Snow v. West
| Citation | 250 Or. 114,440 P.2d 864 |
| Parties | Robert SNOW, dba Snow Reforestation Service, Appellant, v. Ray Calvin WEST, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1968 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Ralph C. Sipprell, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were C. W. Leichner and Buss, Leichner, Lindstedt & Sipprell, Portland.
Albert H. Ferris, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Thwing, Ferris, Atherly & Butler, Eugene.
Before PERRY, C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE and HOLMAN, JJ.
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in driving his car and that such negligence caused the collision in which the driver, one of plaintiff's employees, was killed and the six passengers, also employees of the plaintiff, were injured. He seeks to recover $7,708 in lost profits from his reforestation business resulting from the loss of the services of these employees as a result of the death and injuries received in the accident.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the basis of insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. This appeal is taken from the judgment entered after the demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff failed to plead over. It presents the sole question: Does an employer have a cause of action against one who negligently injuries or kills his employee?
Plaintiff relies on the ancient commonlaw rule that one who negligently injuries a servant becomes liable to the master for his loss of services. The common-law rule was based upon the premise that a servant was a chattel of the master and when the servant was injured by a third person the master suffered an injury to a property interest just as he did if a third person injured the master's horse or his barn. We recently traced this concept back to Bracton. Wampler v. Palmerton, 86 Or.Adv.Sh. 495, 500, 439 P.2d 601 (1968).
The relationship of employer and employee now is obviously completely different than it was in the time of Bracton. It is basically one of contract. For this reason the English courts now limit the action to injuries to a member of the household. Inland Revenue Comrs. v. Hambrook, (1956) 2 QB 641, (1956) 3 WLR 643, (1956) 3 All ER 338, 57 A.L.R.2d 790, Annotation, 57 A.L.R.2d 802, 'Employer's right of action against third person tortiously killing or injuring employee.'
The state of the law in the United States is not as clear. There are no Oregon decisions on the subject.
Prosser states:
'* * * There is one conspicuous exception (to the principle that interference with contract is an intentional tort, rather than one based upon negligence).
The earlier rule under which one who negligently injured a servant became liable to his master for loss of his services, apparently is still alive and good law; and to the extent that there are services lost, of value, the employer can recover damages. This has, however, been under considerable attack of late, and clearly is to be quite narrowly confined within its original limits. * * *.' Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.), 962, § 123.
In a subsection concerning Intentional interference with contracts, 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, 500, n. 6, § 6.9 (1956), states: 'Again, unjustified conduct which prevents a party to a contract from performing has subjected the actor to liability to the promisee where the defendant injured the promisor * * *.' Both authors cite several of the same cases to support both statements.
However, Harper and James, in their next subsection dealing with Negligent interference with contractual relations, state: 'Another group of cases frequently considered in this connection are those involving the negligent injury to a person which causes loss to someone else who has some contractual relation with him.' Harper and James, supra, at 506. They state that in such cases recovery is not allowed.
The over-all position of Harper and James seems to be that if an employee is intentionally harmed so as to cause his employer loss, the employer can recover from the tortfeasor for the employer's damage incurred because of his loss of the services of the harmed...
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