Solan v. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1895
• Citation: 63 N.W. 692,95 Iowa 260
• Parties: PATRICK L. SOLAN v. THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

63 N.W. 692

95 Iowa 260

PATRICK L. SOLAN v. THE CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 31, 1895

Appeal from Sioux District Court.--HON. SCOTT M. LADD, Judge.

Action to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in permitting one of the rails in its tracks to become weak, cracked, and out of repair, and in running the caboose in which plaintiff was riding at a negligent rate of speed, in consequence of which said caboose was derailed, and plaintiff injured. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict and judgment had in favor of the plaintiff for one thousand dollars. Defendant appeals. The issues and facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Affirmed.

George E. Clark for appellant.

Powers & Conway and W. D. Boies for appellee.

OPINION

Given, C. J.

I.

Plaintiff was injured at a point in Iowa when being carried over defendant's road in a caboose attached to a freight train, in which one or more cars of cattle, in charge of plaintiff, were being transported. Plaintiff and the cattle were being carried under a contract between the owner of the cattle and the defendant for their transportation from Rock Valley, Iowa to the Union Stock Yards in Illinois. Said contract contains this provision: "Eight. That the company shall in no event be liable to the owner or person in charge of said stock for any injury to his person in an amount exceeding the sum of $ 500." The trial court instructed the jury that, if it found for the plaintiff, it should allow him such an amount as would compensate him for the injuries sustained. Appellant contends that the court erred in not instructing that, under the contract, plaintiff was not entitled to recover, if at all, more than five hundred dollars, and in this contention we have the only question presented on this appeal. We have no argument for appellee.

II. Appellant assumes that the court omitted to instruct that plaintiff could not recover more than five hundred dollars upon the theory that the part of said contract quoted above was void, under section 1308 of the Code of Iowa. That section is as follows: "No contract, receipt, rule, or regulation, shall exempt any corporation engaged in transporting persons or property by railway from liability of a common carrier, or carrier of passengers, which would exist had no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation, been made or entered into." Appellant's contention is that as this was a contract for an interstate shipment, and as the power to regulate commerce between the states is exclusively in the congress of the United States, said section does not apply. It cannot be questioned but that this was an interstate shipment, and that congress alone possesses power to regulate commerce between the states; but the inquiry remains whether said section, as applied to this contract, is a regulation of commerce. Appellant concedes "that up to the present time your honors have refused to adopt the application and construction which is now contended for." In the case of Hart v. Railroad Co., 69 Iowa 485 . the contract was for the shipment of horses from a point in this state to a point in another, and provided that no liability would be assumed by the carrier on the horses for more than one hundred dollars each. Question was made whether section 1308 was applicable, and it was contended "that the state has no power to place a restriction of that character upon the carrier contracts for the transportation of property from this state into another state or territory. " The court says: "The position is that the restriction, if applicable to a contract of this character, would be a regulation of commerce among states, and a subject which under the federal constitution, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the congress of the United States. In our opinion, however, this position cannot be maintained. The provision is in no just or legal sense a regulation of commerce. It prescribes no regulation for the transportation of freight upon any of the channels of communication. It leaves the parties free to make such contracts as they may choose to make with reference to the compensation which shall be paid for the services to be rendered. The carrier is left free to demand such compensation for the carriage of the property as is just, considering the responsibility he assumes when he receives it. He is forbidden to make any contract that would exempt him from any of the liabilities which arise by implication from his...