Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 02 February 1952
• Citation: 202 Misc. 364
• Parties: Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>Gerald L. Bailey, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

202 Misc. 364

Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., Plaintiff,

v.Gerald L. Bailey, Defendant.

WARD, J.

February 2, 1952.

Raymond V. O'Connor for defendant.

Robert M. Diggs for plaintiff.

WARD, J.

This is an action tried at a trial term before a jury in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injury to its oil pipe line resulting from an alleged trespass by the defendant.

The essential facts, as proved on the trial, are simple and generally conceded by both parties. The plaintiff, a producer and distributor of oil and petroleum products, is the owner of an easement to maintain and operate and has, in fact, for a long period of time operated a pipe line across certain rural property in Cattaraugus County now owned by the Vacuum Gas Burner Company. At the time involved herein, the pipe line was being operated by the plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of the easement. It appears that under these conditions, the defendant, pursuant to a contract with the Vacuum Gas Burner Company to level the latter's property, operated a bulldozer in such a manner that he ran into and broke the plaintiff's pipe line. The instrument creating the easement was duly recorded but there is no proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the location or even the existence of the line.

At the end of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a dismissal of the complaint, which motion was renewed and a motion for a directed verdict also made at the close of the evidence. At that time, the plaintiff also moved for a directed verdict. Decision on all motions was reserved. The court submitted only the question of the amount of damages to the jury which returned a verdict of $100. The defendant thereupon moved to set aside the verdict and renewed his motion for a directed verdict dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff then moved for the entry of judgment in accordance with the finding of the jury. Decisions on these motions were likewise reserved.

The issue presented in this case should be spelled out at the outset. From an analysis of the pleadings and briefs, it appears that the plaintiff seeks to recover on the theory that the defendant committed a trespass to its easement and to its pipe line. If this court understands correctly the substance of the plaintiff's position, it attempts to claim an actionable wrong by the defendant against its easement of a type which might have been covered at common law by an action of trespass on the case and further, a wrong against its personalty, i.e., the pipe line, as a trespass to chattels, which might have been founded at common law on the ancient actions of trespass vi et armis or de bonis asportatis. It does not seek to recover on the theory of a trespass quare clausum fregit to its easement. Because of the requirement that trespass quare clausum fregit must be against a possessory estate in real property, it was well established at common law that an easement, being an incorporeal hereditament was not such an interest as would support that action. (Pollock's Law of Torts [14th ed., 1939] p. 299; 3 Tiffany on Law of Real Property [3d ed. 1939], § 814; cf. First Baptist Church v. Witherell, 3 Paige Ch. 296 [1832], and Shaw v. Beveridge, 3 Hill 26 [1842], in which trespass was held to lie for interference with right of owner of church pew on theory such right was not an easement but a property right and therefore "real estate".) In fact, on page 6 of its brief, plaintiff admits ejectment or trespass quare clausum fregit would not have been a proper common-law action for the interference alleged herein. It is equally clear that the plaintiff does not seek to recover on the theory of negligence and, in fact, the evidence would sustain no such claim. If it is to be successful, the plaintiff must recover upon a theory of liability not based on negligence.

It is true that under the common law the action of trespass on the case was not limited to situations where negligence was involved. Its purpose was to supply a remedy where the other forms of actions were not applicable. (Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176 [1896].) It was employed where the damage suffered was consequential or indirect and not the direct result of the act constituting the trespass as was required in the older form of actions of trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass vi et armis and trespass de bonis asportatis. Thus under the early law, there could be a negligent harm by direct contact remediable by trespass vi et armis or de bonis asportatis (Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns, 257 [1820]) or a harm not based on negligence for which case was the proper action, the distinguishing factor being whether the harm was immediate and direct...