Snodgrass v. Snodgrass

• Decision Date: 21 October 1961
• Citation: 357 S.W.2d 829,49 Tenn.App. 607
• Parties: Georgia Hutchins SNODGRASS, Complainant, Appellant, v. Clarence Major SNODGRASS, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 829

357 S.W.2d 829

49 Tenn.App. 607

Georgia Hutchins SNODGRASS, Complainant, Appellant, v. Clarence Major SNODGRASS, Defendant, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

Oct. 21, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1961.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court April 4, 1962.

Wilbur W. Piper, Knoxville, for appellant.

Joseph F. Denney, Oak Ridge, for appellee.

McAMIS, Presiding Judge.

The bill in this case makes a direct attack upon a decree of divorce in a previous suit between the parties upon the dual grounds that the Court in the prior suit was without jurisdiction and that the decree is void because the grounds of divorce were not alleged with the required particularity as to time and place. Mrs. Snodgrass has appealed from a decree dismissing her suit, renewing here the same grounds of attack.

Both parties are natives of Buncombe County, North Carolina. The jurisdictional question raised by the bill is the allegation that defendant had not been a bona fide resident of Anderson County, Tennessee, more than one year prior to February 11, 1960, when he sued for divorce in the Trial Justice Court of that County.

T.C.A. § 36-803 provides:

'Residence Requirements.--A divorce may be granted for any of the aforesaid causes, though the acts complained of were committed out of the State, or the petitioner resided out of the state [of Tennessee,] at the time, no matter where the other party resides, if the petitioner has resided in this state one (1) year next preceding the filing of the bill or petition.'

Defendant insists that he became a resident of Tennessee in 1956 when he accepted permanent employment at Oak Ridge with the Union Carbide Nuclear Company. The divorce was granted upon constructive service of process by publication. No fraud is charged in the bill.

Since it is not relied upon by defendant, we do not pass upon the question whether the divorce decree constitutes res judicata that defendant at the time the bill for divorce was filed was a resident of Tennessee.

On July 16, 1956, defendant became field representative for Union Carbide Nuclear Company with headquarters at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. As his work required he travelled to various points throughout the United States inspecting work for his employer. As we understand, he at first only maintained a room in one of the dormitories at Oak Ridge. But in the Spring of 1958 he began living in a house at 119 West Arrowwood Road in Oak Ridge.

As the culmination of a long courtship, including a period of several years prior to the time defendant obtained a divorce from his first wife, the parties were married in Anderson County on September 4, 1958. After spending a few days at the home of complainant's mother in Asheville, N. C., defendant returned to 119 West Arrowwood Road in Oak Ridge. Complainant, with the exception of one trip to Oak Ridge one Sunday afternoon, continued at all times thereafter to reside with her mother and a child of the parties at Asheville, N. C.

Defendant testified that he tried to persuade complainant to live with him in his home in Oak Ridge but that she refused and that his visits with her were confined to week-ends when he could make the trip to Asheville. During this time he bought some utilities or furniture for the home in Asheville where complainant was staying with her mother. He also bought a car in Asheville. In these contracts he listed his address as that of complainant and her mother. Until he filed his income tax for the year 1959 his returns were made at Greensboro, N. C. For the year 1959 complainant refused to file a joint return. Defendant then made his return for that year in Tennessee. These circumstances are relied upon by complainant as showing that defendant was domiciled in his native state of North Carolina.

Defendant testified, however, that he last voted in North Carolina in 1952 and voted in Tennessee in 1958 and 1960; that after 1956 when he accepted employment at Oak Ridge his mailing address was Oak Ridge where he also kept his checking account in a local bank; that, even when away on trips for as much as a month, his mail was also sent to his Oak Ridge address and that it was his intention to make Oak Ridge his home during all of the years in question.

The term 'residence' in our divorce statute is to be construed as equivalent to 'domicile'. Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 91, 261 S.W. 959; Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn.App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231.

'Domicile' is defined as the place 'where a person has his principal home and place of enjoyment of his fortunes; which he does not expect to leave, except for a purpose; from which when absent, he seems to himself a wayfarer; to which when he returns, he ceases to travel.' White v. White, 3 Head 404, 40 Tenn. 404; Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, supra.

It is customary for a person to vote at his place of permanent employment. Such employment and the exercise of the right of suffrage coupled with the maintenance of a place of abode are of great significance in determining domicile and we think outweigh the proof offered by complainant outlined above.

If it be conceded that defendant resided for short periods with his wife in Asheville it still does not follow that Asheville was his domicile. It is well settled that a person may have two or more actual residences but only one domicile. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Stile, 193 Tenn. 513, 246 S.W.2d 958; State ex rel. Sprague v. Bucher, 38 Tenn.App. 40, 270 S.W.2d 565.

We think the Chancellor was correct in holding that the Trial Justice Court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce.

We have also concluded after careful consideration that the decree is not void because of any deficiency in failing to charge time and place with the required particularity. We quote the portion of the bill for divorce material to this question:

'That shortly after the marriage due to the defendant's insistence on living with her mother in Asheville, North Carolina, a very bad situation was created for the complainant as the defendant refused to create a home for them in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the complainant resides and is employed. The complainant did all within his power to persuade the defendant to live with him in Oak Ridge, but the defendant, without reasonable cause, refused to comply with complainant's numerous requests in regard thereto.

'Notwithstanding the aforesaid facts the complainant undertook to make a success of the marriage and would go to Asheville to be with the defendant as his work permitted. In a very few months the defendant began cooling in her ardor with and to the complainant and on the occasion of the visits to her would manifest a complete indifference to him. Defendant frequently said to complainant that their marriage was a mistake and should never have taken place.

'Specifically the complainant avers that the defendant wilfully refused to carry out her conjugal duties with him; that on most of his visits to Asheville, she denied her person to him in the matter of physical relations and that since December 16, 1959, she has refused completely to cohabit with him, stating that she did not intend to ever do so again. All of the aforesaid actions were without just cause on the part of the defendant.

'The defendan...