Sokolek v. General Motors Corp.

Decision Date22 August 1995
Docket NumberNos. 13,97960 and 97961,Nos. 100072,95551,14,s. 100072,s. 13
Citation538 N.W.2d 369,450 Mich. 133
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesJanet L. SOKOLEK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AC Rochester Flint East, Defendant-Appellant. Charles H. MULLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. FRANK H. WILSON COMPANY and Citizens Insurance Company of America, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, and Silicosis & Dust Disease Fund, Defendant-Appellee. Halil RIZA, and Nurji Riza, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DELRAY BAKING COMPANY and West American Insurance Company, & Second Injury Fund, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar

Freid, Gallagher, Taylor & Associates, P.C. by Debra A. Freid, Saginaw, for plaintiff Sokolek.

Charles G. Gale, Southfield, for plaintiff Mullins.

Sachs, Waldman, O'Hare, Helveston, Hodges & Barnes, P.C. by Granner S. Ries, Detroit, for plaintiffs Riza.

Munroe & Nobach, P.C. by Cameron C. McComb, East Lansing, for defendant in Sokolek.

Sinn, Day, Felker, Chinitz, Lovernick & Roggenbaum, P.C. by William A. Day, Birmingham, and Daryl C. Royal, Dearborn, for defendants-appellants Frank H. Wilson Company and Citizens Insurance Company of America.

Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C. by Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, for defendants-appellees Delray Baking Company and West American Insurance Company.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Morrison Zack, Assistant Attorney General, Detroit, for amicus curiae Director, Michigan Bureau of Worker's Disability Compensation.

Opinion

BRICKLEY, Chief Justice, and LEVIN, Justice.

I

Riza v. Delray Baking Co.

Halil Riza was employed at the Delray Baking Company until his last day of work January 1, 1971. It was subsequently determined that Mr. Riza had a continuing psychiatric disability.

The plaintiff filed the current action on December 29, 1981, claiming to be totally and permanently disabled. On December 4, 1984, his wife filed a petition requesting reimbursement for nursing and attendant care services she had been providing for the plaintiff. After a hearing, Magistrate Lanita Haith held that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled. The magistrate did not address the request for reimbursement from Mrs. Riza.

The plaintiff appealed, and the WCAB reversed. 1991 WCABO 1535. The WCAB found the plaintiff to be totally and permanently disabled, and ordered the defendant to reimburse Mrs. Riza for all nursing and attendant care provided for the plaintiff from December 1, 1983, to July 30, 1985. After July 30, 1985, however, the board limited the award to compensation for fifty-six hours of work by Mrs. Riza per week, citing § 315(1) of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, an amendment that came into effect on that date. The amendment provides, in relevant part:

Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee's spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons. [M.C.L. § 418.315(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(315)(1).]

The WCAB held that the statute applied to all payments made after its effective date.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. That Court reversed the decision of the WCAB and held that the fifty-six-hour limitation in § 315(1) must be applied retroactively. The statutory language, "shall not be ordered," was found to be indicative of a legislative intent to apply the statute to all injuries for which compensation was ordered after the effective date of the statute, regardless of the injury date. 200 Mich.App. 169, 504 N.W.2d 193 (1993). We subsequently granted leave to appeal. 448 Mich. 852 (1995).

Mullins v. Frank H. Wilson Co.

Mr. Charles Mullins worked for the Frank H. Wilson Company until February 16, 1984, when he was forced to quit because of several severe heart and lung conditions. Mr. Mullins filed a petition for hearing with the WCAB on March 5, 1984. The hearing referee, Steven C. Washington, found him to be disabled and entitled to an open award of benefits.

The referee also found that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for the nursing and attendant care services provided by his wife and daughter. Benefits were awarded for nursing care from February 17, 1984, onward. After July 30, 1985, however, the referee limited the number of compensable hours for such services to fifty-six a week under § 315(1). The referee awarded the plaintiff a compensation rate based on the rate, $7 an hour, that would be charged by an agency that provided home care, and stated that the yearly rate of compensation would be, "subject to cost-of-living increases."

Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed the referee's decision. The plaintiff argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation did not apply to him because his injury occurred before July 30, 1985. The defendant argued that the fifty-six-hour limitation should have been applied retroactively to the time of the plaintiff's injury. It also contended that the plaintiff should only have been awarded compensation equivalent to the going rate for an independently hired nurse's aid, rather than the rate charged by an agency, and that the cost-of-living increases awarded by the referee were inappropriate.

