Snow v. Riggs

• Decision Date: 07 February 1927
• Docket Number: (No. 163.)
• Parties: SNOW v. RIGGS.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

290 S.W. 591

SNOW v. RIGGS.

(No. 163.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 7, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County; John C. Ashley, Judge.

Action by Mary Riggs against Linn Snow. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mary Riggs instituted this action in the circuit court against Linn Snow to recover damages for having been negligently struck and injured by an automobile which he was driving while she was walking along a state highway in Randolph county, Ark.

According to the evidence adduced in favor of the plaintiff, she came out of a gate on the state highway in Randolph county, Ark., and started walking northward along the edge of the road on the east or right-hand side thereof. She was at the edge of the road and did not hear any warning of the approach of an automobile. There was a wagon about the center of the road where the plaintiff was walking, and Linn Snow approached in an automobile also going north. He was traveling at a rapid rate and turned around to the right of the wagon in order to pass it and struck the plaintiff with his automobile and severely injured her. It is fairly inferable from the evidence that the defendant could have seen the plaintiff in time to have stopped his automobile and thus have avoided striking her. According to the evidence of the plaintiff, she did not hear or see the approaching automobile.

There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the case is here on appeal.

E. G. Schoonover, of Pocahontas, and Smith, Jackson & Blackford, of Walnut Ridge, for appellant.

Pope & Bowers, of Pocahontas, for appellee.

HART, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Under an act of an extraordinary session of the Legislature, approved October 10, 1923, power is given the state highway commission to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to regulate traffic on state highways. Extraordinary Acts 1923, p. 11. According to the rules promulgated pursuant to section 68 of the act, pedestrians on state highways are required to travel on the left side of the highway in order that they may face and thus see approaching automobiles.

It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that, under this regulation adopted by the state highway commission, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because she was walking on the wrong side of the road when she was struck by the automobile. It is sought to uphold the judgment on two grounds:

The first ground is that the state highway commission had no authority to promulgate a rule prescribing on which side of a state public highway footmen should walk. We do not agree with counsel in this contention. In 6 Ruling Case Law, p. 179, § 179, the general rule is declared to be that there are no constitutional objections arising out of the doctrine of the separation of the powers of government to the creation of administrative boards empowered within certain limits to adopt rules and regulations, and authorizing them to see that the legislative will expressed in statutory form is carried out by the parties or corporations over whom such boards may be given administrative power. This doctrine has been recognized and applied by this court according to the facts of each particular case. Davis v. State. 126 Ark. 260, 190 S. W. 436; State v. Martin & Lipe, 134 Ark. 421, 204 S. W. 622; and Britt v. Laconia Circle Sp. Drainage Dist., 165 Ark. 92, 263 S. W. 48. The rule itself and the reason for it is stated in a clear and comprehensive manner by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953, Ann. Cas. 1912A, page 100. In discussing the subject, Vickers, C. J., said:

"The government of a state is not such an exact science that every possible contingency can be foreseen and provided for by legislative enactment. The agencies of government do not act automatically, but to accomplish the ends of government it is necessary to vest in its officers certain general powers, with a discretion in the governmental agents as to their exercise. It would be as impracticable as it is undesirable to attempt to formulate in advance a set of hard and fast rules by which every conceivable public act should be governed. In order to accomplish the ends of local government it has been found expedient to create various boards and commissions, which are charged with the duty of supervising, directing and controlling...