Sokolik v. Pateman

Decision Date19 February 2014
Citation981 N.Y.S.2d 111,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01158,114 A.D.3d 839
PartiesAndew SOKOLIK, respondent-appellant, v. Charles M. PATEMAN, et al., respondents, Frank Racanelli, appellant-respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Moses & Singer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Maguerite E. Royer of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Mark E. Constantine, Irvington, N.Y., for respondent-appellant.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.

In an action for specific performance of a contract and to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendantFrank Racanelli appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Giacomo, J.), dated September 12, 2011, as, upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against him, awarded the plaintiff interest at a rate of 10% per annum from March 31, 2001, to the date of the verdict on the principal amount due on a certain promissory note, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as did not award prejudgment interest pursuant to CPLR 5001, and did not award him judgment against the defendantDearman Park Homeowners Associates.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff interest at a rate of 10% per annum from March 31, 2001, to the date of the verdict on the principal amount due on the promissory note, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 9% per annum from March 26, 2002; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a recomputation of prejudgment interest in accordance herewith, and thereafter the entry of an appropriate amended judgment.

This action involves an agreement dated March 31, 2001, between the defendantsCharles M. Pateman, Westwood Development Associates(hereinafter Westwood), Frank Racanelli, and Padriac Steinschneider(hereinafter collectively the Debtors) and the plaintiffAndrew Sokolik, pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to loan the Debtors the sum of $216,250 for the benefit of a housing development, to be evidenced by a promissory note signed by the Debtors.The promissory note, dated March 26, 2001, required repayment of the principal sum of $216,250 one year after the date of the note.The agreement gave the plaintiff the option to apply the principal amount of the loan plus an additional $50,000 “towards the purchase price of” a certain parcel of real property, which option had to be exercised in writing within the one-year loan period.The agreement gave Westwood the option to cancel the agreement within three months after the date of the agreement.Upon exercising the option to cancel, Westwood was required to return to Sokolik the principal sum of $216,250, together with interest calculated at the rate of 10% per annum, prorated from March 26, 2001.

The plaintiff allegedly exercised his option to purchase within his one-year option period.On October 7, 2003, counsel for Racanelli and Steinschneider tendered a check to the plaintiff in the sum of $249,648.81, allegedly in satisfaction of the loan.The plaintiff rejected and returned the check and demanded a deed pursuant to the agreement.However, title to the parcel was never conveyed to the plaintiff.The plaintiff commenced this action alleging two causes of action.In the first cause of action, the plaintiff sought specific performance on the option to purchase the parcel.The second cause of action alleged breach of contract and sought judgment in the amount loaned, $216,250, together with interest.After trial, the jury returned a verdict, inter alia, finding that the Debtors had breached the agreement between the parties by failing to repay the principal sum of the loan within one year after the date of the promissory note, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of the principal amount of the loan plus interest at a rate of 10% per annum from March 31, 2001, to the date of the verdict.

For a reviewing court to determine that a jury verdict is not supported by legally...

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18 cases
  • Mardakhayev v. City of N.Y.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • August 31, 2016
    ...163 ). “Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors” (Sokolik v. Pateman, 114 A.D.3d at 840–841, 981 N.Y.S.2d 111 ; see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 133, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184 ). Here, the jury's determination that the defendant did not affirmativelyaffirmed, with costs.“[A] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Sokolik v. Pateman, 114 A.D.3d 839, 840, 981 N.Y.S.2d 111 ; see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ). “Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather...
  • Loja v. Lavelle
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • October 07, 2015
    ...loss of services. “[A] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Sokolik v. Pateman, 114 A.D.3d 839, 840, 981 N.Y.S.2d 111 ; see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163 ). “Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather163 ). “Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors” (Sokolik v. Pateman, 114 A.D.3d at 840–841, 981 N.Y.S.2d 111 ; see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 133, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184 ). The apportionment of fault among the parties is generally an...
  • Scalogna v. Osipov
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • May 21, 2014
    ...should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors ( see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145;Sokolik v. Pateman, 114 A.D.3d 839, 981 N.Y.S.2d 111). “When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” ( Handwerker...
  • Gibson v. Singh Towing, Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • November 01, 2017
    ...Khan defendants cross-appeal. "[A] jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Sokolik v Pateman, 114 AD3d 839, 840; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746). "Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors"Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746). "Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors" (Sokolik v Pateman, 114 AD3d at 840-841; see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499). "It is for the jury to make determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses, and great deference in this regard is accorded to the jury, which had the opportunity to...
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