Snow v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 1927
• Docket Number: (No. 10371.)
• Parties: SNOW v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

291 S.W. 558

SNOW v. STATE.

(No. 10371.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

January 5, 1927.

On the Merits, February 9, 1927.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Erath County; J. B. Keith, Judge.

F. M. Snow was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

M. L. Munday, of Fort Worth, and Wallace Scott, of Dublin, for appellant.

Sam Russell, Dist. Atty., of Stephenville, Sam D. Stinson, State's Atty., of Austin, and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State's Atty., of Groesbeck, for the State.

On Motion for Certiorari.

MORROW, P. J.

State's counsel has presented to this court a motion for certiorari and for the privilege of correcting the record in this court so far as it relates to the appellant's bill of exceptions No. 13.

It appearing that counsel for the appellant has been duly notified, it is ordered that the state's motion be granted, and that the clerk of the district court of Erath county be directed to prepare a supplemental transcript bringing forward all matters pertaining to the appellant's said bill of exceptions No. 13, including the evidence heard thereon and any orders of the court made with reference thereto.

In the motion before this court there are embraced averments to the effect that the signature of the trial judge to the original bill of exceptions No. 13 was fraudulently obtained, and that upon the hearing in the trial court the correction in the bill was ordered. In support of the procedure sought, counsel for the state refers to the following cases: East Line & Red River Ry. Co. v. Culberson, 72 Tex. 375, 10 S. W. 706, 3 L. R. A. 567, 13 Am. St. Rep. 805; Johnston et ux. v. Arrendale (Tex. Civ. App.) 71 S. W. 44; Neville v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App.) 171 S. W. 1109; Stark v. Harris (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 887; Howard v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 185, 178 S. W. 506; Sullenger v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 98, 182 S. W. 1140.

The order here made directing the clerk to forward the supplemental record does not imply that this court has determined that the alleged correction was made under authority, but the purpose of the order is simply to bring before this court all the proceedings had in the trial court pertinent to the appeal.

Opinion.

The offense is murder; punishment fixed at death.

The name of the deceased was Bernie Connally, who was a young man, stepson of the appellant. About October 6, 1925, the appellant and Mrs. Maggie Poston, mother of the deceased, were married. They, together with Mrs. Olds, the grandmother of the deceased, resided at the home of the appellant.

It is the theory of the state, supported by the confession of the appellant and by circumstances, that on the 27th day of November the appellant killed his wife and her mother in his home, and afterwards, on the same day, killed Bernie Connally, the deceased.

In bill No. 7 it appears that, before announcing ready for trial, counsel for the appellant, who had previously been appointed by the court to represent the appellant, sought by motion to postpone the trial and transfer the appellant to the jail in Fort Worth, in order that an examination by experts on mental diseases might be made. The court overruled the motion with the explanation that he stated he would exert the power of the court to secure the attendance of experts upon the trial; that pursuant to said offer he did cause process to be issued to secure the attendance of three persons from Fort Worth, who testified as expert witnesses and alienists in behalf of the appellant upon the issue mentioned.

Bill No. 8 relates to the action of the court in preventing a witness from repeating irrelevant testimony by admonishing her that she must refrain from disobeying the orders of the court. We find nothing in the bill that appears to transgress the proprieties.

Bill No. 9 reflects the complaint of the action of the court with reference to two written confessions which were introduced in evidence by the state. After the confessions had been introduced and the witnesses concerning them had been cross-examined, appellant, through his counsel, made a motion to have the court withdraw the testimony embraced in them, which was overruled, and it is of this that complaint is made. The motion to withdraw is upon the ground that the confessions were not voluntary, but were induced by promises and by fear of mob violence. According to the bill as qualified, soon after the making of the first confession mentioned, appellant, in company with several officers, went from the city of Fort Worth to a point near Bluff Dale, in Erath county, where, upon a mountain the decapitated body of the deceased, Bernie Connally, was pointed out by the appellant. The same facts, in substance, were, on the next day, again related to the officers by the appellant at Fort Worth, and were then reduced to writing and signed by the appellant. As to the first confession, any evidence touching improper influences was so conflicting as to present an issue of fact; and the facts set out in the second confession were rendered admissible by the phase of the statute on confessions, which declares a verbal confession admissible when the accused, in connection therewith, makes statements of facts and circumstances that are found to be true and which conduce to establish his guilt. See article 727, Vernon's Ann. C. C. P. 1925.

