Atkins v. Lee
| Decision Date | 07 August 1992 |
| Parties | Dr. Colby ATKINS v. Charles LEE and Glendon T. Lee. The CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF ALABAMA v. Charles LEE and Glendon T. Lee. 1900895, 1900896. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas A. Kendrick of Norman, Fitzpatrick, Wood, Williams & Parker, Birmingham, for appellant Dr. Colby Atkins.
Mark W. Lee and Jasper P. Juliano of Parsons, Lee & Juliano, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant The Children's Hosp. of Alabama.
G. Daniel Evans, Birmingham, and Peter F. Burns, Mobile, for appellees Charles Lee and Glendon T. Lee.
Dr. Colby Atkins and Children's Hospital of Alabama ("the Hospital") appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs, Charles and Glendon Lee, $6,875,000 in an action alleging the wrongful death of their four-year-old son, Charles Lee, Jr. We affirm.
On July 21, 1985, Charles Lee, Jr., was admitted to the Hospital for treatment of first-degree to third-degree burns covering 40% to 50% of his body, which he had suffered when a fire erupted in a storage room in which he was playing. Primary responsibility for the child's treatment was assigned to Dr. Marshall Pitts and his associate, Dr. Charles Baldwin, who were board-certified pediatric surgeons.
At the time Charles was admitted, the Hospital had an arrangement with the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB") pursuant to which UAB furnished to the Hospital medical students and medical school graduates, who would, as part of their continuing education, work as "residents," i.e., interns, under the supervision of board-certified pediatric surgeons and physicians. Dr. Colby Atkins, who, when Charles was admitted had been a resident for approximately 28 days, was working under the supervision of Dr. Pitts and Dr. Baldwin.
From his admission on July 21, Charles was routinely treated by residents, including Dr. Atkins. For example, Dr. Hendron, a second-year resident, attended Charles upon his arrival at the emergency room. Soon afterward, chief resident Michael Trotter inserted a "triple-lumen intravenous catheter" 1 into the child's subclavian vein 2 through an incision made at the upper right side of the body. Dr. Hendron replaced the catheter on July 23.
Although from July 21 to July 28 Charles's temperature persistently fluctuated between 99.5 and 102.5 degrees, he showed gradual improvement. Dr. Baldwin testified that the child's recovery was "going very well" and that he was "improving significantly." By July 29, Charles was eating a regular diet, was walking around the room, and was playing with toys in the hallway.
At approximately 3:45 p.m. on July 29, nurse Melanie Taylor discovered that Charles's temperature had risen to 104.5 degrees, and she notified Dr. Atkins. A few minutes later, X-rays were taken. They revealed no abnormalities in the heart or lungs. Also, in order to determine whether the latest temperature increase was the result of an infection, Dr. Atkins ordered the collection of blood and urine samples. Dr. Atkins also ordered an examination of the tip of the intravenous catheter for the presence of infectious organisms. 3 This necessitated removing and replacing the existing catheter. At approximately 5:15 p.m. on July 29, Dr. Atkins, accompanied by nurse Taylor and nurse Cheryl Castner, entered Charles's room to begin the procedure. Mr. and Mrs. Lee, who were present at that time, were asked to leave the room.
When the procedure was concluded, Mr. and Mrs. Lee returned to the room. By 6:00 p.m., Charles's temperature had fallen to 99.4 degrees, 4 and an hour later, he was sitting in his mother's lap drinking a soft drink. At approximately 7:30, after walking to the doorway of his room to watch a child playing in the hall, Charles suffered an apparent seizure and collapsed. A crew of medical personnel, including Dr. Baldwin, was unable to revive the child, and he was pronounced dead at 8:20 p.m.
On April 8, 1986, Glendon and Charles Lee, Sr., sued the Hospital and Drs. Atkins, Baldwin, Pitts, and Trotter, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully caused the death of Charles, and, in an amended complaint filed on June 11, 1987, further alleging that the Hospital had perpetrated a fraud upon Glendon and Charles Lee, Sr., by falsely representing that the child's treatment would be performed by Dr. Pitts or similar "licensed pediatric surgeon[s]."
