Society of Professional Journalists v. Briggs
Decision Date | 22 June 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 87-C-0714G. |
Citation | 687 F. Supp. 1521 |
Parties | The SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, HEADLINERS CHAPTER, Plaintiff, v. Gene BRIGGS, Laray Sadlier, Elbert Steinaker, Jr. and Duane Lamb, Dennis Judd, Daggett County, Lloyd Winward, Marie C. Beckstead, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
D. Miles Holman and Michael P. O'Brien, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
Todd S. Richardson, Salt Lake City, Utah, for other defendants.
Kathryn Collard, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Marie C. Beckstead.
This matter came on for hearing on March 31, 1988, on plaintiff's motion to tax attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff was represented by D. Miles Holman and Michael P. O'Brien and defendants, except Marie Beckstead and Lloyd Winward, were represented by Todd S. Richardson. Defendant Marie Beckstead was represented by Kathryn Collard. Plaintiff and defendants submitted memoranda of law and affidavits. Oral arguments were heard after which the matter was taken under advisement. The court now being fully advised enters its Memorandum Decision and Order.
Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin defendants from refusing to disclose the terms of a confidential settlement agreement which had been entered into by defendants in a prior proceeding in this court.1 In a Memorandum Decision and Order in this case, this court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and denied defendants' motions to dismiss.2 Defendants concede that plaintiff is a prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but claim that special circumstances exist which would render an award for attorney fees unjust.3
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, provides in part that in an action to enforce civil rights "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."4 The Congressional purpose in providing counsel fees was to encourage the vindication of civil rights by private enforcement.5 Such enforcement can best be achieved by encouraging the public to act as private attorneys general.6 As a result, controlling judicial precedent is to the effect that ordinarily a plaintiff who is a prevailing party in a civil rights action is entitled to attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.7
The district court's discretion in denying attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights actions is quite narrow.8 The inquiry into the existence of "special circumstances" should be pragmatic and focus on "the justice under the total range of circumstances of conferring the benefit and imposing the concomitant burden represented by the fee award." Bonnes, 599 F.2d at 1319. Such things as defendant's good faith, private benefit to plaintiff rather than public benefit to a class, simple or routine character of the litigation, and mere uncertainty in the law in and of themselves do not constitute "special circumstances" which would wholly defeat a fee award.9 Further, neither the prevailing party's ability to pay attorney fees,10 nor the losing party's financial ability, or inability, to pay fees,11 are special circumstances which would render an award unjust.
Instances in which special circumstances were found to justify denial of a fee award include outrageous conduct on the part of plaintiff,12 and situations in which a defendant is powerless to provide the remedy sought by plaintiff.13 Other instances where counsel fees were denied include circumstances wherein plaintiff's claims were clothed as § 1983 actions but clearly were state law claims,14 and where plaintiffs, with the barest standing, attacked an antiquated rarely-enforced curfew statute without prior attempts to remedy the grievance without litigation.15
In this case there was not simply a "mere" uncertainty in the law16 in regards to settlement agreements. To the contrary, this case had to do with a well established and clearcut general policy of the law which encourages dispute resolution by settlement.17 Under general contract principles, parties ordinarily are wholly free to establish settlement terms, including a confidentiality requirement.18 Also, at the time plaintiff filed this action, the law regarding settlement agreements entered into by public entities as constituting public documents entitled to First Amendment right of access was not clearly established.19 In Utah the practice of keeping governmental settlements confidential had gone unchallenged in court until the current litigation.20
This status in the law, though not in and of itself a special circumstance, contributed to the situation defendants found themselves in after they had agreed in good faith to a confidential settlement which put to rest pending litigation.21 The parties had contractually bound themselves to keep the settlement agreement confidential without knowledge or notice of plaintiff's desire to be apprised of the potential settlement.22 By the time plaintiff asserted its claim, defendants were powerless to provide the remedy requested without breaching the settlement contract, with resultant substantial damages.23 This case does not represent the typical civil rights case, such as claims by members of racial minorities. Plaintiff is not the victim of invidious discrimination based on race, sex, religion, wealth, or other inherently offensive criteria about which Congress was concerned in enacting § 1988.24
Based upon all of the above, this court considers that special circumstances exist in this case which render the award of attorneys fees to plaintiff unjust. Accordingly, the court awards no attorneys fees in this case. Costs are awarded to plaintiff, to be taxed by the Clerk of the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3 The parties agree that defendant Marie Beckstead would not be personally liable for attorney fees. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2578-79, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See generally Hewitt v. Helms, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). See also Cooper v. State of Utah, 684 F.Supp. 1060, 1071 (D.Utah 1987); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 687 F.Supp. 548, 549 (D.Utah 1987). The fee determination is left to the court's discretion due to the court's "understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters." Hibma v. Odegaard, 769 F.2d 1147, 1157 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
5 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), the Court had determined that it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to create an exception to the American rule that in the absence of statutory authority the prevailing party may not recover attorney's fees. Attorney's fees therefore were denied under the "private attorney general" theory. Id. Congress acted to bridge this "anomalous gap" by providing for the award of attorney's fees in the court's discretion in civil rights cases. See S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5908, 5910. See also Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 638 F.Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.Pa.1986), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631 (3rd Cir.1987).
6 Riddell v. Nat'l Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.1980), on remand, 545 F.Supp. 252 (S.D.Miss.1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 712 F.2d 165 (1983); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds on appeal after remand, 651 F.2d 214 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 1476, 71 L.Ed.2d 681 (1982); see also Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir.1985); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (2nd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S.Ct. 843, 59 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979).
7 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)); Wilson v. Stoker, 819 F.2d 943, 951 (10th Cir.1987); Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir.1985); see also S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5908, 5912.
8 Wilson v. Stoker, 819 F.2d at 951 (10th Cir. 1987); J. & J. Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir.1985); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 130 (10th Cir.1980). See also Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1150 (11th Cir.1985) ( ).
9 J. & J. Anderson, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1474 citations omitted.
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