Snodgrass v. Copple

• Decision Date: 08 June 1908
• Citation: 131 Mo. App. 346,111 S.W. 845
• Parties: SNODGRASS v. COPPLE et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

111 S.W. 845

131 Mo. App. 346

SNODGRASS v. COPPLE et al.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 8, 1908.

1. HOMESTEAD — ABANDONMENT—EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence held to sustain a finding that a homestead had not been abandoned.

2. SAME — REMOVAL — INTENT TO RETURN.

The removal of one's family from a homestead is prima facie evidence of abandonment, but it is not conclusive, and may be overcome by showing that the removal was temporary and accompanied with an intention to return after the accomplishment of a specific purpose which prompted the removal, and while a mere vague and indefinite intention to return at some time under certain contingencies will not prevent the removal from being an abandonment, where a family is compelled to leave the homestead for special reasons, such as pecuniary stress, until the special reason no longer exists, and intends all the time to return, the fact that the length of enforced absence cannot be accurately forecasted will not alter the effect to be given the intention to return.

3. SAME — SALE AND REINVESTMENT.

The sale of a homestead for the purpose of reinvesting the proceeds in another homestead does not constitute an abandonment.

4. SAME — LEASE.

A homestead may be leased during the temporary absence of the owner, without an abandonment of homestead rights.

5. SAME — VOTING ELSEWHERE.

The mere fact that the owner of a homestead votes elsewhere during an absence necessary to the support of his family will not constitute nor establish an abandonment of the homestead, where there is an intention to return.

6. SAME — QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT.

The issue of abandonment of a homestead is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Livingston County.

Action by W. T. Snodgrass against H. Copple and others. Plaintiff recovered judgment and levied an execution on defendants' alleged homestead, and defendants brought proceedings to quash the levy. From a judgment quashing the levy, Snodgrass appealed to the Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. 203 Mo. 480, 101 S. W. 1090. Affirmed.

D. E. Adams, for appellant. A. T. Weatherby and J. M. Davis & Sons, for respondents.

JOHNSON, J.

This is a proceeding to quash the levy of an execution. The question in issue is whether defendant Copple, against whom plaintiff recovered a judgment of $371 on May 12, 1903, abandoned his homestead right in a certain residence property in the town of Dawn, Livingston county, before execution was issued and levied thereon. The trial court heard the evidence, held there had been no abandonment, and rendered judgment accordingly. An appeal was granted to the Supreme Court, but that tribunal transferred the cause to this court on the ground that we alone had jurisdiction over it. Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 408, 101 S. W. 1090.

Copple is the head of a family consisting of himself, his wife, and three minor children. In 1887, he purchased the property in controversy and occupied it as a residence. He was engaged in banking business and, for a time, was judge of the county court of Livingston county; but misfortune overtook him, stripped him of everything but his homestead and household belongings, and forced him to rely on day labor for means to support his family. Finding that his home town afforded but a meager and precarious opportunity to make a living, he first went to Chillicothe, and thence to Kansas City, in the hope of bettering his condition. He arrived in Kansas City about November 1, 1901, and found work for which he was paid $7 per week. Four weeks later, he rented a house and moved his family from Dawn. He procured a tenant from month to month for his residence property, and left some of his household goods on the premises. He voted in Kansas City at the spring election of 1903. An attempt was made by plaintiff to show that his personal property was assessed for taxation in Kansas City, but it was not shown that such assessment was made prior to June 5, 1903, the date on which he sold and conveyed his residence in Dawn to defendant Williams. The consideration of that sale was $900, the fair value of the property. After paying off the incumbrances, he had $573 left of the proceeds, which he invested immediately in a homestead in Kansas...