Snow v. Butts

• Decision Date: 13 October 1937
• Docket Number: No. 43.,43.
• Citation: 193 S.E. 224,212 N.C. 120
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SNOW. v. DE BUTTS et al.

193 S.E. 224

212 N.C. 120

SNOW.

v.DE BUTTS et al.

No. 43.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 13, 1937.

Appeal from Superior Court, Surry County; F. D. Phillips, Judge.

Action by Joe A. Snow against Sydnor De Butts and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant the Atlantic & Yadkin Railway Company appeals.

Reversed as against appellant.

Plaintiff was a mail carrier on the line of the corporate defendant and defendant De Butts was its general manager.

In May, 1931, the corporate defendant petitioned the Corporation Commission of North Carolina to be allowed to discontinue certain passenger trains, then being operated by it. There were a number of hearings before the commission, and the plaintiff as a citizen of Mt. Airy appeared and opposed the petition and gave testimony in behalf of the respondents.

At the time of the hearings the Corporation Commission was not vested with authority to authorize the discontinuance of passenger trains when the convenience and necessity of the public did not require the operation of such trains. At the 1933 session of the Legislature a bill expressly conferring this jurisdiction on the commission was introduced (Pub.Laws 1933, c. 528). There were hearings had on this bill before the committee, and plaintiff appeared and opposed it. The bill was enacted and ratified prior to the occurrences which are the subject matter of this action. So far as the record discloses, there were no other hearings before the Corporation Commission.

On the evening of May 16, 1933, plaintiff went to the station of the corporate defendant to meet a friend, and, while waiting for the arrival of the train, a controversy arose between him and the defendant De Butts, and the plaintiff was abused, insulted, and assaulted by said defendant. There was ample evidence to sustain the verdict against the defendant De Butts, and he did not appeal.

The jury having found by its verdict that the defendant De Butts at the time of said assault was acting within the scope of his employment as general manager of the Atlantic & Yadkin Railway Company, judgment was entered against said defendant and the Atlantic & Yadkin Railway Company appealed.

Carter & Carter, of Mt. Airy, and Hob-good & Ward, of Greensboro, for appellant Atlantic & Yadkin Ry. Co.

Robert A. Freeman, of Dobson, and A. E. Tilley, of Mt. Airy, for appellee.

BARNHILL, Justice.

The one question we need to discuss on this appeal is the liability of the appealing defendant on the judgment rendered against the individual defendant. If De Butts was not acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his master's business at the time of his assault upon the plaintiff, this question must be answered in the negative and the other exceptive assignments of error become immaterial.

The plaintiff described the setting of the assault in substance as follows: "I was standing right near the mail wagon; others were present; I was waiting there for Mr. Brower. Someone said in a humorous way, that perhaps the train had been discontinued. The defendant De Butts was present. Someone asked the question: 'Do you think the trains will be taken off?' I replied, that I did not think they would, because it was too important to the public from the standpoint of mail, express and passenger service. About that time De Butts approached me and said: 'Mr. Snow, when are you going to get your promotion?' I said: I am not going to get it. He said: 'You said you were going to be made chief clerk; you said it, didn't you?' I said: Yes, I thought I was going to get it, but another man got it. He said: 'Why didn't you get it?' I said: Another man got it. He says: 'I know why you didn't get it; you lied to the Corporation Commission; you lied to the Legislature.' I said: Mr. De Butts, there is no reason why we should have any personal ill-will towards each other. I have nothing against you. I did what I did simply because I thought it was my duty and I presume you did the same. He replied: 'You are a G. D. liar. You are interfering with my business. I am trying to save money for the company and it is none of your business. * * *'" The plaintiff then outlined the abusive language and conduct of the defendant De Butts, which amounted to an assault.

There is no hard and fast rule governing the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. The application of the doctrine depends upon the facts in the case under consideration. There are, however, certain general rules established by the decisions of this and other courts which govern its application.

A principal is liable for the torts of his agent (1) when expressly authorized; (2) when committed within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of his master's business--when the act comes within his implied authority; (3) when ratified by the principal.

There is no contention in this case that the conduct of De Butts was expressly authorized, or that it was thereafter ratified by his employer. If the corporate defendant is liable at all, it is by reason of the fact that De Butts was acting within the line of his duty and exercising functions necessarily implied by the general nature of his employment; that is, he was acting within the range of his employment.

The principles requiring the application of the doctrine are variously expressed.

It is elementary that the principal is liable for the acts of his agent, whether malicious or negligent, and the master for similar acts of his servant, which result in injury to third persons, when the agent or servant is acting within the line of his duty and exercising the functions of his employment. Roberts v. R. R., 143 N.C. 176, 55 S.E. 509, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 798, 10 Ann.Cas. 375.

If the wrongdoer, while acting in the range of his authority, does an act which injures another, the principal or master is liable therefor without reference to whether the intent of the agent or servant was good or bad, innocent or malicious.

Liability exists as against the master for wrongful or negligent acts of his servant only when the agent is acting within the scope of his employment and is about his master's business, attempting to do what he was employed to do.

"A servant is acting in the course of his employment when he is engaged in that which he was employed to do and is at the time about his master's business. He is not acting in the course of his employment if he is engaged in some pursuit of his own. Not every deviation from the strict execution of his duty is such an interruption of the course of employment as to suspend the master's responsibility, but if there is a total departure from the course of the master's business the master is no longer answerable for the servant's conduct." Tiffany on Agency, p. 270.

A principal is liable for assaults committed by its agent or servant only when the assault is committed while the agent or servant is about his master's business and acting within the range of his employment, unless his conduct was thereafter ratified by the principal.

On the other hand, there are pertinent decisions holding that the principal under certain conditions is not liable.

The principal is not liable when the agent is about his own business, or is acting beyond the scope and range of his employment. This is true irrespective of the intent of the agent.

A master is not responsible for the torts of his servant committed wholly for the servant's own purpose and in consummation of his personal desire. Linville v. Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096. Roberts v. R. R., 143 N.C. 176, 55 S.E. 509, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 798, 10 Ann.Cas. 375.

A master cannot be held liable for the unauthorized act of a servant on the ground that the servant did the act with the intent to benefit or serve the master. Daniel v. R.R., 136 N.C. 517, 48 S.E. 816, 67 L.R.A. 455, 1 Ann.Cas. 718. Marlowe v. Bland, 154 N.C. 140, 69 S.E. 752, 47 L.R. A.(N.S.) 1116.

Nor is a master liable when his...