Snyder v. Monroe County

• Decision Date: 03 July 1956
• Citation: 153 N.Y.S.2d 479,2 Misc.2d 946
• Parties: Myron S. SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF MONROE and Schantz Construction Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 479

153 N.Y.S.2d 479

2 Misc.2d 946

Myron S. SNYDER, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF MONROE and Schantz Construction Corporation, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Equity Term, Monroe County.

July 3, 1956.

Forsyth, Forsyth & Forsyth, Rochester, for plaintiff. C. Benn Forsyth, Rochester, of counsel.

Joseph B. Boyle, Rochester, for Monroe County. Jerry R. Leonardo and Leo T. Sawyko, Rochester, of counsel.

Harold F. Curtis, Rochester, for defendant Schantz Const. Corp., Nicholas E. Brown, Rochester, of counsel.

JAMES C. O'BRIEN, Justice.

Very few facts are in dispute. Plaintiff owns some 25 acres of land in Irondequoit, lying just easterly of a subdivision known as Winton Village. He claims in this action that he owns also the beds of the various streets in the subdivision and certain irregularly shaped open spaces at street intersections shown on a map of the subdivision (Ex. 2) and there designated 'Park'. Defendant Schantz Construction Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'Schantz', has bought or is buying from defendant County of Monroe, hereinafter referred to as 'County', most of the numbered lots in this subdivision, which the County had acquired as the result of a tax foreclosure. The County and Schantz claim that they together own, and that plaintiff has no title to, either the beds of the streets or the so-called 'Parks'. This is the principal controversy.

Schantz, buying the lots from the County, has eliminated or proposes to eliminate certain roads as originally laid out on the map, and to relocate others. Moreover in improving some of the streets of the subdivision, Schantz has interfered temporarily and occasionally with the complete use of the various roads. It is to prevent these acts on the part of Schantz, as to roads which plaintiff claims to own, that plaintiff seeks an injunction.

I have concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment providing that he is entitled to an easement by implication over the part of Irondequoit Boulevard running west from plaintiff's driveway and over other streets of the subdivision, continuing by the most direct routes to Empire Boulevard and Winton Road. Without such easement his home is practically inaccessible. Moreover his right to such easement is not disputed by the defendants. The judgment may also provide that plaintiff is seized in fee of the easterly one-half of the part of Irondequoit Boulevard which runs north and south. The remainder of plaintiff's prayer is denied without costs to any party.

Some 40 years ago Myron C. Snyder, who was plaintiff's father, inherited the 52 1/2 acres of land with which we are now concerned. The westerly half of it, flat in character, eventually became Winton Village Subdivision, which is referred to hereinafter as 'Winton Village', or as the 'Subdivision'. The easterly half of it, mostly hillside property, abuts Winton Village on the east and is the property which the plaintiff now owns. The plaintiff's home is at the northerly end of this easterly half.

Plaintiff's father, Myron C. Snyder, conveyed the whole 52 1/2 acres to one Summers. See item No. 14 on Abstract, Exhibit No. 6. Summers gave back to Snyder a purchase money mortgage and thereafter conveyed all the property to one Will. No. 16 on Abstract. Will in turn conveyed it to Winton Village, Inc., which sold and conveyed a number of lots to purchasers who built houses in the Subdivision. Thereafter (1929) Snyder foreclosed the purchase money mortgage which Summers had given him. As a result the whole 52 1/2 acres were conveyed by the referee to Myron C. Snyder, with certain exceptions which included principally the lots which theretofore had been sold and released from the mortgage. Thereafter in 1931, No. 43 on the Abstract, Myron C. Snyder and wife conveyed to the Winton Snyder Realty Corporation (sometimes referred to hereinafter as 'Corporation'), of which he was sole stockholder, all the unsold lots in the tract, describing them by number with reference to the map of the subdivision which had been filed in Monroe County Clerk's office (Exhibit 2). In this deed to the corporation there is no specific mention of the bed of the streets in the corporation there is no specific 'Park' areas. Myron C. Snyder and his wife both died intestate and plaintiff, their sole distributee, inherited the land of which they died seized. He claims that this land included the beds of the streets and the so-called Park areas.