The WCAB affirmed in part and reversed in part. The board held that § 315(1) did not apply to Mr. Mullins. Hence, the referee's decision to limit reimbursement for nursing and attendant care to fifty-six hours a week after July 30, 1985, was reversed. The board affirmed the referee's decision to award compensation at the rate of $7 an hour, but held that the cost-of-living increases were "unenforceable and without any method by which to compute said cost-of-living increases...." 1991 WCABO 331, 340.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the fifty-six hour a week limitation on compensation for nursing and attendant care imposed by § 315(1) should not apply to the plaintiff, because Mr. Mullins was injured before the effective date of the statute. Retroactive application of the amendment was inappropriate because it affected a substantive right. The Court also affirmed the WCAB's refusal to enforce the cost-of-living increases awarded in the referee's opinion, and reversed the WCAB's decision to award the plaintiff the $7 an hour rate charged by home care agencies. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 9, 1992 (Docket No. 139268). Both parties appealed to this Court, and we granted leave in an unlimited order. 1 448 Mich. 852 (1995).

Sokolek v. General Motors Corp.

Janet Sokolek was an employee of General Motors Corporation. Ms. Sokolek suffered an injury to her back while at work on April 16, 1980. She petitioned for worker's compensation benefits and received an open award in November, 1981.

On October 14, 1985, Ms. Sokolek filed a petition to obtain compensation for nursing and attendant care provided by her husband. The magistrate found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, and the defendant appealed the decision to the WCAB.

GM argued that the magistrate had erred in not applying § 381(3) of the WDCA, the "one-year-back rule." Like § 315(1), the one-year-back rule applying to nursing and attendant care became effective on July 30, 1985. The amendment provides:

Payment for nursing or attendant care shall not be made for any period which is more than 1 year before the date an application for a hearing is filed with the bureau. [M.C.L. § 418.381(3); M.S.A. § 17.237(381)(3).]

The WCAB found that the amendment did not apply to injuries that occurred before July 30, 1985. It thereby affirmed the decision of the magistrate.

The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's application for leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered July 1, 1992 (Docket No. 146817). The defendant then appealed to this Court. We also denied leave initially, but on the defendant's motion for rehearing, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted the defendant's claim that § 381(3) applied to these facts. 442 Mich. 924, 503 N.W.2d 901 (1993). On remand,the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the WCAB. 206 Mich.App. 31, 520 N.W.2d 668 (1994). The defendant again appealed to this Court, and we granted leave. 447 Mich. 996 (1994).

II

1985 P.A. 103 added the following sentence to § 315 of the Worker's Compensation Act:

Attendant or nursing care shall not be ordered in excess of 56 hours per week if such care is to be provided by the employee's spouse, brother, sister, child, parent, or any combination of these persons. 2

Act 103 added the following sentence to § 381:

Payment for nursing or attendant care shall not be made for any period which is more than 1 year before the date an application for a hearing is filed with the bureau. 3

The question presented is whether these provisions, limiting the amount of medical benefits payable by an employer or its insurer in respect to an injured worker, apply retroactively in respect to injuries suffered before the July 30, 1985, effective date of Act 103, or apply prospectively.

Cognizant of the fact that the decision in these cases overrules, sub silentio, prior decisions of this Court, we hold that, although the workers in the instant cases were injured before July 30, 1985, these provisions apply to all services rendered on and after the July 30, 1985, effective date. Thus, in Riza and Mullins services rendered before July 30, 1985, are compensable without regard to the fifty-six-hour a week limitation, and services rendered on and after July 30, 1985, are subject to the fifty-six hour a week limitation. In Sokolek, the one-year-back limitation is not effective regarding nursing or attendant care services rendered before July 30, 1985, with the result that Ms....

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Sington v. Chrysler Corporation
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 31 Julio 2002
    ...Castings, Inc., 450 Mich. 620, 544 N.W.2d 278 (1996); People v. Wood, 450 Mich. 399, 538 N.W.2d 351 (1995); Sokolek v. General Motors Corp., 450 Mich. 133, 538 N.W.2d 369 (1995); People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 (1994); Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 521 N.W.2d 230 ......
  • Hardrick v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 1 Diciembre 2011
    ...services, thereby consigning to a jury the necessary economic-value choices. This analysis is consistent with Sokolek v. Gen. Motors Corp., 450 Mich. 133, 538 N.W.2d 369 (1995). Sokolek is a workers' compensation case in which the parties disputed the reasonable rate for a relative who prov......
  • Cipri v. Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 22 Agosto 1995
    ...the procedural/substantive distinction for determining retroactivity of a worker's compensation statute. Sokolek v. General Motors Corp., 450 Mich. 133, 538 N.W.2d 369 (1995). ...
  • Matney v. Southfield Bowl
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 27 Agosto 1996
    ...effective date of the statute. Sokolek v. General Motors Corp. (On Remand), 206 Mich.App. 31, 520 N.W.2d 668 (1994), aff'd 450 Mich. 133, 538 N.W.2d 369 (1995). Here, all the nursing or attendant-care benefits upheld by the WCAC were for services provided before the effective date of the st......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT