Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC

• Decision Date: 25 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-55229,16-55229
• Citation: 893 F.3d 1152
• Parties: Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARBOR PLAZA CENTER, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

893 F.3d 1152

Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.HARBOR PLAZA CENTER, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-55229

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed June 25, 2018

Submitted October 2, 2017^* Pasadena, California

Scottlynn J. Hubbard, Disabled Advocacy Group APLC, Chico, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Susan P. Graber, and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Concurrence by Judge Christen ;

Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In this action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), Plaintiff Martin Vogel timely appeals the district court's award of $600 in attorney's fees following the entry of a default judgment. Defendant Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, originally filed an answer and took other actions but, before trial, failed to appear. The district court eventually struck the answer, entered a default judgment against Defendant, and awarded fees pursuant to a local rule. By eschewing the ordinary considerations that apply when calculating fees in ADA cases, the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the award of fees and remand for reconsideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Martin Vogel is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair when traveling in public. He visited the Harbor Plaza Shopping Center and, in the parking lot, encountered barriers that prevented him from fully enjoying the shopping center.

In June 2014, Plaintiff filed this action against the shopping center's owner, Defendant Harbor Plaza Center, LLC. He alleged violations of state law and the ADA, and he sought declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory damages, and attorney's fees. In July 2014, Defendant, represented by counsel, filed an answer to the complaint. The court scheduled trial for October 2015. In September 2014, Defendant filed a request to substitute counsel, which the court approved. The request was signed by Defendant's initial lawyer, its new lawyer, and its representative (Defendant's vice-president). Defendant and Defendant's lawyer thereafter stopped appearing. In the meantime, Plaintiff dutifully prepared for trial and, pursuant to the district court's scheduling order, filed motions in limine, a witness list, an exhibit list, and a pretrial brief.

At the scheduled pretrial conference, in September 2015, Defendant and its lawyer failed to appear. Plaintiff expressed concern that Defendant was unaware of the proceedings. The court shared that concern and noted that, in 2005, Defendant's lawyer had been convicted of a federal corruption charge. The court continued the pretrial conference and ordered Plaintiff to provide notice to Defendant's lawyer and to Defendant's representative of the now-postponed conference. Plaintiff provided notice, but Defendant and Defendant's lawyer failed to appear at the continuation of the pretrial conference. The court struck Defendant's answer and ordered that Plaintiff "may proceed by way of entry of default and then default judgment."

Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for default, which the court entered. But Plaintiff remained concerned that Defendant was unaware of the proceedings. Instead of filing a motion for default judgment, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for the court to reschedule the pretrial conference and to order Defendant's representative to appear personally. The district court denied the application without explanation. The court later ordered Plaintiff, upon pain of dismissal, to file a motion for default judgment.

Plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment, seeking injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Plaintiff sought $36,671.25 in attorney's fees. In an attached declaration, Plaintiff's lawyer provided the court with a seven-page itemized list of the work that his firm had performed.

The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. The court entered an injunction ordering Defendant to make specific structural changes to the parking lot:

(1) install a handicap and van-accessible parking stall with a width greater than or equal to 132 inches, with (a) appropriate signage; (b) a curb cut offering walkway access to the entrance of Defendant's Shopping Center located at 13011–13129 Harbor Boulevard, Garden Grove, CA 92843; and (c) an adjacent access aisle at least 60 inches wide that is nearly level in all directions to the parking spaces they serve, with a slope no steeper than 2.082%; and (2) ensure that no disabled parking spaces have slopes or cross-slopes exceeding 2.082% due to encroaching build-up curb ramps.

The court awarded Plaintiff statutory damages of $4,000, and it awarded Plaintiff all of his requested costs, $3,590.83.¹

On Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, the district court consulted the Local Rules of Practice in Civil Proceedings before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In particular, Local Rule 55-3, titled "Default Judgment—Schedule of Attorneys' Fees," provides:

When a promissory note, contract or applicable statute provides for the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees, those fees shall be calculated according to the following schedule:

                Amount of Judgment Attorneys' Fees Awards
                $0.01-$1,000          30% with a minimum of
                                      $250.00
                $1,000.01-$10,000     $300 plus 10% of the amount
                                      over $1,000
                $10,000.01-$50,000    $1200 plus 6% of the amount
                                      over $10,000
                $50,000.01-$100,000   $3600 plus 4% of the amount
                                      over $50,000
                Over $100,00          $5600 plus 2% of the amount
                                      over $100,000
                

This schedule shall be applied to the amount of the judgment exclusive of costs. An attorney claiming a fee in excess of this schedule may file a written request at the time of entry of the default judgment to have the attorney's fee fixed by the Court. The Court shall hear the request and render judgment for such fee as the Court may deem reasonable.

Consulting the local rule's formula, the district court calculated fees of $600. The court held that, because it was awarding Plaintiff the full amount of his requested costs, "[t]he Court does not believe ... that further modification of the Local Rule's recommended attorneys' fees award is necessary here. The Court therefore awards Plaintiff $600 in attorneys' fees."

Plaintiff timely appeals, challenging only the district court's calculation of fees. Defendant declined to file a responding brief, and we granted Plaintiff's request that we decide this appeal without oral argument.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's award of attorney's fees under the ADA. Armstrong v. Davis , 318 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2003). But we review de novo questions of law that underlie a court's fee award. Id. at 971. Here, the central legal issue underlying the district court's award of fees is the proper interpretation of Local Rule 55-3. Ordinarily we give great deference to a district court's interpretation of its own local rules. Bias v. Moynihan , 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007). That deference rests on the idea that a court that creates a rule is in the best position to apply it to the circumstances of particular cases. E.g. , Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp. , 868 F.2d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1989). But where, as here, the interpretive question is a purely legal one and the judges of the district court have been inconsistent in their interpretation of the rule, the amount of deference that we owe is diminished. See Jackson v. Beard , 828 F.2d 1077, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that an interpretation of a local rule in a particular case should be given less deference when the interpretation "is at odds with that of any other ... judges of the district").

DISCUSSION

"The general rule in our legal system is that each party must pay its own attorney's fees...." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 550, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (citation omitted). But many federal statutes protecting civil rights, including the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, contain fee-shifting provisions that allow a "prevailing party" to recover "a reasonable attorney's fee." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 550 & n.3, 130 S.Ct. 1662. Despite minor textual differences, we interpret those provisions uniformly. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 601–03, 603 n.4, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ; City of Burlington v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).

The district court correctly held that Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiff is indisputably a "prevailing party," because he has secured an "enforceable judgment[ ] on the merits." Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 603–04, 121 S.Ct. 1835. And we see nothing in the record that would render an award of fees unjust. See Jankey v. Poop Deck , 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." (internal quotation marks omitted) ). The only remaining question is the calculation of a reasonable fee.

"[A] 'reasonable' fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 552, 130 S.Ct. 1662. "[T]he district court must strike a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified counsel to civil rights cases and avoiding a windfall to counsel." Moreno v. City of Sacramento , 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "The way to do so is to compensate counsel at the prevailing rate in the community for similar work; no more, no less." Id. "Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will...