I have come to the conclusion that the conveyance by Myron C. Snyder and his wife to the corporation of the lots by number, carried title to the center of the streets and the Park areas on which those lots abutted. When land is bounded by a street it is presumed that title conveyed extends to the center of the street. Bissell v. New York Central Railroad Company, 23 N.Y. 61. This presumption does not operate where the description of the property conveyed runs along the side of a street plainly excluding the fee in the road bed. Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 87 N.Y. 287; In re 165th Street in City of New York, 258 N.Y. 42, 179 N.E. 253, or where an express provision in the deed shows that the highway was not intended to be conveyed, Van Winkle v. Van Winkle and Ruggles, 184 N.Y. 193, 77 N.E. 33; White's Bank of Buffalo v. Nichols, 64 N.Y. 65; also in a case where public authorities are the grantors, Graham v. Stern, 168 N.Y. 517, 61 N.E. 891; Dunham v. Williams, 37 N.Y. 251, and own the street, and where the grantor, himself, does not own the fee of the street, Nemet v. Edgemere Garage & Sales Co., Sup., 73 N.Y.S.2d 921, at page 924. It is true also that the presumption that the title extends to the center line of the street, under certain circumstances, may be rebutted. White's Bank of Buffalo v. Nichols, 64 N.Y. 65; Tietjen v. Palmer, 121 App.Div. 233, 105 N.Y.S. 790. Also in a proper case some additional evidence may be admitted to explain the deed or the surrounding circumstances or the situation of the parties, Haberman v. Baker, 128 N.Y. 253, 28 N.E. 370. However, such evidence is admissible only where the language of the deed is susceptible of more than one interpretation. When the deed is complete and unambiguous all other evidence is excluded. Loch Sheldrake Associates, Inc. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 304, 305, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447; Uihlein v. Matthews, 172 N.Y. 154, 159, 64 N.E. 792, 794; Blackman v. Riley, 138 N.Y. 318, 34 N.E. 214; Armstrong v. DuBois, 90 N.Y. 95.

It is well settled that where a conveyance describes property as a numbered lot, referring to a map upon which the lot appears, the conveyance includes the fee to the center of the street on which the lot abuts, unless expressly reserved. Fiebelkorn v. Rogacki, 280 App.Div. 20, 111 N.Y.S.2d 298, affirmed 305 N.Y. 725, 112 N.E.2d 846; Johnson v. Grenell, 188 N.Y. 407, 81 N.E. 161, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 551; Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N.Y. 317, 323, 33 N.E. 330, 331; Bissell v. New York Central Railroad Company, 23 N.Y. 61; Goulding v. Town of Tonawanda, 282 App.Div. 321, 122 N.Y.S.2d 740; Nemet v. Edgemere Garage & Sales Co., Sup., 73 N.Y.S.2d 921, 924. Such construction of a deed has so long prevailed that it has now become a rule of property. Hennessy v. Murdock, 137 N.Y. 317, 323, 33 N.E. 330, 331.

Plaintiff calls our attention to certain evidence outside the conveyance, viz.: the oral testimony of Mr. Bly as to the advice which he gave to the plaintiff's father before the latter conveyed to the corporation, and the difference in the description employed in the various deeds, viz.: the deed by which the referee conveyed to plaintiff's father and the deed by which plaintiff's father conveyed to the corporation. As to Mr. Bly's testimony we feel that it cannot be considered under the authorities already cited. However, if it were considered, we do not feel that that testimony and the difference in the two deeds would be sufficient to justify a different conclusion.

Also we feel that for all the purposes involved in this case the small areas at street intersections referred to as 'Parks' are to be treated the same as streets. Perrin v. New York Central Railroad Company, 36 N.Y. 120.

While the corporation held title to certain numbered lots in the tract, which, as has already been stated, in our opinion included the beds of the streets on which the said lots abutted, the taxes on the corporation's lands in the subdivision became delinquent with the result that the County of Monroe by action foreclosed the tax liens. On the tax rolls the beds of the streets in the subdivision were not specifically mentioned nor were the park areas. The lots were assessed by lot number. Whether or not under those circumstances the lien of the unpaid taxes extended to the part of the streets and the parks upon which the lots abutted, is an interesting question. The excellent and very voluminous briefs with which counsel for all the parties have supplied the Court have not uncovered a single case which is determinative of this question, nor has the Court, itself, found one. The description of property on a tax roll must be sufficient to fairly advise the person assessed that his property is being taxed and sufficient to enable a purchaser at a tax sale to determine what property is being offered and acquired on the sale. Fulton v. Krull, 200 N.Y. 105, 110, 93 N.E. 494, 496; McDonogh v. Smith, 277 App.Div. 1087, 100 N.Y.S.2d 968; Griffin v. City of Syracuse, 179 Misc. 250, 38 N.Y.S.2d 476, affirmed 266 App.Div. 1055, 45 N.Y.S.2d 724; Dillwood Corp. v. Manning, 184 Misc. 1067, 55 N.Y.S.2d 745. It would seem that since the description in a deed of a numbered lot abutting on a street is sufficient to pass title to the center of the street upon which the lot abuts, the same description on an assessment roll should be sufficient also to include one-half of such street. Accordingly it would seem that at the time the county's tax foreclosure occurred, the corporation owned, and the taxes were...