Snyder v. State Medical Bd., 11346

• Decision Date: 18 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 11346,11346
• Parties: , 18 O.B.R. 160 SNYDER, Appellant, v. STATE MEDICAL BOARD, Appellee. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 47

18 Ohio App.3d 47

480 N.E.2d 496, 18 O.B.R. 160

SNYDER, Appellant, v. STATE MEDICAL BOARD, Appellee. ^*

No. 11346.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County.

April 18, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the State Medical Board issues an order prohibiting a doctor from practicing in a limited field of medicine, which order states that it is effective immediately, it is a violation of R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) and (12) for the doctor to continue practicing in that field pending the outcome of his appeal of the board's order, even if he does so on the advice of his attorney.

2. Where there is conflicting expert testimony in a hearing before the State Medical Board, regarding a doctor's alleged failure to conform to the minimum standards of care, on appeal a reviewing trial court must give due deference to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts. Therefore, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to weigh the conflicting testimony.

3. A medical disciplinary proceeding is a special statutory proceeding conducted by individuals, primarily physicians, possessing the expertise to determine whether a physician has failed to conform to the minimal standards of care within the medical profession. Because the State Medical Board has its own expertise, it does not require expert opinion testimony to establish the minimal standards of care.

Bernard L. Moutz, Mogadore, and Robert B. Henn, Medina, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GEORGE, Judge.

The appellant, Harvey J. Snyder, Jr., M.D., appeals the judgment of the trial court affirming the Ohio State Medical Board's decision to revoke Snyder's license to practice medicine in Ohio. This court affirms the judgment.

On August 13, 1980, the board issued an order prohibiting Snyder from practicing obstetrics, rendering any prenatal or post-natal care, and delivering babies. With the exception of these limitations, he was still permitted to practice medicine. The board's decision was affirmed by the trial court and the court of appeals.

After the board's decision of August 13, 1980, Snyder continued to practice obstetrics despite the limitations on his medical license. On December 2, 1981, the board indefinitely suspended Snyder's license. This order was affirmed by the trial court. Snyder appeals to this court.

Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 4

"1. The State Medical Board of Ohio denied appellant due process of law by its failure to present reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support its order indefinitely suspending the right of appellant to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio."

"4. The Court of Common Pleas denied appellant due process of law by its failure to follow the mandate imposed upon it by O.R.C. Sec. 119.12."

Snyder was cited for violating R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) and (12), failing to conform to the minimal standards of care in his practice, and practicing medicine beyond the scope of his license. Snyder first argues that his actions were not beyond the scope of his license. He admitted that he continued his obstetrics practice after his license was limited by the board on August 13, 1980. However, he argues that he did so on the advice of his attorney, who informed him that he could continue practicing obstetrics while the board's order was being appealed.

The August 13, 1980 order of the board expressly stated that it was effective immediately. The record reveals that Snyder was not granted a stay of this order pending appeal. As such, Snyder's subsequent obstetrics practice was beyond the scope of his license. Snyder's claim that he was relying on the advice of his attorney is no defense. This is the general rule in criminal cases. 25 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1981) 168, Criminal Law, Section 63. This rule clearly applies to civil actions. See, generally, McCrary v. Jones (1941), 34 Ohio Law Abs. 612, 39 N.E.2d 167; and Link v. Wabash RR. Co. (1962), 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734.

Next, Snyder argues that the evidence does not support the board's finding that he failed to conform to the minimal standards of care in his treatment of Elizabeth Cline. This court has reviewed the record and finds reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the board's decision.

Finally, Snyder argues that the trial court erred by refusing to weigh the evidence in determining whether Snyder failed to conform to the minimal standards of care. There was conflicting evidence concerning Snyder's medical skills. Upon appeal from the board's decision, the standard of review that guides the trial court is whether there exists reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the board's decision. R.C. 119.12. In Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 407 N.E.2d 1265 , the Ohio Supreme Court defined this standard of review as follows:

"In Andrews [v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1955), 164 Ohio St. 275, 131 N.E.2d 390 (50 O.O. 51) ], this court acknowledged that determining whether an agency order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence essentially is a question of the absence or presence of the requisite quantum of evidence. Although this in essence is a legal question, inevitably it involves a consideration of the evidence, and to a limited extent would permit a substitution of judgment by the reviewing Common Pleas Court."

However, the court went on to state that:

"In undertaking this hybrid form of review, the Court of Common Pleas must give due deference to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts. * * * "

In the instant case, there was conflicting testimony given by medical experts concerning whether Snyder's treatment of...