Snyder v. Charlotte Public School Dist., Eaton County

• Decision Date: 01 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 15,Docket No. 71152,15
• Citation: 421 Mich. 517,365 N.W.2d 151
• Parties: , 43 A.L.R.4th 745, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 466 David SNYDER, Patricia Snyder, and David Snyder, as father and next friend of Brenda Snyder, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Attorney General of the State of Michigan, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLOTTE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, EATON COUNTY, Michigan, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 151

365 N.W.2d 151

421 Mich. 517, 43 A.L.R.4th 745, 24

Ed. Law Rep. 466

David SNYDER, Patricia Snyder, and David Snyder, as father and next friend of Brenda Snyder, a minor Plaintiffs-Appellants and Attorney General of the State of Michigan Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLOTTE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, EATON COUNTY, Michigan Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 71152.

Calendar No. 15, Oct. Term, 1983.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 5, 1983.

Decided Dec. 28, 1984.

Released Feb. 11, 1985.

Charles M. Zwick, Charlotte, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Gerald F. Young, Paul J. Zimmer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for intervenor-plaintiff-appellant.

Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg, P.C. by Thomas J. Nordberg and Michael A. Eschelbach, Lansing, for defendant-appellee.

Levin, Levin, Garvett & Dill by Erwin B. Ellmann, Southfield, for amicus curiae Mich. Educ. Assn.

Miller, Cohen, Martens & Sugerman, P.C. by Mark H. Cousens, Detroit, for amicus curiae Mich. Federation of Teachers.

Stuart D. Hubbell, Traverse City, for amicus curiae Mich. Ass'n of Nonpublic Schools.

Linda L. Bruin, Mich. Assn. of School Boards, Lansing, for amicus curiae Mich. Assn. of School Boards.

CAVANAGH, Justice.

Plaintiffs are residents of the defendant Charlotte Public School District. They pay property taxes to the district for school operating purposes. In the 1981-1982 school year, plaintiffs enrolled their daughter Brenda as a full-time sixth grade student in the Charlotte Christian Academy, a private nondenominational school.

Since the academy does not offer a band course, plaintiffs attempted to enroll Brenda in the sixth grade band course offered in defendant's public schools. Brenda has her own musical instrument and plaintiffs are willing to transport her to and from class. Brenda would attend band at the time and place which this course is provided to full-time public school students. Defendant admits that there is room in the class for Brenda and that it would receive state school aid for her part-time attendance. Nevertheless, defendant refused to permit her enrollment because it does not offer any shared time courses or permit dual enrollment. Its policy is to limit enrollment in all classes to full-time students only. However, defendant allows its public school students to attend classes at local community colleges during the school day for credit.

Plaintiffs filed suit to compel defendant school district to enroll Brenda in the band class. They argued that Brenda's exclusion violated her statutory right to attend public school in the school district in which she resides. M.C.L. Sec. 380.1147; M.S.A. Sec. 15.41147. In addition, defendant's policy allegedly violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freely exercise their religious beliefs and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Michigan public school systems are not required to offer shared time instruction and that plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated.

Plaintiffs appealed, and the Attorney General was allowed to intervene in their behalf. The Court of Appeals affirmed, over a lengthy dissent. Snyder v. Charlotte Public School Dist., 123 Mich.App. 56, 333 N.W.2d 542 (1983). This Court granted plaintiffs' and the Attorney General's application for leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 1041 (1983). The Michigan Education Association, Michigan Federation of Teachers, Michigan Association of School Boards, and Michigan Association of Nonpublic Schools have filed amici curiae briefs.

I

"Shared time" instruction was aptly described in Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 411, fn. 3, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971):

" 'As generally used in current literature in the field of education, the term "shared time" means an arrangement for pupils enrolled in nonpublic elementary or secondary schools to attend public schools for instruction in certain subjects.... The shared time provision is or would be for public school instruction for parochial school pupils in subjects widely (but not universally) regarded as being mainly or entirely secular, such as laboratory science and home economics.' * * *

"As this quotation indicates, shared time is an operation whereby the public school district makes available courses in its general curriculum to both public and nonpublic school students normally on the premises of the public school."

