Sohayegh v. Oberlander

Decision Date06 November 1989
Citation547 N.Y.S.2d 98,155 A.D.2d 436
PartiesSion SOHAYEGH, Appellant-Respondent, v. Herman OBERLANDER, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Gerard M. Karlen, New York City, for appellant-respondent.

Jacob Rabinowitz, New York City (Laurence H. Pearson, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Before KUNZEMAN, J.P., and RUBIN, HARWOOD and BALLETTA, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lodato, J.), dated November 4, 1988, as conditioned the granting of his motion for summary judgment upon his consent to the appointment of an independent appraiser by the court, and performing the contract in accordance with the appraiser's findings as to the current fair market value of the subject real property, and the defendant cross-appeals, as limited by his notice of cross-appeal and brief, from so much of the same order as granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and denied his cross application for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on his counterclaim for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff defaulted on the contract, and that he is entitled to retain the plaintiff's downpayment of $8,000.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, the defendant's cross application for summary judgment is granted, the complaint is dismissed, and it is declared that the plaintiff defaulted on the contract, and that the defendant is entitled to retain the plaintiff's downpayment of $8,000.

The plaintiff instituted the instant action seeking specific performance of a contract executed on April 17, 1985, concerning the sale of certain real property located in Brooklyn, New York. The contract provided, inter alia, that the closing date of the sale was to be May 20, 1985. The contract did not contain a provision that time was to be of the essence and it also did not state that its performance was contingent on the plaintiff's ability to obtain mortgage financing.

The plaintiff did not make arrangements to close on the May 20, 1985, closing date, nor did he request an adjournment of the closing. By letter dated May 22, 1985, the defendant's attorney informed the plaintiff's attorney that the defendant is granting "a final adjournment of closing until June 6, 1985", at the office of the defendant's attorney, and that in the event the plaintiff failed to close title on that day, the defendant would "have no alternative but to hold you in default". Prior to June 6, 1985, the closing date was adjourned to June 12, 1985. It is disputed as to which of the parties requested the adjournment. In his letter to the plaintiff's attorney, dated June 5, 1985, the defendant's attorney confirmed that June 12, 1985, was the adjourned date of closing and warned that the "seller will not permit any additional adjournments to the purchaser as I previously advised you". On June 12, 1985, neither the plaintiff nor his attorney appeared at the office of the defendant's attorney to close title. The defendant duly notified the plaintiff that he was in default under the contract, that he was canceling the contract, and that he would retain the plaintiff's down payment of $8,000 as liquidated damages.

By letter dated June 12, 1985, which was hand delivered to the defendant's attorney, the plaintiff requested an adjournment of the closing date until June 19, 1985. The letter stated further that the closing date of June 12, 1985 "was originally based (with the understanding of both parties) upon the expectation that [the plaintiff] could secure the necessary financing by that date", but that "[u]nfortunately, the financing arrangements have not been concluded". However, the plaintiff indicated that financing would be secured by June 19, 1985. The defendant refused to grant the adjournment and maintained that the plaintiff was in default and that he was retaining the plaintiff's down payment as liquidated damages.

The instant action was commenced on or about October 10, 1985. By order to show cause dated May 25, 1988, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The defendant opposed the motion and demanded summary judgment (1) dismissing the complaint and (2) sustaining his counterclaim for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff defaulted on the contract, and that the defendant was entitled to retain the $8,000 down payment as liquidated damages.

We agree with the defendant that the plaintiff defaulted on the contract and therefore reverse.

Where a contract for the sale of real property does not contain a specific declaration that time is of the essence, the law permits the parties a reasonable time in which to tender performance, regardless of whether the contract designates a specific date on which such performance is to be...

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24 cases
  • Revital Realty Grp., LLC v. Ulano Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 26 Diciembre 2013
    ...a specific date for performance ( see Grace v. Nappa, 46 N.Y.2d 560, 565, 415 N.Y.S.2d 793, 389 N.E.2d 107; Sohayegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436, 438, 547 N.Y.S.2d 98; Zev v. Merman, 134 A.D.2d 555, 557, 521 N.Y.S.2d 455, affd.73 N.Y.2d 781, 536 N.Y.S.2d 739, 533 N.E.2d 669). What constit......
  • Lashley v. BDL Real Estate Dev. Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 25 Enero 2023
    ...notice specifies a time on which to close and warns that failure to close on that date will result in default" ( Sohayegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436, 438, 547 N.Y.S.2d 98 ). It does not matter that the date is unilaterally set (see id. at 438, 547 N.Y.S.2d 98 ; Zev v. Merman, 134 A.D.2d ......
  • Coizza v. 164-50 Crossbay Realty Corp.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 13 Octubre 2010
    ...555, 557 [2d Dept. 1987], affirmed 73 N.Y.2d 781 [1988]; see also, 3M Holding Corp. v. Wagner, 166 A.D.2d 580 [1990]; Sohayegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436 [2d Dept. 1989]). Even if this court were to ascribe legal effect to the purchasers' time-of-the-essence letter, its contents fail to ......
  • Savitsky v. Sukenik
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 16 Junio 1997
    ...designates a specific date for performance (see, Grace v. Nappa, 46 N.Y.2d 560, 415 N.Y.S.2d 793, 389 N.E.2d 107; Sohayegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436, 547 N.Y.S.2d 98; Zev v. Merman, 134 A.D.2d 555, 521 N.Y.S.2d 455, affd. 73 N.Y.2d 781, 536 N.Y.S.2d 739, 533 N.E.2d 669). What constitute......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • A. Purchase and Sale Standard Documents
    • United States
    • New York State Bar Association Practical Skills: Real Estate Transactions -- Commercial Property (NY)
    • Invalid date
    ...adjournment of the closing date. 3M Holding Corp. v. Wagner, 166 A.D.2d 580, 560 N.Y.S.2d 865 (2d Dep't 1990); Sohayegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436, 547 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't 1989). In granting an adjournment, the other party may unilaterally impose a condition that time be of the essence......

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