Snyder v. Critchfield

• Decision Date: 19 February 1895
• Citation: 44 Neb. 66,62 N.W. 306
• Parties: SNYDER ET AL. v. CRITCHFIELD.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

44 Neb. 66

62 N.W. 306

SNYDER ET AL.

v.CRITCHFIELD.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Feb. 19, 1895.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A judgment of a court of a sister state, authenticated as prescribed by act of congress, is conclusive here upon the subject-matter of the suit. An action thereon can only be defeated on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, that there was fraud in procuring the judgment, or by defenses based on matters arising after the judgment was rendered.

2. A judgment entered in pursuance of a warrant of attorney, in a state in which such judgments are authorized, has the same force, when sued on here, as a judgment on adversary proceedings.

3. In an action on such judgment, payment of the debt before judgment, that the foreign action was barred by the statute of limitations, or any other defense which applied to the original cause of action, cannot be availed of. The judgment itself is conclusive against such defenses.

4. Whether a warrant of attorney is sufficient, under the laws of another state, to authorize the appearance entered thereunder, is a question to be determined from the evidence as to the laws of that state.

5. Evidence in this case examined and held to establish that the assignee of a note containing a warrant of attorney may, in Pennsylvania, avail himself of such warrant.

Error to district court, Richardson county; Bush, Judge.

Action by Snyder & Dull against David Critchfield. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed.J. D. Gilman and C. Gillespie, for plaintiffs in error.

Edwin Falloon, for defendant in error.

IRVINE, C.

This was an action by the plaintiffs in error against the defendant in error on a judgment alleged to have been recovered in Pennsylvania. The case was tried to the court, which found for the defendant. The only assignment of error calling for notice is the sufficiency of the evidence. The plaintiffs offered in evidence a transcript from the court of common pleas of Somerset county, Pa., which discloses the entry of judgment by confession against Critchfield and in favor of Austin Critchfield, to the use of Perry Critchfield, to the use of Harrison Snyder and Rufus H. Dull, partners trading as Snyder & Dull. The confession of judgment was entered by attorneys under a warrant of attorney contained in a promissory note as follows: “$100.00. April 17th, 1873. Five months after date I promise to pay to the order of Austin Critchfield one hundred dollars, without defalcation, value received; and further, we do empower any attorney of any court of record within the United States or elsewhere to appear for me, and, after one or more declarations filed, confess judgment against me as of any term for the above sum, with costs of suit, and attorney's commission of ______ per cent. for collection, and release of all errors, and without stay of execution; and inquisition and extension upon any levy on real estate is hereby waived, and condemnation agreed to; and the exemption of personal property from levy and sale on any execution hereon is also hereby expressly waived, and no benefit of exemptions be claimed under and by virtue of any exemption law now in force or which may be hereafter passed. Witness my hand and seal. David Critchfield. [Seal.]” There is no doubt of the principle that the judgment of a court of a sister state, authenticated as prescribed by the act of congress, is conclusive here upon the subject-matter of the suit. An action thereon can only be defeated on the ground that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the case; that there was fraud in procuring the judgment, or by a defense based on matters arising after the judgment was entered, such as payment of the judgment or the statute of limitations. Eaton v. Hasty, 6 Neb. 419; Keeler v. Elston, 22 Neb. 310, 34 N. W. 891;Packer v. Thompson, 25 Neb. 688, 41 N. W. 650. A judgment entered on warrant of attorney in a state recognizing such a proceeding is as much an act of the court as if formally pronounced on nil dicit or a cognovit, and until it is reversed or set aside it has all the qualities and effects of a judgment on verdict. Braddee v. Brownfield, 4 Watts, 474. A judgment entered in such a manner in a state recognizing such instruments, when sued upon here must be treated as any other judgment. Nicholas v. Farwell, 24 Neb. 180, 38 N. W. 820;Sipes v. Whitney, 30 Ohio St. 69. The defendant contends that this was not a valid judgment, for a number of reasons. The first is that the note on which it was entered was not negotiable, and the warrant of attorney contained therein not assignable, from which it is argued that, the record disclosing that the note had been assigned, and that the judgment was for the benefit of another than the payee, the warrant conferred no authority for the entering of defendant's appearance and the confession of judgment. This argument has the support of the supreme court of Ohio. Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio, 130;Spence v. Emerine, 46 Ohio St. 433, 21 N. E. 866. It must be remembered that judgments on notes of this character are not known to the jurisprudence of our state, and that, the notes having been made in Pennsylvania and the judgment there rendered, the effect and validity of the contract must be determined by the law of Pennsylvania. What that law is, was a fact to be established by evidence in this case. The evidence upon the subject consists of a statute, two decisions of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and the depositions of two Pennsylvania lawyers. The statute is as follows: “It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record, within this commonwealth, on the application of any person being the original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a...