Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., 91-1314

• Citation: 973 F.2d 555
• Decision Date: 28 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1314,91-1314
• Parties: 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1143, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,735, 61 USLW 2188 Sharon SNIDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 555

973 F.2d 555

59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1143,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,735, 61 USLW 2188

Sharon SNIDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 91-1314.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 22, 1992.

Decided Aug. 26, 1992.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 28, 1992.

John D. Lynn (argued), Michael J. Hoare, Hoare & Associates, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff-appellee.

Donald L. Metzger, Edwardsville, Ill., Thomas G. Bearden (argued), David D. Mattern, Bearden, Breckenridge, Knoten & Mattern, St. Louis, Mo., Lori M. Eddy, Consolidation Coal Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant-appellant.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, MANION, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. ¹

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Consolidation Coal Company (hereinafter "Consol") appeals the district court's judgment in favor of Sharon Snider on her Title VII claim, contending the trial court was estopped from believing Snider's testimony by virtue of a jury verdict on tort claims heard and disposed of in this proceeding. Consol also challenges the district court's award of front and back pay. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Beginning in July of 1979, Snider worked at a coal mine owned by Consol that is referred to as "Burning Star # 4" and is located in Cutler, Illinois. In late 1979 or early 1980, Richard Delloma began working at the mine as its Assistant Superintendent; in January 1982, he was promoted to Superintendent. As the mine's superintendent, Delloma was the highest ranking company official on the premises, and he had authority over sixty salaried and 267 hourly employees. Seventeen of these employees were female.

In 1984, Snider and Delloma had some form of relationship, though they vehemently disagree about the nature of that relationship. According to Snider, Delloma began making unwanted advances in 1982. Snider alleges that on numerous occasions, Delloma expressed his desire to have sex with her, and promised her easier job assignments in return. When Snider declined, Delloma began assigning her more difficult work and refusing to approve her absences. In July 1984, Delloma threatened to fire Snider and tell her husband about her affairs with two other miners unless she agreed to sleep with him. Faced with these threats, Snider gave in to his demands. On one occasion in September 1984, at a time when both were working at the mine, Delloma allegedly physically forced Snider to perform oral sex. Consol fired Delloma in January 1985 for "sexual harassment and unacceptable relations with employees who worked directly for him."

Delloma's version of the facts, as indicated, is different from Snider's. He denies threatening or otherwise harassing Snider. He admits that they had sexual relations at his house, but insists their encounters were completely consensual. He also admits to having had sexual relationships with at least nine other female employees over whom he had supervisory control, but insists all these relationships were also consensual.

In September 1985, Snider attempted suicide by taking an overdose of heart medication. She was hospitalized for several days and obtained psychiatric care. In November, she attempted to return to work, but found the experience traumatizing. In April 1987, her doctor advised her not to return to work, and she began an indefinite sick leave that continues at this time.

In July 1986, Snider filed suit against Consol and Delloma, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII and a variety of state-based tort claims. Snider dismissed some of the tort claims prior to trial; trial commenced in May 1989 on her claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, ² and negligent hiring/retention/supervision. ³ A jury was impaneled to decide the tort claims, while the court was to try the Title VII claim.

At trial, the two primary witnesses were Snider and Delloma; Snider set forth her allegations, and Delloma denied them. The remaining witnesses' testimony primarily ⁴ addressed the credibility of Snider and Delloma; in fact, the strategy of both defendants was to launch a full-scale assault on Snider. Without detailing all the arenas of attack, we note that the defense counsel focused much of their energies on emphasizing that Snider never complained about Delloma's activity to anyone, and that none of the other women Delloma supervised--including those he had dated and had sexual encounters with--ever raised allegations of sexual harassment. In their closing arguments, both defendants' attorneys focused on these facts in describing Snider as a "liar."

