Snider v. State

• Decision Date: 17 October 1888
• Citation: 7 S.E. 631,81 Ga. 753
• Parties: Snider v. State.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

7 S.E. 631

(81 Ga. 753)

Snider

v.State.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 17, 1888.

1. Intoxicating Liquors—Illegal Sale—Alcohol as an Intoxicant—Evidence.

Alcohol is, as matter of law, an intoxicant, and such fact need not be proven in a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors.

2. Same—Sale to Minors bt Clerk.

One whose clerk sells liquor may be convicted, under Code Ga. § 4540ej, providing that " no person or persons, by himself or another, shall sell, or cause to be sold, or furnished, or permit any other person or persons in his employ " to sell, intoxicating liquors, to minors, etc.

Error from city court of Atlanta; Van Epps, Judge.

One Snider was convicted of selling liquor to minors and brings error. Alexander & Turnbull, for plaintiff in error. F. M. O'Bryan, for defendant in error.

Simmons, J. 1. Snider was convicted in two cases for selling spirituous and intoxicating liquors to minors, and in both cases made motions for a new trial, which were overruled by the court, and he excepted. The proof showed that the defendant sold pure alcohol to two boys on different occasions. The main point argued before us was that the judge, in charging the jury in both cases, instructed them that alcohol was a spirituous and intoxicating liquor, and that it was not necessary for the state to prove that it was intoxicating; or, in other words, that the court could take judicial cognizance of the fact that alcohol was intoxicating, and could so instruct the jury, without proof that it was intoxicating. Counsel for the plaintiff in error argued that this was an expression of opinion by the court upon the facts of the case, and therefore was error. We do not agree with the learned counsel who argued these cases so ably for the plaintiff in error. That alcohol is an intoxicant is as well known and established as any other physical fact. There is not one man in ten thousand, or a hundred thousand, who, if asked whether alcohol is intoxicating, would not reply immediately in the affirmative. It is not a purely scientilic fact, it is a fact that every person of the commonest understanding knows. Indeed, it is a matter of common knowledge that alcohol is the intoxicating element of the various forms of beverages known as "spirituous and intoxicating liquors." It is known by the people generally as well as they know that the sun produces heat, that summer is succeeded by winter, that flowers bloom in the spring, that the earth revolves, or that the blood circulates in the human system. Would it be necessary upon the trial of a case, where any of these facts were involved, to prove to the jury any one of them? We apprehend no lawyer would undertake to burden the record of a case with such proof. If, therefore, it be unnecessary to prove any of these well-known physical facts, why should it be necessary to prove the equally well-known fact that alcohol is an intoxicant? In the case of Briffitt v. State, 58 Wis. 42, 16 N. W. Kep. 39, the defendant was indicted for selling intoxicating liquors without first having obtained a license therefor. The proof was that he sold beer. The question before the court was whether proof that the de-fendant had sold beer was sufficient proof that he had sold malt and intoxicating liquor. ORton, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "At the present time we all know that this malt liquor, under the the generic name of ' beer, ' is made and used in most of European countries, and in our own, and is a common beverage. As long as Jaws for licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors have existed, brandy, whisky, gin, rum, and other alcoholic liquids, have been held to be intoxicating liquors per se; and why? Simply because it is within the common knowledge and ordinary understanding that they are intoxicating liquors. By this rule of common knowledge, courts take judicial notice that certain things are verities, without proof; as in Chambers v. George, 5 Litt. 335, the circulating medium in popular acceptation was held to mean ' currency of the state;' and Lampton v. Haggard, 3 T. B. Mon. 149, the circulating medium was held to mean 'Kentucky currency;' and in Jones v. Overstreet, 4 T. B. Mon. 547, the word' money' was held to mean paper currency. * * * Words in contracts and laws are to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they are technical, local, or provincial, or their meaning is modified by the usage of trade. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 278. When the general or primary meaning of a word is once established by such common usage and general acceptation, we do not require evidence of its meaning by the testimony of witnesses, but look for its definition in the dictionary." There are numerous other cases holding that the courts will take judicial knowledge that beer is an intoxicant, and that the fact need not be proven to the jury. It is true that there are authorities in conflict upon the question of whether beer is such a well-known intoxicant as to need no proof of the fact, —some courts holding that it is, and others that it is not; but no case was cited, nor have we been able to find any, that holds that it is necessary to prove that alcohol, whisky, brandy, gin, or...