Soler v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 18 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14cv2470-MMA (RBB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | JAMES SOLER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES
Plaintiff James Soler brought this action asserting civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for false imprisonment, negligence, and violation of California Civil Code section 52.1. See Doc. No. 1. The Court entered judgment in favor of Soler against Defendants Lisa Wilkins and Ray Hobbs ("Wilkins and Hobbs" or "Defendants"). See Doc. No. 223. As the prevailing party, Soler now seeks an award of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Doc. Nos. 241, 242. Defendants filed a response to the motion, see Doc. Nos. 262, 263, Soler replied, see Doc. No. 270, and the Court granted Defendants leave to file a sur-reply, see Doc. No. 275. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Soler's motion and AWARDS Soler $721,118.27 in attorneys' fees and expenses.
This action arises out of events involving a case of mistaken identity and James Soler's arrest in January 2014 for a thirty-year old crime he did not commit. Based on those events, Soler instituted this action on October 16, 2014 against the County of San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, alleging causes of action for wrongful arrest and detention in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, false imprisonment, negligence, and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Doc. No. 1. Soler also brought a legal malpractice claim against the San Diego Office of the Public Defender and attorney Salvatore Tarantino. See id. Several months later, Soler added claims against San Diego Sheriff's Department Deputies Germaine, Medina, Milton, Smith, and Turvey.2 See Doc. No. 39.
As Soler would later discover, Lisa Wilkins was an attorney employed by the Arkansas Department of Corrections and Ray Hobbs was the Director of the Arkansas Department of Corrections during the relevant time period. See Doc. No. 58-1 at 6.3 Wilkins prepared an affidavit for Hobbs' signature to support a judicial finding of probable cause to conclude that Soler was a wanted escapee from an Arkansas prison, Steven Dishman. In turn, Hobbs presented the affidavit to an Arkansas judge, who issued an Affidavit of Probable Cause to support the extradition of "Steven Dishman, a/k/a James DeWolfe Soler" from California to Arkansas. Based on these events, Soler brought claims against Wilkins and Hobbs. See Doc. No. 60.
The Court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Wilkins and Hobbs anddismissed Soler's claims against them. See Doc. Nos. 125, 141. Thereafter, Soler filed suit against Wilkins and Hobbs in the Eastern District of Arkansas. See Docket, E.D. AR. Case No. 4:17-cv-00018-BRW. Meanwhile, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining San Diego defendants. See Doc. Nos. 160, 161.
Soler appealed certain aspects of the Court's rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Doc. No. 162. The Ninth Circuit affirmed entry of summary judgment on Soler's wrongful detention claim in favor of Defendants Smith, Germain, and Turvey. See Soler v. County of San Diego, 762 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2019). The circuit court reversed the entry of judgment on Soler's wrongful detention claim against the County and Defendant Banuelos as well as this Court's determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Wilkins and Hobbs. See id. Post-remand, Wilkins and Hobbs moved to dismiss Soler's claims; the Court denied the motion. See Doc. Nos. 189, 197.
On July 22, 2020, Wilkins and Hobbs made an offer of judgment to Soler under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which Soler accepted, and the Court entered accordingly. See Doc. Nos. 222, 223. The terms of the offer and judgment ordered a payment of $110,000 to Soler and payment of Soler's costs, including attorneys' fees, accrued up to July 22, 2020, to be determined by the Court. See Doc. No. 223. The Clerk of Court taxed costs against Wilkins and Hobbs in the amount of $7,851.09. See Doc. No. 256. Soler moved to retax costs; the Court declined to do so. See Doc. Nos. 259, 278. The only remaining matter for the Court to resolve is the attorneys' fees and nontaxable, out-of-pocket expenses Wilkins and Hobbs owe to Soler.
Soler seeks an award of $1,203,875.00 in fees and requests reimbursement for $7,129.41 in out-of-pocket expenses. Defendants object on multiple grounds, arguing that the amount of fees is unreasonable, with respect to both the requested rates and hours, and many of the expenses are nonrecoverable.
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"Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes a district court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil rights action." Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied and opinion amended, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to section 1988, out-of-pocket expenses that "would normally be charged to a fee paying client" are also recoverable by the prevailing party. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1216 n.7. "A plaintiff prevails for purposes of § 1988 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The parties do not dispute that Soler is a "prevailing party" and thus entitled to a fee award pursuant to section 1988.
"Once a party is found eligible for fees, the district court must then determine what fees are reasonable." Roberts, 938 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 810 F.3d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted)). In order to determine the fee award, the Court calculates the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and then multiplies that number by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); see also Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) () (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). The resulting calculation is referred to as "the lodestar figure" and "provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit "requires that courts reach attorney's fee decisions by considering some or all of twelve relevant criteria set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975)." Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1988). The Kerr factors are: "(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty anddifficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the 'undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases." Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70.
At the first step in its lodestar calculation, the Court must determine a reasonable hourly rate for each attorney and staff member that worked on this case. Here, this includes two attorneys - Todd Burns and Gabriel Cohan - as well as paralegal Alicia Cisneroz (collectively, "counsel"). Soler requests that the Court find the following rates reasonable: (1) a rate of $775 per hour for work performed by Mr. Burns; (2) a rate of $550 per hour for work performed by Mr. Cohan; and (3) a rate of $200 per hour for work performed by Ms. Cisneroz. See Doc. No. 241 at 9-11.
Defendants object to Soler's requested rates, arguing that the rates are unreasonable, inadequately supported, and do not reflect the rates for attorneys with comparable skills and experience in similar cases in this legal community. Defendants argue that the following rates are reasonable: (1) $550 for work performed by Mr. Burns; (2) $300 per hour for work performed by Mr. Cohan; and (3) $90 per hour work performed by Ms. Cisneroz. See Doc. No. 262 at 21-26.
Attorneys' fees awarded under section 1988 must be based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community," Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), for "similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. "The hourly rate for successful civil rights attorneys is to be calculated by considering certain factors, including the novelty and difficulty of theissues, the skill required to try the case, whether or not the fee is contingent, the experience held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases." Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr....
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