Bradenberg v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-03198 |
| Citation | 564 F.Supp.3d 627 |
| Parties | Sharon BRADENBERG, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v. MERIDIAN SENIOR LIVING, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Douglas M. Werman, Zachary Cole Flowerree, Michael Mark Tresnowski, Werman Salas PC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Melissa A. Siebert, Erin Bolan Hines, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Meridian Senior Living, LLC's ("Meridian") Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9). Because Plaintiff's Complaint properly states a claim under Illinois's Biometric Information Privacy Act, which is neither preempted nor time-barred, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
Defendant Meridian is a Delaware limited liability company whose principal place of business is in Bethesda Maryland, though it operates a senior living facility in Sangamon County, Illinois. Defendant is also a "private entity" under the Biometric Information Privacy Act. See 740 ILCS 14/10. Plaintiff Sharon Bradenberg was an employee of Defendant at its Newton, Illinois facility from approximately November 21, 2017 through April 21, 2020.
During that time, Defendant required its workers, including Plaintiff, to scan their fingerprints into a biometric timeclock operated by Defendant at the beginning and end of each shift. According to Plaintiff, this was to prevent workers from clocking in for other workers, something Defendant could not prevent as effectively with employee badges or identification numbers. Each time Plaintiff scanned her fingerprint, that personal identifying information was, Plaintiff alleges, disclosed to Defendant's timekeeping vendor without Plaintiff's consent. According to Plaintiff, Defendant never obtained Plaintiff's written consent before requiring her to use the biometric timeclock. Nor did Defendant obtain any other prior authorization from Plaintiff to collect, store, disseminate, or use her fingerprints or other personal identifying information. Compl. ¶¶ 1–6, 10–11, 23–26.
On June 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois. On August 3, 2020, Defendant removed the suit to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. See Notice of Removal (d/e 1) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) ). In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the above facts amount to three counts of violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff claims violations of Sections 15(a), 15(b), and 15(d) of BIPA, which require companies, among other things, to maintain public retention and destruction schedules before collecting biometric data—Section 15(a)—and to obtain written consent before either collecting biometric data—Section 15(b)—or disclosing that data to third parties—Section 15(d). 740 ILCS 14/15 ; Compl. ¶¶ 42–46, 50–52, 57–59. In doing so, Plaintiff claims Defendant "compromised the privacy and security of the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiff and other similarly situated workers." Compl. ¶12. Plaintiff's relief sought in each count includes liquidated or monetary damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and an injunction enjoining Defendant from further violating the Act as alleged. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 54, 61.
On September 23, 2020, Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, and thus defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing she is entitled to relief and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), courts construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Additionally, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are construed in the plaintiff's favor. Id. The complaint need only set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual content from which the Court can reasonably infer that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). But merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting claims with conclusory statements of law is insufficient to state a cause of action. Id.
Defendant argues Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed for four reasons: first, because Plaintiff's BIPA claims are preempted by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act ("IWCA"), 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. ; second, because Plaintiff's claims are barred by either a one- or two-year statute of limitations period; third, because Plaintiff fails to plead either recklessness, intent, or negligence; and fourth, because Plaintiff assumed the risk that the privacy and security of her biometric information would be compromised by working at Meridian. See generally Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (d/e 10).
The Illinois Workers Compensation Act ("IWCA") largely abrogates Illinois workers' ability to recover damages from employers under common law for workplace injuries and instead provides the exclusive remedy for such injuries. 820 ILCS 305/5(a) ; Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.2d 455, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (1990) ; see also Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 881 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (7th Cir. 2018). But the IWCA is not without exceptions. The exclusive remedies within the IWCA do not apply where the plaintiff establishes "(1) that the injury was not accidental; (2) that the injury did not arise from ... her employment; (3) that the injury was not received during the course of employment; or (4) that the injury was not compensable under the [IWCA]." Meerbrey, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d at 1226 (citing Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill.2d 229, 41 Ill.Dec. 776, 408 N.E.2d 198, 201–02 (1980) ).
Defendant argues that none of these four exceptions to the IWCA exclusive remedy provision apply to Plaintiff's alleged injuries under BIPA. As a result, Defendant argues, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because the proper remedy would be through the workers' compensation procedures set out in the IWCA.
In response, Plaintiff states that injuries under BIPA are neither covered nor compensable under the IWCA. Thus, according to Plaintiff, her claims fall under the fourth, non-compensable injury exception to the IWCA exclusivity provision.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Whether an injury is compensable under the IWCA depends on the outcome of a ‘human organism’ test outlined in the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission. 62 Ill.2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913, 918 (1976) ; see Cothron v. White Castle Sys., 467 F.Supp.3d 604, 616 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (hereinafter " Cothron I") (citing Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 918 ), and Snider v. Heartland Beef, Inc., 479 F.Supp.3d 762, 768 (C.D. Ill. 2020) (same). Under the Pathfinder test, an injury will be compensable only if it triggers a "harmful change in the human organism—not just its bones and muscles, but its brain and nerves as well." Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 918 (internal citations omitted).
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that BIPA "codified that individuals possess a right to privacy in and control over their biometric identifiers and biometric information." Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 432 Ill.Dec. 654, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206 (2019). As a result, Illinois state trial courts have held that the privacy rights protected in BIPA are "distinct from those preempted by the IWCA." Cothron I, 467 F.Supp.3d at 617–617 (collecting cases). Thus, as other federal courts have held, "only physical or psychological injuries are compensable under the IWCA" while privacy interests, such as those under BIPA, are not. Snider, 479 F.Supp.3d at 769–770.
Plaintiff does not claim any physical or psychological injuries. Rather, she claims an injury to her right to privacy codified in BIPA. Plaintiff's injuries cannot, then, be compensated under the IWCA and are, therefore, not preempted.
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As an initial matter, because a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on those grounds is only proper where the allegations "plainly reveal that the action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations." Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (citing Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) ). BIPA itself does not contain a specific limitations period, and other federal courts in Illinois have acknowledged as much. Cf. Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 477 F.Supp.3d 723, 729 n. 4 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (hereinafter " Cothron II"); Burlinski v. Top Golf USA Inc., No. 19-CV-06700, 2020 WL 5253150, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020).
Still, Defendant argues that either a one- or two-year limitation should apply to BIPA claims. The one-year period should apply, Defendant argues, because Section 13-201 of Illinois's Code of Civil Procedure applies a one-year limitation to actions for "publication of matter violating the right of...
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