Snodgrass v. Snodgrass

• Decision Date: 12 February 1914
• Citation: 185 Ala. 155,64 So. 594
• Parties: SNODGRASS v. SNODGRASS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

64 So. 594

185 Ala. 155

SNODGRASS v. SNODGRASS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 12, 1914

Appeal from Chancery Court, Jackson County; W.H. Simpson Chancellor.

Bill for an accounting by John A. Snodgrass, as administrator against Eliza A. Snodgrass, as administratrix. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Virgil Bouldin and John B. Tally, both of Scottsboro, for appellant.

W.H Norwood and Milo Moody, both of Scottsboro, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

This is the second appeal in this cause. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 58 So. 201. A somewhat similar cause, of like title, was considered in 58 South 199. Different conclusions prevailed in the two appeals. Both bills sought an accounting of one who had served as trustee of estates for a long term of years. The ruling on the last-mentioned appeal was predicated upon the doctrine of Whetstone v. Whetstone, 75 Ala. 495. The opinion in the former appeal of this cause recognized Whetstone v. Whetstone as authoritative, but distinguished that authority, and Snodgrass v. Snodgrass following it, by reference to the facts averred in the original bill in this cause. Upon the remandment of this cause, the bill was amended. It is to be inferred that the object of the amendment was to state a cause within the doctrine of Whetstone v. Whetstone and of Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 58 So. 199. It is insisted for appellant that the principles announced and applied on former appeal in this cause require the reversal of the decree overruling the grounds of demurrer to be indicated, notwithstanding the amendment effected. This contention renders it necessary, if not otherwise essential, that the pronouncement of applied principle in the opinion on former appeal should be, to a degree at least, re-examined. The conclusion was that the grounds of demurrer numbered 1, 2, 3, and 10 were erroneously overruled by the chancellor. These grounds, in the order of their number, were: That the demands set up were stale; that they were barred by laches; that they were barred by prescription; and that "the matters complained of in the bill have been continuing for a period of 25 years; that no settlement or accounting has ever been had; that Ann C. Snodgrass is dead and had been dead for six years before the bill was filed; that N.H. Snodgrass is dead; that no bill was filed during his life for more than five years after the death of Ann C. Snodgrass, and the matters and things set up are of such nature that, by death of parties, want and loss of evidence, it is impossible to do justice between the parties on an accounting, and said demands and each of them severally are barred by laches." It is seen that the tenth ground of demurrer is but an amplification, by recitals of facts, of grounds 1 and 2, ante.

The original bill was filed July 22, 1911. Ann C. Snodgrass died July 25, 1904. Nathaniel H. Snodgrass was a brother of Ann C. Snodgrass. They were children of John Snodgrass, who died in 1880, from whom Ann C., inherited, in her proportion, an estate of both personal and real property. Another brother of Ann C. viz., William E., exercised, by general consent in the family, the trusteeship of the estate of Ann C., as well as that of another brother, John T., until December 15, 1886; at which time the care, management, and control of said estates of the adults, Ann C. and John T., was committed, with like consent, to Nathaniel E. Snodgrass, defendant's intestate. Ann C., John T., and Nathaniel E. occupied as tenants in common and lived together upon lands so descending until the death of Ann C. in July, 1904. It is averred in the original bill that upon the acceptance, in 1886, of the trusts by Nathaniel H., the entire trust estates were turned over to him. It is then averred "that, from and after the time Nathaniel H. Snodgrass so accepted said trust, and assumed to act as general [agent] of and for the said Ann C. Snodgrass in receiving, managing, and controlling her entire estate and business affairs, he continued to act as such agent and trustee until the death of the said Ann C., which occurred July 25, 1904; that during the entire period of said agency he, the said Nathaniel H. Snodgrass, was exclusively engaged in the occupation of farming, and he in each and every year during the continuancy of his said agency, that is to say, from and including 1887 to and including the year 1904, when said Ann C. died, caused to be cultivated on his individual account a large portion" of the tillable lands in which Ann C. had a one-fifth undivided interest and annually rented or leased the remainder of the land in which she had that interest; and that he "received and collected the entire rents and profits of said lands in each of said years from 1887 to 1904, both inclusive." (Italics supplied.)

It is clear from the averments of the original bill that the relation, to the estate of Ann C., assumed and acted upon by Nathaniel Snodgrass, was one of a trust nature; and that the inception of a period wherefrom, if sufficiently long maintained, the right or the remedy to exact an accounting by the trustee would become barred, could not and did not antedate the last act done under or in recognition of the existence of the trust. Whetstone v. Whetstone, 75 Ala. 495, 502; Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 58 So. 199. Since the period of prescription in this state is 20 years, it is manifest that the time elapsing between July 25, 1904--when Ann C. died--and the filing of the original bill, was entirely insufficient, being approximately 7 years, to raise in behalf of the trustee or of his personal representative any right or defense based upon prescription. So, the former opinion in this cause was and is unsound in its pronouncement of error in the chancellor's decree in overruling the ground of demurrer asserting the bar of the complainant's right or remedy by reason of prescription. To that extent the former opinion, in this cause, is overruled.

Pretermitting the recital of any more of the facts averred in the amendment than are at this time essential, the pith of the presently important averments therein are these: "Ann C. Snodgrass was always, after she reached and passed the age of twelve years down to her death, which occurred on July 25, 1904, of unsound mind and subject to fainting fits, with which she was often and repeatedly visited during her life, and she died *** while a fit or convulsion was upon her. The unsoundness of her mind was in a degree such as to render her wholly incapable of understanding business affairs, or transacting her business affairs with judgment and intelligence." That "it was ascertained by her teachers and by her parents that her mind was incapable of receiving and retaining more than the rudiments of a literary education." That her mental incapacity was well known to her parents and to her brothers, one of whom Nathaniel was. That the father, shortly before his death, verbally requested his sons, among them Nathaniel, to watch and care for their unfortunate brother (John T.) and sister (Ann C.). That, in 1883, for a consideration of $6,000, James D. Snodgrass conveyed his entire interest in the father's estate to his brothers and sister, viz., Wm. E., John T., Nathaniel and Ann C., thereby enhancing their interests in the real estate from one-fifth to one-fourth. It is then averred that, "after the death of said Ann C. Snodgrass, which occurred on July 25, 1904, the said N.H. Snodgrass recognized and admitted his continuing agency and trusteeship of and for the said Ann C. Snodgrass in receiving, managing, and controlling...