Sola v. Leighton

• Decision Date: 13 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011–186–Appeal.,2011–186–Appeal.
• Citation: 45 A.3d 502
• Parties: Cheryl A. SOLA v. Chelsea LEIGHTON, et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

45 A.3d 502

Cheryl A. SOLA

v.Chelsea LEIGHTON, et al.

No. 2011–186–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 13, 2012.

Joseph R. Palumbo, Jr., Esq., Middletown, for Plaintiff.

Marc DeSisto, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 9, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The plaintiff, Cheryl A. Sola (Sola or plaintiff), appeals from a Superior Court decision dismissing her defamation claim as time-barred and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City of Newport (city) and Detective Michael Caruolo (Det. Caruolo), individually and in his capacity as a member of the Newport Police Department, (collectively, defendants).¹ On appeal, the plaintiff argues: (1) that the statute of limitations on her claim should have been tolled because her original complaint, filed before the statutory period expired, included John Doe defendants; (2) that her claim accrued on the date when she was fired as a result of Det. Caruolo's allegedly defamatory statements, not on the date when those statements were published; and (3) that the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Det. Caruolo fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action. Having carefully reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown; thus, the appeal may be decided at this time. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

On May 30, 2006, plaintiff was fired from her position as a receptionist in the admitting department at Newport Hospital. On June 16, 2006, plaintiff filed a civil complaint in Superior Court against “John Does 1–10 and Jane Does 1–10,” alleging that “[i]n or about the period of the first four months of 2006 * * * an individual or individuals defamed the plaintiff by falsely and maliciously stating that plaintiff publicly disclosed confidential health care information about certain patients at Newport Hospital.” The plaintiff further alleged that she was fired as a result of the defamatory statements and consequently suffered humiliation, mental anguish, and economic damages.

In her quest to discover the source or sources responsible for the claimed defamatory statements, plaintiff obtained a copy of an April 13, 2006 e-mail sent to the Newport Hospital Director of Health Information and Registration, Pamela Improta (Improta), from Newport Police Captain Wayne Morrison (Capt. Morrison). In the e-mail, Capt. Morrison notified Improta that in “February of 2006[he] was informed by an employee who works * * * in the Newport Police Detective Division, Detective Michael Caruolo,” about irregularities involving a Newport Hospital employee, Cheryl Sola. The e-mail described how the misdeeds came to light after Det. Caruolo interviewed a confidential informant who had witnessed plaintiff divulging “information concerning Newport police officers * * * [which] had been culled from their medical files in Newport Hospital.” According to the e-mail, Det. Caruolo's confidential informant specifically named several members of the police department whose personal information—including their home addresses and information about their spouses and children—had been disclosed by Sola. According to the informant, plaintiff's conduct included driving by the homes of several members of the police department and surveilling their activities. The e-mail went on to describe how Sola's behavior reportedly was motivated by a desire to boast to her friends about the information to which she had access and to monitor men in the police department with whom previously she had been romantically involved. Captain Morrison concluded his e-mail to Improta by expressing his hope that the information he provided would aid Improta's investigation into the informant's allegations.²

The information imparted by Capt. Morrison apparently was derived from a police report written by Det. Caruolo, dated February 23, 2006, in which Det. Caruolo reported that he received information in December 2005 “from a reliable source” that Sola “was accessing and [disseminating] personal information as well as medical information of members of [the Newport] police department.” According to the report,Det. Caruolo asked the informant to gather more specific information and conducted a follow-up interview with the informant on February 23, 2006. That same day, he reported what he had learned to Capt. Morrison.

On October 19, 2006, having obtained a copy of Capt. Morrison's April 13 e-mail mentioning Det. Caruolo's involvement in the case, plaintiff filed a motion to depose Det. Caruolo. The motion was granted and on June 26, 2007, Det. Caruolo was questioned about his report. During the course of the deposition, it was revealed that Chelsea Leighton (Leighton), a friend of plaintiff's, was Det. Caruolo's “reliable source” who informed him of plaintiff's improper activities. The plaintiff subsequently moved to amend her complaint to name Leighton as a defendant. Leighton was served with plaintiff's amended complaint but failed to respond; a default judgment entered against her on October 2, 2007.

It was not until May 11, 2009, that plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint, adding Det. Caruolo and the city as defendants. The plaintiff's motion was granted and her second amended complaint was filed on May 20, 2009—more than three years from the date when Det. Caruolo published his allegedly defamatory statements. The complaint alleged that Det. Caruolo, acting individually and in his official capacity, had “knowingly and maliciously published false statements that a so-called confidential informant employed at Newport Hospital informed him that Plaintiff accessed and/or released confidential health care information concerning Newport police officers while she was employed at Newport Hospital.”

On June 8, 2009, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that plaintiff's claim was barred because more than three years had passed between the date when Det. Caruolo's police report was filed, February 23, 2006, and the date when plaintiff filed her second amended complaint, May 20, 2009. The defendants requested that the trial justice treat their motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiff asserted the same three arguments that she now raises on appeal. The defendants asserted that plaintiff's “John Doe” complaint did not toll the statute of limitations because, at the time she filed her initial complaint, plaintiff knew Det. Caruolo's identity and that he filed the police report that prompted Capt. Morrison's e-mail. Furthermore, defendants argued that plaintiff's cause of action accrued on February 23, 2006, when Det. Caruolo's allegedly defamatory statements were published, not on May 30, 2006, when plaintiff was fired. Finally, defendants averred that there was no evidence that Det. Caruolo had sought to fraudulently conceal the statements that he had made in his report.

On October 21, 2009, the trial justice—who agreed to treat defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment—issued a decision in defendants' favor.³ The trial justice determined that G.L.1956 § 9–5–20, which permits a plaintiff who does not know a defendant's name to use a fictitious name for purposes of filing process, was unavailable to plaintiff because she knew both Det. Caruolo's identity and that he had written the police report.⁴ The trial justice also determined, based on this Court's pronouncement in Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 725 (R.I.1985), that plaintiff's claim accrued on the date when Det. Caruolo's report was published, which was more than three years before plaintiff filed her second amended complaint. See id. (holding that the right of action in a defamation case accrues on the date when the allegedly defamatory statements are published). Finally, the trial justice held that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence that Detective Caruolo acted in any way to conceal the existence of a cause of action against him;” and, consequently, the trial justice refused to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9–1–20.⁵ The trial justice accordingly ruled that plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and on January 21, 2010, entered final judgment in defendants' favor. The plaintiff timely appealed.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews de novo a trial justice's decision granting summary judgment.” Lynch v. Spirit Rent–A–Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I.2009). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law.” Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1187 (R.I.2005) (quoting Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I.2003)). “Only when a review of the admissible evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party reveals no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, will this Court uphold the trial justice's grant of summary judgment.” National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d 968, 971 (R.I.2008) (quoting Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I.1999)).

Analysis

The plaintiff does not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies to her defamation claim or that her second amended complaint was filed more than three years after Det. Caruolo's allegedly defamatory statements were...