Society for Ethical Culture in City of New York v. Spatt

• Decision Date: 18 December 1980
• Citation: 434 N.Y.S.2d 932,51 N.Y.2d 449,415 N.E.2d 922
• Parties: , 415 N.E.2d 922 In the Matter of the SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE IN the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Beverly M. SPATT et al., Constituting the Landmarks Preservation Commission et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 932

434 N.Y.S.2d 932

51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922

In the Matter of the SOCIETY FOR ETHICAL CULTURE IN the CITY

OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Beverly M. SPATT et al., Constituting the Landmarks

Preservation Commission et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 18, 1980.

Louis Haimoff, Joseph Blum, Leo Rosen, Marcia B. Paul and Laurie R. Rockett, New York City, for appellant

Allen G. Schwartz, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Carolyn E. Demarest and Leonard Koerner, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

At issue in this case is the propriety of the action of New York City's Landmark Preservation Commission in designating as a landmark the Meeting House of the Society of Ethical Culture of the City of New York (Society). The Society argues that the designation, with its attendant restrictions on the use of the property, is a confiscation without due compensation and an interference with the free exercise of the Society's religious purpose. The Appellate Division held that this landmark designation was a permissible land use regulation. We affirm, 68 A.D.2d 112, 416 N.Y.S.2d 246.

The Society is a religious, educational and charitable organization founded in 1877 for the purpose of uniting interested persons to further the goal of nonsectarian moral improvement. By the early 1900's the Society had grown to the extent that a permanent home for the organization was sought. To this end, a valuable parcel of real property with an entire block frontage of 200 feet on Central Park West in the City of New York was purchased.

Two buildings eventually were constructed on the site, but only the second, known as the Meeting House, is involved in the instant controversy. That building, which comprises 40% of the lot area, was deemed worthy of landmark status due to its exemplification as the first building facade of the art nouveau style pioneered in this country by the noted architect Robert D. Kohn, who was also a president of the Society. It was the architectural distinction of the building, and the architect's personal involvement in the Society, that led the commission to conclude that the Meeting House is "a tangible symbol of the Society's permanent social contribution and a rich architectural element of the fabric of our City."

The proposal of the landmark designation was met by the Society's immediate opposition; first at the public hearing required under the Administrative Code of the City of New York (Administrative Code, § 207-2.0), and later by way of an article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the commission's designation. This proceeding was converted into an action for declaratory judgment, and after a nonjury trial the trial court agreed with the Society's contention that there was insufficient evidence that the Meeting House was of historical or architectural significance, and declared that the designation was unreasonable, confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional. The Appellate Division, in a thorough and thoughtful opinion by Mr. Justice Joseph P. Sullivan, noted that Trial Term had impermissibly substituted its subjective judgment on the landmark question for that of the Landmark Preservation Commission and unanimously reversed. The Society now appeals.

The Administrative Code of the City of New York defines a landmark as "(a)ny improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation" (Administrative Code, § 207-1.0, subd. n.). At the outset we note that if the only question before us were whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support respondents' determination that the Meeting House falls within this definition, there would be no question but that the designation would be sustained. Certainly, on this record, the determination of the commission in this regard cannot be deemed irrational (see Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 230-231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321). However, because the landmark designation subjects the Society to substantial restriction in its use of the property without any outright compensation, substantial questions remain concerning the constitutional application of those restrictions to the Society, a religious and charitable organization.

The Society notes, quite rightly, that the landmark designation will prevent the exploitation of the full economic value of the Central Park West property, since that development would require the demolition of the existing structures in violation of the commission's designation. Furthermore, the Society argues, the designation also effectively prevents the development of the adjacent school building portion of the tract which, although not the subject of landmark designation, is physically and functionally related to the Meeting House through common interior passageways and utility systems. This latter argument appears weaker than the first, because the record indicates that the buildings could be demolished separately, but in any event it is clear that at the present time the designation has the potential of inflicting a substantial economic impact on the Society. Inevitably the reduced development potential of the property will be reflected in its market value. The question, of course, is whether the impact on the Society and its charitable activities is so severe that the restrictions become confiscatory (Lutheran Church in Amer. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 316 N.E.2d 305).

Although the State and Federal Constitutions require that land use regulation not be so unreasonable or extreme that it amounts to an appropriation of property without due compensation (Matter of Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 262, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636, 397 N.E.2d 1304; French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381), it has nonetheless long been accepted that a...