Snyder v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 07 June 1907
• Parties: SNYDER v. THOMPSON ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

134 Iowa 725

112 N.W. 239

SNYDER

v.THOMPSON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 7, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Hardon County; W. D. Evans, Judge.

Suit to recover damages for false imprisonment. There was a trial to a jury and verdict for the defendants, which was set aside on plaintiff's motion, and the defendants appeal. Affirmed.Albrook & Lundy, for appellants.

Chas. A. Rogers and N. S. Carpenter, for appellee.

SHERWIN, J.

On April 26, 1905, the defendants, Thompson and Boylan, were, respectively, mayor and marshal of the incorporated town of Hubbard, Iowa. On the evening of that day Thompson orally directed the marshal, Boylan, to arrest and put the plaintiff in jail, stating that it had been reported to him that plaintiff was drunk and had been disturbing the peace and quiet of the town. Pursuant to said oral order to arrest the plaintiff, the marshal procured two assistants, and then, without warrant or other process, entered the home of plaintiff and there arrested him, took him therefrom and placed him in the town jail, where he remained over night. On the following day plaintiff was arraigned in the mayor's court and pleaded guilty to having been drunk on the 20th day of April, 1905, but denied that he was drunk on the 26th day of April, 1905. No information was filed before the magistrate until the morning of April 27th, and no warrant of arrest was ever issued. At the close of all of the evidence both of the defendants moved for a directed verdict, which motion was overruled and the ruling duly excepted to. After the verdict had been returned the plaintiff filed motion to set aside the same and for a new trial, alleging various grounds therefor, some of which will be more particularly noticed hereinafter. This motion was sustained generally, and the appeal is taken from the order granting a new trial. It is a rule of long standing in this state that a motion for a new trial should be addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and such discretion will not be interferred with by this court, unless it is manifest that it has been improperly exercised. Pickering v. Kirkpatrick, 32 Iowa, 163. But this discretion is a legal one, and must be exercised according to the rules of law, and, where it becomes apparent to an appellate tribunal that it has not been so exercised, the order will be reversed without hesitation. It has also been said that the court will be more reluctant to disturb the order of the trial court where the motion for a new trial is granted. Peebles v. Peebles, 77 Iowa, 11, 41 N. W. 387;Hopkins v. Knapp & Spaulding Co., 92 Iowa, 212, 60 N. W. 620.

The appellants' first contention is that their motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained because of insufficient evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. They base this contention on the proposition that, before the plaintiff can recover, he must show the imprisonment; and, secondly, the unlawfulness thereof, and they then contend that there is no sufficient evidence to sustain the latter of the two propositions. We have examined the record in this case with care, and reach the conclusion that there is such a conflict of evidence therein on every vital issue presented by the pleadings that the court could not properly have sustained the appellants' motion. On the question whether the plaintiff was in fact intoxicated on the 26th day of April, there is a sharp conflict in the testimony, and it would manifestly have been error to direct a verdict on that branch of the case. The question whether the defendants had reasonable grounds for directing the arrest of the plaintiff and for making it was peculiarly a question for the jury; and in our judgment there was sufficient evidence touching this question to take it to the jury for its determination. It must be borne in mind in considering this case that at the time the arrest was made, and during the period of imprisonment for which damages are claimed, no information had been filed against the plaintiff, and no warrant had been issued for his arrest. Code, § 5196, provides that a peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant (1) for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; (2) where a public offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground for believing that a person to be arrested has committed it. So far as we are advised, this section of the statute furnishes the only generalauthority for such an arrest as was made in this case, and subdivision 2 thereof, in exact language, points out the essentials to give an officer authority to make an arrest without a warrant. In the first place, a public offense must have been committed, and, in addition thereto, the officer making the arrest must have reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested committed it. Stated differently, if no public offense has in fact been committed, the section furnishes no justification for making the arrest. In the instant case the evidence as to intoxication is in conflict, as we have seen, and if, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff was not intoxicated on the 26th day of April, we do not see how the defendants could justify under this statute. Code, § 5198, does not furnish any justification for either the magistrate or the officer who served the warrant. It is as follows: “A magistrate may orally order a peace officer * * * to arrest any one...