Snook v. Kennedy

• Decision Date: 19 August 1918
• Docket Number: 14714.
• Citation: 103 Wash. 390,174 P. 643
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SNOOK v. KENNEDY et al.

174 P. 643

103 Wash. 390

SNOOK v. KENNEDY et al.

No. 14714.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 19, 1918

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John S. Jurey Judge.

Action by Ina Hoffman Snook, executrix, against H. B. Kennedy, Carl J. Smith, and others. From a judgment for Carl J. Smith, as to an issue affecting his claim for professional services plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Tucker & Hyland and Herbert E. Snook, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Donworth & Todd, of Seattle, for respondents.

TOLMAN J.

The appellant, who is the executrix under a nonintervention will brought this action, seeking an accounting and possession of the property belonging to the estate from the defendants and respondents. The respondent Carl J. Smith had been her attorney in the matter from its inception, and the only part of her complaint which affects him is paragraph 20, which reads:

'That the defendant Carl J. Smith heretofore has been the attorney for the plaintiff herein, and is entitled to an undetermined claim as against said estate of Josephine E Kennedy, deceased, for services as counsel in said estate, which remains unfixed and undetermined.'

So far, therefore, as Carl J. Smith is concerned, the only purpose of the action was to fix the amount due him for professional services rendered to the estate. After hearing upon this issue, and before the entry of the final judgment upon the other issues, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the respondent Smith and against Ina Hoffman Snook, as executrix, and against the estate, for $6,000, with costs and interest, and impressed the judgment as a trust upon all of the property of the estate. The appeal is taken from this judgment, and errors are assigned as follows:

'(1) The court erred in rendering judgment for respondent Carl J. Smith; (2) the amount allowed to Carl J. Smith was too large.'

The court having theretofore found the estate to be solvent, and entered the usual nonintervention order, the action was a proper one of the purpose of fixing the amount due the respondent Smith, because, the parties failing to agree, there was no way in which the amount of the attorney's fees could be fixed, except by an action brought by one or the other of the interested parties; and the appellant, having sought the aid of the court for this purpose, cannot complain because of the entry of a judgment.

It is argued here that the judgment...