district court ruled that the exhaustion requirement should be considered satisfied because there was a clear manifestation in the record that further state proceedings would be futile. The court based this conclusion on the state court's treatment of the physician-client privilege issue and the state court's determination that the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony had not prejudiced Snethen's case.

After thus disposing of the exhaustion issue, the district court ruled in its August 31, order that Snethen had demonstrated "cause" as defined in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), for his failure to make a timely objection at trial to the admission of Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony. The district court further ruled that the admission of this testimony violated Snethen's fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. The court then directed further briefing on the issue of prejudice. Following the submission of supplemental briefs, the district court reconsidered its prior ruling on cause in light of Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). The court held that even if Snethen had shown cause for failing to assert his constitutional objections to Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony at his criminal trial, he had not shown cause for the same failure during his state post-conviction trial. Consequently, in an order dated June 30, 1983, the district court denied Snethen's application for a writ of habeas corpus. This appeal followed.

In their briefs on appeal, neither party discusses the exhaustion issue, focusing instead on the district court's determination that there had been no cause for Snethen's failure to raise his constitutional challenges in the state courts. At oral argument, however, the state contended that its alternative position on appeal was that Snethen has failed to exhaust state remedies for some of his claims. In the interest of comity, we resolve this appeal on the exhaustion issue. We therefore need not decide whether the district court properly applied the cause and prejudice analysis of Engle to the facts of this case.

Rose v. Lundy directs district courts to dismiss state prisoner petitions for habeas corpus which contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The rule is based on principles of comity and federalism and is designed to encourage state prisoners to seek full relief from the state courts first, thus giving those courts the initial opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. Rose v. Lundy, supra, 455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203. The prisoner whose "mixed" petition is dismissed has the option of either returning to state court to litigate the unexhausted claims or resubmitting a petition to the federal courts which contains only exhausted claims.

We must look to the legal arguments Snethen made before the state court to determine whether the claims he makes in his federal petition have been exhausted. In Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (per curiam) the Supreme Court stated:

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, * * * or that a somewhat similar state law claim was made * * *. In addition, the habeas petitioner must have "fairly presented" to the state courts the "substance" of his federal habeas corpus claim.

Id. at 277.

While it may not be necessary for a petitioner to refer to a specific provision of the Constitution, some indication of the nature of his or her constitutional claim must be given either by direct or indirect reference to federal law. See Nelson v. Solem, 714 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir.1983); Daye v. Attorney General of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 194 (2d Cir.1982) (en banc); Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir.1980).

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