Snyder v. North Allegheny School Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1998
• Citation: 722 A.2d 239
• Parties: Mary Ann SNYDER and Robert Snyder, her husband, Appellees, v. NORTH ALLEGHENY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

722 A.2d 239

Mary Ann SNYDER and Robert Snyder, her husband, Appellees, v. NORTH ALLEGHENY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 19, 1998.

Decided December 24, 1998.

Kathryn L. Simpson, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

William F. Goodrich, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before PELLEGRINI, J., KELLEY, J., and NARICK, Senior Judge.

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

North Allegheny School District (School District) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) denying its post-trial motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (judgment n.o.v.) and entering judgment in favor of Mary Ann Snyder (Plaintiff) for injuries sustained as a result of a fall on the School District's property.

On March 18, 1993, Plaintiff was leaving from an evening activity of the North Star Kids organization at the Espe School when she slipped and fell after stepping onto a snow and ice covered concrete landing at the top of a set of stairs adjacent to the driveway in front of the school building. As a result of her fall, Plaintiff suffered a "Colles" fracture to the radius and styloid tip of the ulna in her right hand and wrist. Plaintiff and her husband, Robert Snyder, filed a civil action against the School District seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident and contending that the School District was negligent in failing to, inter alia, provide adequate lighting for the parking lot and its adjacent areas, remove the ice and snow from the concrete landing, and provide warning signs notifying individuals of the dangerous conditions existing on the concrete landing. Robert Snyder asserted a claim for loss of consortium as a result of Plaintiff's injuries. In the new matter of its answer, the School District asserted, inter alia, that it was immune from suit and that Plaintiff's injuries did not fall within any exception contained within the "Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act" (Tort Immunity Act).¹ The case proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, Plaintiff testified² that when she arrived at the Espe School on the day of her injury, she recalled that there was "trampled snow" on the concrete landing. She stated that when she left the Espe School that evening, she walked down the path that ended approximately where the stairs leading to the parking lot were located, and that the light at the bottom of the stairs leading to the parking lot was not illuminated. Plaintiff testified that when she crossed the driveway to travel down the stairs leading to the parking lot, she could not see the top surface of the concrete slab that formed the landing and, as a result, she slipped and fell causing injury to her right hand and wrist.

Regarding how she actually fell, Plaintiff stated that "I stepped up [onto the concrete landing] with my right foot, took a step with my left foot. Then when I put my right foot down the second time was when I fell ... to my right side onto my right wrist." She indicated that she "landed definitely right on the ice or like — it would seem like a mound of something. Then I grabbed my wrist and rolled over; and ... I rolled onto my left side, and my face went into the snow." Plaintiff testified that the snow itself was hard and it appeared slippery. She stated that, normally, when she descended the stairs, she would use the railings, but when coming across the concrete landing, there was no railing to use for support.³

The School District presented the testimony of Robert Jones (Jones),⁴ the night custodian at the Espe School in March 1993.⁵ As to the conditions of the concrete landing on the day Plaintiff fell, Jones testified:

[T]hat day there, the sidewalks were clear; but what was happening, it was just a lot of snow piled up; and what happened, it was a little sunny that day. It melted some of the snow; and then we got a snow storm. Some snow was blowing, you know that happened. Snow probably covered the ice there; and what happened, I never did get out there maybe to salt the sidewalk or whatever at that time ... I didn't [go out and check the landing] [b]ecause I thought maybe it was kind of clear out there, maybe safe to walk on.