There are three significant differences between shared time and direct financial aid to nonpublic schools (also known as parochiaid):

"First, under parochiaid the public funds are paid to a private agency whereas under shared time they are paid to a public agency. Second, parochiaid permitted the private school to choose and to control a lay teacher whereas under shared time the public school district chooses and controls the teacher. Thirdly, parochiaid permitted the private school to choose the subjects to be taught, so long as they are secular, whereas shared time means the public school system prescribes the public school subjects. These differences in control are legally significant.

"Obviously, a shared time program offered on the premises of the public school is under the complete control of the public school district...." Id., at pp. 413-414, 185 N.W.2d 9.

II

Plaintiffs argue that M.C.L. Sec. 380.1147; M.S.A. Sec. 15.41147 establishes the statutory right of school-aged children to attend public schools in the district in which they reside. The Legislature has not conditioned (or authorized local boards of education to condition) this right upon full-time attendance. Plaintiffs conclude that Brenda must be allowed to attend all or part of the public school program. They criticize the Court of Appeals majority for limiting this statutory right because of the speculative potential for excessive entanglement of church and state which shared time allegedly presents.

Defendant responds by citing numerous statutory provisions which authorize local boards of education to set curriculum and determine the operating policies of public school districts. Courts may not disturb a board's policy decision unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable. Defendant maintains that it has adequately justified its full-time enrollment policy. Defendant asserts that part-time students would dilute the school program for full-time students and take a disproportionate amount of scarce resources; full-time attendance in a single school is administratively and educationally advantageous; part-time admission would cause an overall decline in full-time enrollment, resulting in decreased state aid; and extensive coordination between public and private schools would be required.

A

Although public education is not a fundamental right granted by the federal constitution, it is not merely some governmental benefit which is indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2397, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1295, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." Brown v. Topeka Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Whenever the state has undertaken to provide education to its people, this right must be made available to all on equal terms. Id. See also San Antonio, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 29-30, 93 S.Ct. at 1294-1295.

This state's policy of encouraging education is set forth in Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 1:

"Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

This provision evidences a settled state purpose of providing, fostering and protecting educational facilities for all. Dennis v. Wrigley, 175 Mich. 621, 625, 141 N.W. 605 (1913).

Const.1963, art. 8, Sec. 2 provides for the establishment of the public elementary and secondary school system:

"The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin."

See also M.C.L. Sec. 380.1146; M.S.A. Sec. 15.41146.

The statutory right of each school-aged child to attend public school in the district in which he resides is set forth in Sec. 1147 of the School Code of 1976: ¹

"(1) A person, resident of a school district not maintaining a kindergarten and at least 5 years of age on the first day of enrollment of the school year, shall have a right to attend school in the district.

"(2) In a school district where provision is made for kindergarten work, a child, resident of the district, is entitled to enroll in the kindergarten if the child is at least 5 years of age on December 1 of the school year of enrollment. In a school district which has semiannual promotions, a child, resident of the district, is entitled to enroll in kindergarten for the second semester if the child is at least 5 years of age on March 1 of the year of enrollment." M.C.L. Sec. 380.1147; M.S.A. Sec. 15.41147. (Emphasis added.)

The prior school codes contained substantially similar language. ² These earlier provisions have been interpreted to prevent a school board from excluding any resident because of race, color or religious beliefs and to provide an equal right to all schools, irrespective of such distinctions. People ex rel. Workman v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 18 Mich. 400, 410 (1869). The 1976 code was primarily intended to be a recodification of existing law. See 1976 Journal of the Senate 2622.

Parents and guardians have a corresponding duty to send their children to public schools, subject to several...