In the first confession embraced in the bill, appellant stated, in substance, that he was 46 years of age; that some five months before Mrs. Maggie Poston, her son Bernie Connally, and her mother, Mrs. Olds, came into the neighborhood, and that he later married Mrs. Maggie Poston; that on November 27th he took them to the town of Iredell and left them at the depot, being told by his wife that they were going to Waco to sell some property which belonged to her son; that he had not seen his wife or her mother since, but had received letters from his wife. This took place on Friday. On Monday following, Bernie Connally returned and that evening was killed by the appellant and his body hauled to a point in Erath county about two miles from Cedar Point; that the head of the deceased was chopped off with an ax; that he left the head of the deceased in an old cellar on the Riggs' place, wrapped in the coat of the deceased and placed in a tow sack. Some two or three days before the arrest of the appellant there had been accidentally discovered in an old cellar on the Riggs place a human head, the flesh upon which was in a state of decay. The head was in a sack and with it there was a coat. This head was afterwards identified as that of the deceased.

The officers were not satisfied with the confession, and, after talking to the appellant, he agreed to tell the truth and accompany the officers to Erath county and to a mountain near the Cedar Point schoolhouse, where the decapitated body of the deceased was found through the directions and statements of the appellant.

Some of the state's witnesses testified that the appellant, before making the verbal statement, said that he would tell the truth if they would see that his neck was not broken; that they assured him that they would protect him against any mob violence. He was also told by the sheriff of Erath county that if he would not tell the location of the body of the deceased he would be taken to jail at Stephenville, and something in that connection was said about a mob. The inference to be drawn from the evidence before the court is that the appellant was apprehensive that he might be injured by a mob in Erath county; that he did not want to be taken to Erath county unless he was assured protection against mob violence, and that this assurance was given him. As we understand the law, the accused under arrest, who makes a confession through persuasion or fear, may not successfully oppose its receipt in evidence where, in connection therewith, he makes statements of facts and circumstances that are found to be true and conduce to establish his guilt. Such are the terms of the statute. See Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 458, 16 S. W. 247; Jones v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 329, 96 S. W. 930; Ortiz v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 524, 151 S. W. 1056; Martinez v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 171 S. W. 1153; Freeman v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 20, 188 S. W. 425; Elliott v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 366, 203 S. W. 766; Torrence v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 310, 212 S. W. 957; Washington v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 327, 216 S. W. 869, and other cases collated in Vernon's Tex. C. C. P., vol. 2, p. 827, note 12.

In the second confession, that is, the one made in connection with the finding of the body of the deceased and afterwards reduced to writing and signed by him, under the formalities required by article 727, supra, the appellant said, in substance, that after killing the deceased he pulled off his trousers and shoes and kept them; that he then took the body to a point about eight or nine miles and left it; that he cut off the head with an ax, wrapped it in the coat of the deceased, placed it in a sack, and carried it to the place where it was afterwards found; that the next night, about 9 o'clock, he destroyed, by fire, the bodies of his wife and mother-in-law by placing them in the fireplace of his dwelling; that he used about a quarter of a cord of wood in destroying them, and that it required until about 4 o'clock in the morning; that after burning the bodies he carried the ashes and deposited them in an ash pile which he designated. He also gave other details. The statement also contained declarations that there had been no coercion or undue persuasion used in inducing the confession.

The court submitted to the jury as a question of fact the voluntary nature of the confessions and instructed that they be disregarded unless they were voluntarily made. This is the familiar practice. See Bingham v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 594, 262 S. W. 747; Ruiz v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 73, 242 S. W. 231; Richardson v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 526, 244 S. W....