Following a trial that spanned nearly five weeks, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the Hospital on the fraud claim and a verdict in favor of Dr. Baldwin on the wrongful death claim. It returned a verdict against Dr. Atkins and the Hospital in the amount of $6,875,000 on the wrongful death claims. 5
Dr. Atkins and the Hospital each filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, or for a remittitur. After conducting a hearing as required by Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), to review the defendants' contentions that the verdict was excessive, the trial court denied the defendants' motions.
On appeal, the Hospital insists that the trial court erred in (1) submitting to the jury the plaintiffs' fraud claim against the Hospital. In addition, the Hospital and Dr. Atkins contend that the trial judge erred in (2) admitting or refusing to admit numerous items of evidence; (3) improperly charging the jury; (4) allowing improper argument before the jury; (5) exhibiting judicial bias or misconduct; and (6) overruling the defendants' motions for a J.N.O.V., a new trial, or a remittitur.
In addition to alleging that the defendants had wrongfully caused the death of their son, Glendon and Charles Lee, Sr., alleged that the Hospital had misrepresented the nature of the care that Charles would receive in order to induce them "to admit their son to the care of the Hospital and to expend great sums of money" in procuring medical care. Their amended complaint further alleged that as a "proximate result of the fraudulent misrepresentations of the Hospital, the plaintiffs unknowingly submitted their son to the care of medical students, unlicensed physicians, and others," and, in addition to incurring expenses for medical care, "suffered great emotional and mental distress and anguish" as a result of Charles's death.
The Hospital argues that "Alabama law provides for one exclusive cause of action for death allegedly caused by the tortious acts or omissions of another"; therefore, it contends, the joinder of the fraud claim with the wrongful death claim and the submission of the fraud claim to the jury mandates reversal of this case. Brief of Children's Hospital, at 39. We disagree.
The fraud claim was tried and submitted to the jury against the Hospital, only. The jury returned a special verdict on forms clearly indicating the claims on which liability rested. Because the jury rejected the plaintiffs' arguments on the fraud claim and returned a verdict in favor of the Hospital on that claim, its submission could not have tainted the verdict on the wrongful death claim, which assessed damages against both defendants in the amount of $6,875,000. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ponder, 469 So.2d 1262 (Ala.1985); Russell v. Baccus, 707 F.2d 1289 (11th Cir.1983); Van Cleef v. Aeroflex Corp., 657 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.1981).
Moreover, the evidence introduced in support of the plaintiffs' fraud claim also was material to issues arising under the wrongful death claims, such as the conduct of the defendants in relation to applicable standards of care. See Sims v. Struthers, 267 Ala. 80, 100 So.2d 23 (1957); C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 425.01(14) (4th ed. 1991). Thus, assuming, without deciding, that the joinder of the fraud and wrongful death claims and the submission of the fraud claim to the jury constituted error, we are unable to conclude that those errors necessitate a reversal.
In reviewing a trial court's rulings on the admission of evidence, we are guided by two fundamental principles. The first principle is that trial judges are invested with Ryan v. Acuff, 435 So.2d 1244, 1247 (Ala.1983); see also C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 21.01(6) (4th ed. 1991). The second principle is that a judgment cannot be reversed on appeal for an error "unless ... it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties." Rule 45, A.R.App.P.; Snow v. Boykin, 432 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Ala.1983); see also American Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. McWane, Inc. 477 So.2d 369 (Ala.1985); Muncher v. Muncher, 509 So.2d 250 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). The defendants' excellent briefs enumerate at least seven allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings. However, after carefully reviewing the record within the framework of these two principles, we conclude that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings do not constitute reversible error.
The defendants contend that the closing arguments of the plaintiffs' counsel contained improper references to the "value of life in a wrongful death case, where the exclusive remedy is ... punitive damages and not compensatory damages." Brief of Colby Atkins, at 48. In this connection, the following discourse appears in the record:
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