Regarding the light near the stairs leading to the parking lot, Jones explained that the light was on a timer connected to a circuit breaker switch located inside a gray box where the switch could be turned on. He testified that it was his job to check and make sure the light was on for the parking lot and the driveway if a group was going to be using the Espe School in the evening, and on the night Plaintiff fell, the light was on. Jones stated that the only time when the light would not be on was when there were no evening activities occurring at the Espe School; however, he admitted there had been times when he "might have been too busy [and] forgot there was a class or something... [that] was supposed to be going on at the school" and he would have to manually turn the light on.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and assessed damages at $400,000,⁶ which the trial court molded for a total award of $275,237.55. Following entry of the verdict, the School District filed a post-trial motion for judgment n.o.v. contending that Plaintiff fell from a sidewalk and, as a result, it was immune from suit under Section 8542(b)(3)(iv) of the Tort Immunity Act. It also contended that it was immune from suit under Section 8542(b)(7) of the Tort Immunity Act because Plaintiff slipped and fell as a result of the ice and snow located "on" the sidewalk and not any dangerous condition "of" the sidewalk itself. In opposition to the School District's motion for judgment n.o.v., Plaintiff asserted that the area where she fell was part of the landing to the set of stairs and not a sidewalk. She also asserted that because the School District failed to maintain light in the area or to remove the ice and snow covering the landing, the School District was negligent in its care, custody and control of this real property within its possession, constituting an exception to governmental immunity under Section 8542(b)(3) of the Tort Immunity Act.

Denying the School District's post-trial motion for judgment n.o.v., the trial court concluded that the sidewalk exception of Section 8542(b)(7)⁷ was not applicable to the case because "a sufficient amount of evidence existed on the record for the jury to classify the [concrete landing] as other than a sidewalk," making the School District's "on/of" distinction irrelevant. The trial court, however, found that Plaintiff's injuries fell within the real property exception contained in Section 8542(b)(3)⁸ because they were the result of the School District's negligence in the care, custody and control of its real property. This appeal by the School District followed.⁹

I.

The School District contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. by not finding it was entitled to immunity under the sidewalk exception to governmental immunity contained in Section 8542(b)(7) of the Tort Immunity Act. If the trial court applied the sidewalk exception, it contends that because the Plaintiff fell as a result of the snow and ice being "on" the sidewalk and not any defective condition "of" the sidewalk, then Plaintiff's injuries did not fall within the exception and it remains immune from suit. However, in no way can a concrete slab that represented the top landing to a set of stairs leading to the parking lot of the Espe School be considered a sidewalk.

In this case, the concrete landing was not adjacent to a public right-of-way,¹⁰ but to a driveway owned by the School District and used by parties with express or implied permission from the School District. See, e.g., Section 102 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §102 (relating to definition of "driveway"). For the concrete landing to fall within the sidewalk exception contained in Section 8542(b)(7) of the Tort Immunity Act, a condition precedent for that exception to apply is that it is the dedicated portion of a public right-of-way used for pedestrian traffic. In this case, the concrete landing was not in a public right-of-way but adjacent to the school driveway, and where Plaintiff fell was the top landing to a set of stairs leading to the parking lot of the Espe School, with grass on either side, and only served as the landing when ascending or descending the parking lot stairs. Because Plaintiff fell on a concrete slab representing the top landing to a set of stairs leading from the Espe School parking lot, the trial court properly found that it was not part of a sidewalk and that the sidewalk exception did not apply.

II.

A.

While not agreeing that the Plaintiff has made out a case for negligence that falls within the real property exception, the School District additionally contends that the trial court should be reversed because it is not clear on what basis the jury imputed negligence to it, i.e., because of the ice and snow on the landing or because of inadequate lighting.¹¹ It asserts that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury with respect to Plaintiff's claim that it failed to provide adequate light near the concrete landing also causing her to fall and injure herself. The School District also contends that the special interrogatories should have been presented to the jury for it to specify whether it found the School District liable for failing to provide adequate lighting in the area near the concrete landing or failing to remove the ice and snow from the concrete landing, or both, in arriving at its verdict.¹²

However, the School District neither objected at trial to the jury interrogatories nor raised this issue in its post-trial motion.¹³ If a party fails to object to a jury charge or the wording of a special interrogatory regarding a theory or theories of liability before the case goes to the jury for deliberations, the issue is waived on appeal....