Snider attempted to elicit the testimony of Dr. Freada Klein, an expert who consults with and advises companies on the problems of sexual harassment in the workplace. Based on Snider's offer of proof, the court determined the probative value of Dr. Klein's testimony would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect it would have on the jury, and refused to allow the jury to hear Dr. Klein's testimony. However, with respect to the Title VII claim, the court concluded Dr. Klein's testimony was more relevant, and the risk of prejudice was diminished; therefore, the court heard Dr. Klein's testimony outside of the jury's presence. ⁵

Dr. Klein was able to testify about sexual harassment in general, but she had not interviewed Delloma or Snider, nor had she examined the operations at Burning Star # 4 or any other component of Consol's operation. ⁶ Instead, she testified about the problems faced by women working in traditionally male-dominated industries (such as coal mining), as well as the unique problems presented by romances between supervisors and their subordinates. She stated that she did not believe dating relationships between supervisors and subordinates could be truly consensual and voluntary, but that in those cases when the relationship appeared truly voluntary, she advised the company to remove the subordinate employee from the supervisor's control with respect to business matters. She also explained that over 95% of the victims of nonconsensual relationships--whether sexual or merely social--did not complain or report the problem due to a fear of reprisal or loss of privacy.

The jury returned verdicts in favor of the defendants on all counts. Snider filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial based on several evidentiary points; among these was a claim that the court improperly barred Dr. Klein from testifying before the jury. The court reiterated that it relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 ⁷ to exclude Dr. Klein's testimony, and then stated that "[t]o the extent that plaintiff asserts that Klein's testimony would have served to bolster plaintiff's credibility, that claim is of no legal value." Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 86-3462, slip op. at 4 (E.D.Ill. June 27, 1990) (memorandum and order denying j.n.o.v. and new trial).

The same day the district court denied Snider's motions for j.n.o.v. and new trial, it rendered its decision in favor of Snider and against Consol ⁸ on the Title VII claim. In so doing, the court made thirty specific factual findings, six of which were based exclusively on Dr. Klein's testimony. The court also stated that Snider's "reluctance to file a formal complaint against Delloma is consistent with the patterns exhibited by subordinate employees who are subjected to sexual harassment by their supervisors. The Court finds that although plaintiff did not file a union grievance or a formal EEOC complaint, the attention by Delloma was unwelcome and constituted sexual harassment." Snider v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 86-3462, slip op. at 12-13 (E.D.Ill. June 27, 1990) (memorandum and order on Title VII claim). The court awarded Snider front pay, back pay, interest, and attorney fees.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judgment on the Title VII Claim

Consol argues the jury's verdicts in favor of the defendants on the tort claims are inconsistent with the judge's verdict in favor of Snider on the Title VII claim. Specifically, Consol contends the jury obviously disbelieved Snider; had the jury believed Snider, it could not have rendered judgments for the defendants. Consequently, the judge was barred from believing any of Snider's testimony when deciding the outcome of the Title VII claim.

When a lawsuit involves both legal and equitable claims, the legal claims must be decided by the jury before the court resolves the equitable claims. This ordering of events is required so that the judge's decision with respect to the equitable claims does not bind the jury's decisionmaking ability with regard to factual issues common to both the legal and equitable claims, thereby undermining the guarantees of the Seventh Amendment. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 334, 99 S.Ct. 645, 653, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). This ordering of events, designed to prevent the jury from being bound by the judge's factual findings, creates situations in which the judge may be bound by the jury's factual findings. Indeed, this court has held that when common issues are simultaneously tried to both a judge and a jury, the jury's findings with respect to those common issues are binding upon the judge. E.g., Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (7th Cir.1987); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir.1986). This latter rule of law has been variously characterized as mandated either by the Seventh Amendment or by notions of collateral estoppel. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 113 (7th Cir.1990) (recognizing and criticizing both bases for the rule), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1306, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991). In its briefs, Consol has characterized its argument as resting on both principles, but at oral argument conceded the analysis would be the same whether we analyzed this case...