Snow v. Boykin

• Decision Date: 27 May 1983
• Citation: 432 So.2d 1210
• Parties: Tisdale SNOW, et al. v. Laura BOYKIN, et al. 81-399.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1210

432 So.2d 1210

Tisdale SNOW, et al. v. Laura BOYKIN, et al.

81-399.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 27, 1983.

Michael A. Figures, Mobile, for appellants.

Edward P. Turner, Jr. of Turner, Onderdonk, Bradley & Kimbrough, Chatom, for appellees.

EMBRY, Justice.

This is an action to quiet title to land located in Washington County, Alabama. Plaintiffs (hereinafter "the Snow heirs") filed a statutory in rem action to quiet title, alleging they were the owners of a certain 240 acres of land in Washington County.

Defendants Boykin and Bentley counterclaimed in an in personam action to quiet title to certain of the disputed lands in them.

After taking testimony on various motions, the trial court heard the case on the merits, ore tenus. It entered its final judgment in favor of Boykin and Bentley on their counterclaim. Although the trial court did not specify the legal theory upon which its decision was based, the substance of the testimony elicited at trial was directed to the theory of adverse possession.

It is well settled that when it cannot be determined on what ground or theory judgment was rendered, the finding of the trier of fact is referred to the theory supported by the evidence. Holley v. Crow, 355 So.2d 1123 (Ala.Civ.App.1978).

Also, we remain cognizant of the rule that in an action brought to quiet title to real property in which the evidence was heard ore tenus, the trial court's findings of fact should not be disturbed on appeal unless palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust. We find there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding by the trial court that defendants Boykin and Bentley acquired title to the subject property under the rule of prescription and absolute repose. Therefore, we affirm.

I.

In the year 1921, title to 240 acres of land in Washington County was vested in Milton Snow, Sr. He died intestate and left surviving eleven children.

Beginning, roughly in 1930, and continuing for sometime thereafter, R. M. Boykin, defendant Boykin's late husband, began acquiring the interests of the Snow heirs. Appellees, Boykin and Bentley contend that by 1947, R.M. Boykin had purchased all the interests of the Snow heirs and had gone into exclusive possession of the property conveyed to him.

In 1947, by warranty deed purporting to convey the fee, defendant Boykin and her husband, R.M. Boykin, conveyed a portion of the disputed lands to Dinah Snow Weaver. In 1948, the Boykins conveyed another portion of the disputed lands to Beanie Wilkerson, predecessor in title to Bentley. Mr. Boykin died in 1952, leaving the remainder of the disputed property to his widow, Mrs. Boykin.

Sometime after her husband's death, Mrs. Boykin discovered that several of the deeds to the Snow property were missing.

In an effort to prove the previous existence of those deeds, Boykin attempted to procure from certain of the Snow heirs, quit-claim deeds, only two of which she was able to obtain. Therefore, when suit was filed, there were no conveyances on record from York and Frank Snow to defendant Boykin's predecessor in title. Consequently the heirs of York and Frank Snow are cotenants of record with Boykin and Bentley.

II.

Under the doctrine of prescription, actual adverse possession of land for twenty years or more without recognition of adverse claim creates a conclusive presumption of title, and the law presumes the existence of all the necessary elements of adverse possession, or title, without full proof. Lay v. Phillips, 276 Ala. 273, 161 So.2d 477 (1964); Barry v. Thomas, 273 Ala. 527, 142 So.2d 918 (1926); Stearnes v. Woodall, 218 Ala. 128, 117 So. 643 (1928). This presumption, created by prescription, precludes judicial inquiry into a title so acquired; thus the rule of prescription of twenty years is a rule of absolute repose. Walker v. Coley, 264 Ala. 492, 88 So.2d 868 (1956). The essence of this principle is that, if parties allow twenty years to elapse without taking steps to assert property rights, repose of the disputed title is presumed. We have carefully examined the evidence of record and opine that the weight and preponderance of that evidence supports the judgment below.

Reference to some of the significant evidence discloses that both Boykin's and Bentley's predecessors in title periodically terpentined, cut timber, and annually assessed and paid taxes on their respective tracts of the disputed property for more than twenty years. In addition to these acts of possession, both persons treated that property as their own. Beanie Wilkerson, Bentley's predecessor in title, actually resided on her tract, and Boykin, at times posted and executed oil and gas leases to her claimed tract. The appellees, or those through whom they claim, assessed and paid ad valorem taxes on their claimed tracts for more than twenty years.

Boykin had color of title to the property she claimed by virtue of a quit-claim deed given her in 1953 by Frank W. Boykin as a result of a contest of her husband's will. That will purported to devise her the fee to all of the disputed property. From that time forward, a period of more than twenty years, Boykin and Bentley's predecessor in title, Beanie Wilkerson, regularly assessed and paid ad valorem taxes on all the disputed property.

For certain, appellants became cognizant of Boykin's exclusive claim of ownership when she, having discovered that certain of the Snow deeds were missing, called upon appellants to provide deeds to replace those missing.

The record strongly imports, that for a period of more than twenty years, there was an exclusive claim of ownership by both Boykin and Bentley.

The case of Howard v. Harrell, 275 Ala. 454, 156 So.2d 140 (1963), is closely analogous. In Howard, the lands subject to litigation were owned, prior to the turn of the century, by three brothers, each of whom owned an undivided one-third interest in the property. Beginning in 1906, appellees' father in that case, and predecessor in title, Harrell, Sr., began acquiring fractional interests in the property; his acquisitions culminating in 1917, at which time he began to assert full and complete title to the lands. From 1917 until the filing of that suit in 1950, Harrell, Sr., followed by his sons, who succeeded to his claim upon his death in 1948, exercised complete control and dominion over the lands--renting, hunting, cutting timber, and assessing and paying taxes on the lands for more than thirty years. Id. at 455, 467, 156 So.2d 140. In 1948, after Harrell, Sr.'s title had been unquestioned for more than thirty years, appellant (Howard) conceived the idea that he had not effectively acquired the title to the property and proceeded to procure deeds from various heirs of the original three owners. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court quieting the title to the suit property in the appellees (the Harrells) on the basis of rule of prescription and repose. Id. at 456, 156 So.2d 140.

The instant case is factually similar to Howard. In that case this court set forth its rationale applying the rule of prescription and repose:

"The case of Walker v. Coley, 264 Ala. 492, 88 So.2d 868, contains a comprehensive compilation of the Alabama case law on this subject. The court in that case quoted with approval the following excerpt from Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, 61 So. 100:

" ' " * * * This court has repeatedly held that the lapse of 20 years, without recognition of adversary...