Solano-Reed v. Leona Grp., LLC
| Decision Date | 11 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-14245 |
| Parties | HELENA SOLANO-REED a/k/a HELENA SOLANO, Plaintiff, v. THE LEONA GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 46). The case involves a dispute between Plaintiff, Helena Solano-Reed, and her supervisors, Defendants Javier Garibay and Juan Martinez, regarding the testing of 11th graders at Cesar Chavez Academy High School ("CCAHS"), owned and operated by Defendant The Leona Group, LLC. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff, Helena Solano-Reed, worked as a guidance counselor from 2006 until 2011 at CCAHS. (Doc. 46 at 1). CCAHS is a public charter school owned and operated by The Leona Group. Solano-Reed was hired on an annual basis, with a renewal of her contract each year until employment ceased in mid - 2011. (Compl. at ¶ 15-18). She received exemplary performance reviews, and was given a raise after the2010-11 school year. (Id. at ¶ 20). Juan Martinez is the principal of CCAHS and Javier Garibay is the Regional Vice President of The Leona Group.
The State of Michigan requires that all 11th graders take the Michigan Merit Exam ("MME") in order to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLBA"). (Doc. 46 at 1; Doc. 54 at 1). CCAHS receives federal and state funds for its compliance. According to Chris Janzer, Accountability Specialist with the MDE, charter schools have the discretion to set criteria identifying which students qualify as 11th graders. (Doc. 46 Ex. B, ¶ 6, 7). At CCAHS, those students with 12 or more credit hours were considered 11th graders eligible to test, and were administered the MME. (Doc. 46 at 2).
Beginning in early 2010, Defendants prepared to administer the MME to only a portion of students in 11th grade; those who completed 12 credit hours. Some students were labeled as juniors, but had completed only 10 or 11.5 credit hours. In February 2010, Solano-Reed attended a conference with officials from the MDE and voiced her concern about the decision not to test all students in 11th grade. (Compl. at ¶ 30-31). She asserts that MDE officials "noted . . . this was improper." (Id. at ¶ 32).
In March 2010, Solano-Reed told Martinez that MDE officials believed the testing protocol to be improper. (Id. at ¶ 33). However, Martinez proceeded as originally planned. That summer, Solano-Reed was not asked to direct the summer school program. (Id. at ¶ 35). Later in September, she sent out a school-wide email directing teachers to avoid sending students to the guidance office during the first week of school. (Doc. 46 Ex. H). Martinez responded via email, voicing his displeasure with such a policy. (Id.) In a November meeting with Martinez, Solano-Reed again objectedto the testing protocol. A series of emails between Martinez and Solano-Reed in December indicates she failed to provide Martinez with information regarding seniors eligible to graduate, and that Martinez was "very let down" by the overall performance of her and her co-employee. (Id. at Exs. I, J, K).
(Id. at 1). Solano-Reed also indicated to those present that she had a "tortured colon" resulting from the stress of her employment. (Id.)
On February 19, 2011, Solano-Reed sent an anonymous email to MDE inquiring into the legality of the testing protocol regarding the fact that students with 11 or 11.5 credits were not administered the MME. (Id. at Ex. O). In response, an official from the MDE stated that those 11th graders who did not test would be expected to test as 12th graders, but did not otherwise express any concern with the protocol. (Id. at Ex. P). On February 27, 2011, she sent an email to a professor at Eastern Michigan University, in which she detailed her concerns with the testing protocol and noted "[Martinez] is trying to now build a case against me." (Id. at Ex. N).
In April 2011, Solano-Reed sent a memo to William Coats, CEO of The Leona Group, detailing her allegations of harassment and intimidation against Martinez and Garibay. (Id. at Ex. P). The memo listed several "acts of harassment," including ignoring her at meetings, providing her with busy work, failing to provide direction, statements made to other employees by Martinez about her, lack of invitations to meetings, and her displeasure that teachers, not counselors, were now meeting with students one-on-one. (Id.) After an investigation, Coats responded to the memo in June and stated that Martinez's work requests were reasonable, no evidence of harassment or hostile work environment existed, and the testing protocol was "entirely legal." (Id. at Ex. Q). Subsequently, Solano-Reed refused to sign her poor performance review. (Id. at Ex. R). Instead, she drafted a seven-page, single-spaced rebuttal, detailing why the review was "malicious." (Id.). Soon thereafter, The Leona Group decided not to renew her contract for the upcoming school year.
On September 27, 2011, Solano-Reed filed a complaint against Defendants alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful termination resulting from engaging in First Amendment protected speech, violation of the False Claims Act, violation of the Michigan Whistleblower's Protection Act, and violation of Michigan public policy. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, Solano-Reed did not engage in protected activity under the statutes and cannot prove causation.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, (1986). Rule 56 mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts supported by affidavits or other appropriate evidence establishing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,157 (1970). The Court "must lend credence" to the non-moving party's interpretation of the disputed facts. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1775 (2007)). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will not suffice. Rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Hopson v.DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2002).
Solano-Reed's first cause of action is that her contract was not renewed in retaliation for her engaging in protected speech under the First Amendment. Specifically, because she voiced her concerns about the legality of the MME testing protocol at CCAHS, The Leona Group decided to terminate the relationship. In contrast, Defendants assert she was let go based on her poor working performance during the last several months of her employment at CCAHS.
The First Amendment "protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). In order to establish a prima facie case for wrongful termination resulting from retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) [she] was participating in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant's...
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