Snider v. Shapp
| Decision Date | 31 August 1979 |
| Parties | Obie SNIDER et al., Petitioners, v. Milton J. SHAPP, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Argued June 5, 1979. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
William Fearen, Michael I. Levin, Cleckner & Fearen, Harrisburg, for petitioners.
John W. Blasko, State College, for Center County Bd. of Com'rs.
John B. Koontz, Bedford, for Bedford County Bd. of Com'rs.
Lewis P. Sterling, York, for York County Bd. of Com'rs.
Robert B. Hoffman, Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, for the Com.
Robert Meehan, Harrisburg, Harry C. Elsesser, Jr., York, for Auditor Gen.
Bruce A. Rosenfield, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Gordon E. Stroup, Bedford, David E. Grine, Bellefonte, John C. Uhler, York, amicus curiae.
Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH, Jr., WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS, CRAIG and MacPHAIL, JJ.
On October 4, 1978, the Governor signed into law what is popularly known as the "Public Officials Ethics Law" (herein simply the Ethics Law or Act) [1] proscribing certain conduct involving conflicts of interest and to that end requiring that candidates for public office, elected officials and certain appointed officials file financial disclosure statements with a State Ethics Commission (hereafter the Commission) created to implement and administer the Act.
Petitioners, elected members of three school districts in the Commonwealth, have filed a class action in this Court's original jurisdiction against the Governor, Treasurer, Auditor General, Attorney General, the Commission and its members individually, and the county boards of election and district attorneys as a class seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against implementation of the Act alleging the Act violates various provisions of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Following the filing of an amended petition for review, [2] respondents have filed preliminary objections presently before this Court. The Governor, Treasurer, Attorney General and the Commission have lodged a petition raising the question of this Court's jurisdiction and preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. The Auditor General has filed separate preliminary objections relating to petitioners' claims against him. [3] For the reasons set forth we will sustain the preliminary objections of the Governor, Treasurer, Attorney General and the Commission.
Petitioners Snider and Hoffman aver that each is an elected public official subject to the provisions of the Act, either as a candidate seeking re-election in the general election or as an incumbent school director and each avers that he will resign rather than comply with the disclosure provisions of the Act. Petitioner Barker avers that compliance with the financial disclosure provisions of the Act is against her husband's wishes and will cause severe harm to her marriage. Petitioners allege the Act on its face violates Article I, Sections 5 and 8, Article III, Section 28 and Article IV, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Petitioners also allege the implementation of various provisions of the Ethics Law will cause irreparable damage and injury to them in that it will cause an expenditure of tax money for an unlawful purpose and will cause an improper and unwarranted interference with petitioners' "right to run and serve as school directors." The amended petition for review further includes a count in quo warranto requesting that the three individual members of the Commission appointed by the Governor be removed from office.
The stated purpose of the Ethics Law is to "strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of the State in their government" and to assure the people that "the financial interests of holders of or candidates for public office present neither a conflict nor the appearance of a conflict with the public trust." [4] The Act then prohibits eight categories of conduct, [5] requires the filing of annual financial statements by public officials, candidates and certain public employees, [6] establishes an independent, nonpartisan Ethics Commission [7] and provides for civil and criminal penalties for violations of the restricted activities provision and the disclosure requirements. [8]
We will consider the respondents' preliminary objections to the constitutional challenges posed regarding these provisions of the Act seriatim.
Petitioners have sought injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that the Act is so vague and indefinite in the terms it employs to define a crime that enforcement would constitute a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Respondents initially question whether an action for declaratory judgment is appropriate in this case and secondly whether petitioners have standing to challenge these provisions. In particular, respondents argue that no justiciable controversy and no antagonistic claims indicating imminent and inevitable litigation are present in this case.
The stated purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7531 et seq. is to settle and afford relief to any person from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and legal relations affected by a statute. We believe sufficient uncertainty exists with respect to the facial validity of these provisions of the Ethics Law to meet the threshold jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory Judgments Act. Further, we find that petitioners and the class of school directors they represent are sufficiently affected by the provisions of the Act to provide standing to challenge its validity on vagueness grounds. See Singer v. Sheppard, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 276, 381 A.2d 1007 (1978).
In this context, however, we must note that a statute challenged on vagueness grounds is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared otherwise unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitutions of this Commonwealth or the United States. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975). The allegations of petitioners in this regard are necessarily limited to the facial invalidity of the Act, since petitioners' averments contain no facts indicating enforcement of the provisions against petitioners or that any of the petitioners are engaged in conduct arguably within the proscription of the Act. In this posture, we must conclude that petitioners have failed to sustain their burden in this regard.
The sole support underpinning petitioners' vagueness challenge is a reference to an opinion of the Attorney General which attempted to interpret various provisions of the Act. To find this Act unconstitutional on such a thin reed would in our judgment amount to construing a statute in a vacuum. Further, an examination of Section 3 of the Act, 65 P.S. § 403 containing activities restricted by the Ethics Law leads us to conclude that the section is neither so vague nor inconsistent on its face as to deny due process. While the applicability of Section 3 to particular factual situations must necessarily await regulations and opinions of the Commission, the conduct proscribed by Section 3 is in our view, clearly and plainly set forth. We believe, therefore that judicial interpretation of these sections must await cases which properly present concrete questions for resolution.
Petitioners contend the disclosure requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of the Ethics Law, infringe on their right of privacy as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the right to be free from unreasonable searches guaranteed by Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Petitioners argue that the constitutional guarantees require that the legislature relate those areas of disclosure to sources of income of public officials which might be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest. Respondents have demurred to these allegations for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
The right of privacy asserted here by petitioners has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). The Court has recognized that this right of privacy can be implicated in required disclosure of information concerning financial matters, See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), and further, extends to those matters of a personal nature of public officials which are not related to any acts done by them in their personal capacity, See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). Further, our Supreme Court in Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938) recognized that the right of privacy possessed by private individuals as guaranteed by the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions extends to financial records so that a subpoena of such records issued by a legislative committee must be limited to such disclosure as is reasonably required to meet the general purpose of the legislative inquiry.
While many state courts in considering the validity of similar state statutes and plans have devised various means of analyzing these constitutional claims, [9] we believe the Court in Annenberg, supra, provides the appropriate vehicle to test petitioners' claims in this area. The rule is simply: Where it is alleged that legislation impinges...
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