Snoots v. Demorest

Decision Date03 July 1969
Docket NumberNo. 338,338
Citation254 Md. 572,255 A.2d 12
PartiesLawrence E. SNOOTS v. John R. DEMOREST, III, et ux.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Thomas M. O.'Malley, Washington, D. C. (James F. Bromley, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

William H. Clarke, Bethesda, for appellees.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, BARNES, FINAN and SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant (Snoots) claims that without warning he went to sleep while operating a motor vehicle and that this should excuse him from the judgment entered against him at the suit of the plaintiff appellees, John R. Demorest (Demorest) and his wife. We shall sustain the action of the trial court.

Snoots, Demorest and another on the might of August 13, 1967, had been to motorcycle races. They all had 'a couple of beers' which was later defined to be two beers. They stopped on the way home to play the slot machines at which time Demorest and Snoots each had another beer. Although there appears to have been evidence of sleeping on the part of the passengers in the car, the parties testified that Snoots showed no visible effect of his three beers and that he appeared alert. Around midnight they stopped at a restaurant for breakfast. It serves no alcoholic beverages. Snoots there drank coffee in addition to eating. They took one passenger home. Demorest remained on the back seat of the car after that passenger was discharged. About seven or eight miles from the point where this passenger was discharged the accident took place. Demorest's version of it was:

'We were just driving along and I must have fell asleep, and the next thing I remember was hitting the curb and waking up, going through the windshield.'

He claimed that his last recollection before the accident was that Snoots was wide awake, very alert and not having any problem with his driving.

The Snoots version of the accident was:

'Well, I took the normal route that I would take from Foote's house to mine. And we were going out Good Luck Road and I apparently fell asleep at the wheel, and I woke up in an instant before we hit the curb.'

He testified that he felt fine at Foote's house ten or fifteen minues before the accident, and he had no preliminary signs or indications that he was in a sleepy condition. On cross-examination, however, the record is as follows:

'Q. You said apparently you fell asleep. You don't know whether you did for sure? A. No, not for sure.'

It is the contention of Snoots here that the trial court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that Demorest failed to establish negligence on the part of Snoots, 'in that the evidence of record established that appellees' injuries were caused when, without any reason to foresee or anticipate that he might do so, appellant suddely fell asleep while operating the involved automobile.'

Snoots relies on a recent decision of the Superior Court of Connecticut in Shanley v. Shanley, 27 Conn.Sup. 417, 241 A.2d 543 (1968) denying a plaintiff passenger's motion for summary judgment in view of the fact that the defendant driver's affidavit tended to support the driver's defense that he fell asleep and his car swerved off the road and struck a pole. The court there said:

'While the rule of law relative to the 'sleeping motorist' has been subjected to criticism, a majority of the jurisdictions agree that in automobile accident litigation if, 'without any premonitory signs of drowsiness, you were suddenly deprived of consciousness by the sandman of Morpheus, you were not at fault and were not an actor' and thus legally incapable of incurring liability. Kaufman & Kantrowitz, 'The Case of the Sleeping Motorist,' 25 .y.u.l.r/ev. 362. '(B) ecause negligence presupposes a voluntary act, the actor (the sleeping motorist) cannot be negligent for what he does or fails to do while he is unconscious.' 2 Harper & James, Torts § 16.7, p. 921. ...

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7 cases
  • Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • July 19, 1978
    ...verdict. In such circumstances, the case should be submitted to the jury and a motion for a directed verdict denied. Snoots v. Demorest, 254 Md. 572, 575, 255 A.2d 12 (1969); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ely, 253 Md. 254, 263, 252 A.2d 786 (1969); Jacobson v. Julian,246 Md. 549, 555-556, 229......
  • Cavalier Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Liberty Homes, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • January 5, 1983
    ...when the facts or inferences drawn therefrom lead to but one conclusion is a court justified in directing a verdict. Snoots v. Demorest, 254 Md. 572, 255 A.2d 12 (1969); Smack v. Jackson, 238 Md. 35, 207 A.2d 511 (1965). Even against this extremely strict standard there are nevertheless cir......
  • Medina v. Meilhammer, 850
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1984
    ...in his favor unless the facts and circumstances permit of only one inference with regard to the issue presented." Snoots v. Demorest, 254 Md. 572, 575, 255 A.2d 12 (1969) (quoting Smack v. Jackson, 238 Md. 35, 37, 207 A.2d 511 (1965)). If appellee presented "any legally relevant and compete......
  • Deloso v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 15, 1977
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